INES-event
INES 2

IMPACT ON SAFETY DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF A SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGNED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION (CONTAINMENT SAND FILTERS)

The sand filters installed in 1988 to decrease pressure within containment buildings in case of a severe accident were found to have been inoperable for one year.
On Tuesday, 22 August, during tests on Units 1 and 2 of the Tricastin plant, EDF noted the abnormal presence of plugs in the pipes leading to the sand filter shared by the two reactors.
These plugs made the sand filter unavailable. This is a filter which would come into play in the event of a hypothetical serious accident to reduce the pressure in the reactor containment and filter the radioactive products.
The plugs in question had not been removed after the sand filter was installed in 1989; moreover, filters of this type have recently been installed in various other French nuclear power plants as an additional device to enhance safety. Thus, the power plant in question had operated for almost a year with this additional safety device entirely unavailable.
In the course of inspections carried out on all nuclar plants following this discovery, EDF noted that the same anomaly existed in the Chinon Nuclear Production Centre, and also that the pipes leading to the sand filters in Golfech 1, Penly 1 and Cattenom 3 exhibited manufacturing anomalies which could have led to malfunctioning of the sand filter.
EDF decided to set up a commission of enquiry to look into these different anomalies.
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Location: TRICASTIN-1
Event date: Wed, 22-08-1990
Nuclear event report
Legenda & explanation