Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy-Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power

AuteurCongressional Research Service, M.B.Nikitin, A.Andrews, M.Holt
6-03-2-30-09.pdf
Datumfebruari 2011
Classificatie 6.03.2.30/09 (PROLIFERATIE - FUEL BANK / GNEP / GNPI)
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Uit de publicatie:

Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy
Implications of Expanding Global Access to
Nuclear Power

Congressional Research Service
Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator
Analyst in Nonproliferation
Anthony Andrews
Specialist in Energy and Defense Policy
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy
March 2, 2011

Summary
After several decades of widespread stagnation, nuclear power 
is attracting renewed interest. New license applications for 
30 reactors have been announced in the United States, and another 
541 are under construction, planned, or proposed around the world. 
In the United States, interest appears driven, in part, by tax 
credits, loan guarantees, and other incentives in the 2005 Energy 
Policy Act, as well as by concerns about carbon emissions from 
competing fossil fuel technologies.
A major concern about the global expansion of nuclear power is the 
potential spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology—particularly uranium 
enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing—that could be used for nuclear 
weapons. Despite 30 years of effort to limit access to uranium 
enrichment, several undeterred states pursued clandestine nuclear 
programs, the A.Q. Khan black market network’s sales to Iran and North 
Korea representing the most egregious examples. However, concern over 
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies may be offset by 
support for nuclear power as a cleaner and more secure alternative to 
fossil fuels. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have expressed 
optimism that advanced nuclear technologies being developed by the 
Department of Energy may offer proliferation resistance. Both 
Administrations have also pursued international incentives and 
agreements intended to minimize the spread of fuel cycle facilities.
Proposals offering countries access to nuclear power and thus the 
fuel cycle have ranged from requesting formal commitments by these 
countries to forswear sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology, 
to a de facto approach in which states would not operate fuel cycle 
facilities but make no explicit commitments, to no restrictions at all. 
Countries joining the U.S.- led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), 
now the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), 
signed a statement of principles that represented a shift in U.S. policy
 by not requiring participants to forgo domestic fuel cycle programs. 
 Whether developing states will find existing proposals attractive 
 enough to forgo what they see as their “inalienable” right to develop 
 nuclear technology for peaceful purposes remains to be seen.