Publication Laka-library:
Shunning Rosatom. Prospects of Russia’s nuclear expansion in the context of widening global sanctions

AuthorEcodefense
2-34-6-50-05.pdf
DateMay 2022
Classification 2.34.6.50/05 (RUSSIA - EXPORT / ROSATOM)
Front

From the publication:

Shunning Rosatom
Prospects of Russia’s nuclear expansion in the context of widening global 
sanctions
Ecodefense, May, 2022

Though a state-owned corporation, the Russian nuclear giant Rosatom, unlike 
numerous Russian entities under state or private control, has not been 
directly hit with sanctions following Russia’s February 24 invasion of 
Ukraine. However, calls to cut ties with the Russian nuclear industry have 
been made in Europe and the U.S., and certain ventures pursued by Rosatom 
outside Russia’s borders have suffered since the start of the war.
Just like the billions Russia is still receiving from selling its gas, oil, 
and coal abroad, the money earned by Rosatom – a conglomerate of some 350 
companies both offering commercial nuclear power products and services and 
overseeing production of nuclear weapons in Russia – eventually helps 
finance Russia’s war machine. And just like the sanctions the West has 
imposed and plans to expand against the Russian gas, oil, and coal imports, 
stopping the Russian nuclear industry from continuing to earn money in 
Europe – even as the Kremlin continues to rain bombs and terror on a 
European country and threatens the world with nuclear annihilation – may 
help stop the brutal and unprovoked aggression Moscow has unleashed.
Certain sanctions, bans, and contract dissolutions will probably hurt 
Rosatom more than others.
Rosatom claims a robust portfolio of foreign reactor orders. In truth, 
however, only a handful of the 35 reactor construction projects it says it 
has in various stages of implementation have seen any development beyond a 
memorandum of understanding or an intergovernmental agreement. More to the 
point, most are in countries that would likely have been unable to carry 
them without the extremely generous financial backing from the Russian state. 
In an era when hydrocarbons and nuclear energy are inexorably fading into 
history, Rosatom’s role is not corporate survival so much as it is that of a
 political tool. Vendor-specific technologies create a dependency for 
vendor-specific fuel and maintenance, and much like it does with gas 
deliveries, the Kremlin may wield this dependency as a weapon of political 
influence.