SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS FOR EACH COUNTRY
In the following table, we first summarize a number of data by country: the number of operating nuclear power reactors, their capacities, the present amount of nuclear waste stored/disposed of, and the future amount to be stored/disposed of.
Table: central data * MT SF = metric tons of spent fuel, no volumes were specified. For Canada, the future amount of other waste is unknown to the authors.
| Country | Reactors | Capacity (Gwe) | Present waste (m3) | Future waste (m3) |
| Belgium | 7 | 5.7 | 13,715 | 70,500 |
| Canada | 21 | 10.0 | 985,000 | ± 79,200 MT SF* |
| France | 55 | 59.0 | 635,816 | 1,006,410 |
| Germany | 19 | 22.0 | 158,800 | 412,000 |
| Spain | 9 | 7.1 | 21,000 + 1,800 MT SF | 200,200 + 6,750 MT SF |
| Sweden | 12 | 10.0 | 27,442 + 2,395 MT SF | 252,000 + 7,380 MT SF |
| Switzerland | 5 | 3.0 | 10,000 | 102,500 |
| U.K. | 35 | 12.8 | 1,060,000 | 3,080,000 |
Summary
Since its founding in 1980, teh NIRAS--Belgium's National
Institute for Radioactive Waste and Enriched Fissile Material-has managed
all teh radioactive waste that has been produced in Belgian territory.
In Mol, an underground laboratory was realised in clay.
When it was set up, it didnot face large public resistance. It is the only
laboratory in teh world with such a size. Extensions are being made in
the PRACLAY (clay disposal) project. With this project, NIRAS has to prove
that an infrastructuture for a geological disposal of vritrified waste
can be built, operated and sealed in a safe way. The NIRAS points out that
there was an absence of public protests towards teh research character
of the project, and states that teh laboratory cannot be converted into
a final disposal unit. The research character is the reason that
Greenpeace did not resist, although Greenpeace considers PRACLAY to be
a step too far and thinks the project is the realisation phase "under the
guise of research". Both Greenpeace and the NIRAS expect that a decision
on storage will indeed lead to protests.
Public discussions about nuclear waste were on low- or inter-mediate-level
waste with short half-life (Category A). In 1994, NIRAS mentioned 98 possible
locations in 47 municipalities. In 1997, an additional 25 military bases,
not anymore in use as such, were added. The proposals led to mass protests.
In all these, the fact that different factors determine whether waste is
Category A waste or not played a role.
After the protests, the government reviewed its policy. The research
is now limited to the existing nuclear zones in Doel, Tihange, Mol, Dessel
and Fleurus, or to municipalities that volunteer. The government will not
conduct a broad consultation with the population.
A new element is the partnership, consisting of local governments,
local organisations, and the local nuclear operators, as well as the NIRAS.
The idea behind this is that the storage can fit in a broader project,
so that the total effect is to be perceived by the local community as positive.
These partnerships still have to be formed.
Conclusions
1. Until now there has never been a discussion about the total nuclear
waste policy, and there is no expectation that it is being planned.
2. The definition of the different categories of waste is unclear and
difficult to explain. This has not supported the gaining of public acceptance.
3. The idea of local partnerships still has to be worked out. In practice
it has to be shown whether the idea is realistic.
Summary
Public review of the concept of the Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd. (AECL) for nuclear waste disposal already started in the late
1980s. An independent panel was set up to examine the criteria for safety
and acceptability and to make a proposal for future steps to be taken by
the government.
Nuclear energy was outside the Panel's mandate and therefore
some environmental groups refused to participate, others only had minor
difficulties with the decision not to discuss nuclear energy. The government
promised to conduct a parallel review of more broad energy issues, but
never realised it, also not after several requests from the Panel. The
review got broad input, with anti-nuclear groups actively participating.
Some provinces, however, did not want to get involved as they refused to
accept a disposal facility in their territory at all.
The Panel concluded that safety is an important, but
only one part, of acceptability, as both safety and acceptability are "relative,
value-laden and subject to different interpretations". Because of the relation
between nuclear waste and future generations, an ethical and social framework
is considered necessary. The Panel concluded that technical safety had
been demonstrated "on balance", but not from a social perspective. Reasons
for this conclusion were: the long-term danger of the waste and the needed
cautious approach; scientific uncertainties in relation to the long-time
frame; and public concern more about possible severe consequences than
about the small probabilities. Concerning acceptability, the Panel concluded
that the AECL's concept did not have the broad public support that is required.
It recognised that the lack of a clear policy on the future of nuclear
energy made it difficult for the public to develop trust. Other reasons
for it were: too little Aboriginal cultural input; no other alternatives
to choose from; and a level of distrust in the AECL.
The Panel further recommended the creation of a Nuclear
Fuel Waste Management Agency (NFWMA) "at arm's length" from the industry
to make "a fresh start" and build trust. In a four-step approach of a)
set-up, b) concept acceptance, c) project acceptance and d) realisation,
the NFWMA should try to solve the issues that were recognised by the Panel
and finally realise a disposal or storage site. This can also be a long-term
aboveground storage when this is what the public prefers.
In its Government of Canada Response to the Panel's final
report, it was announced that the creation and activities of the new agency
is to be executed by the nuclear industry itself, which is contrary to
the Panel's advise to put it "at arm's length" from the industry. It is,
however, in accordance with the 1996 Radioactive Waste Policy Framework,
that prescribed that the nuclear industry is responsible for managing and
organising the nuclear waste problem. The government "expects" that the
new agency will take into account the conclusions and recommendations of
the Panel in the future.
More distrust arose when the government wrote in its
response to the Panel that the steps taken to resolve the waste problem
would support the further use of nuclear energy.
Conclusions
1. An independent panel, with an open mind and no biases,
conclusions, will gain more trust and participation than a government-conducted
review, as government will always take into account the goals it wants
to reach.
2. Although it took as long as 10 years to review a disposal
concept, it had not gained enough public acceptability for the concept
to be realised.
3. The decision not to place the new agency "at arm's
length" of the industry has created a distance to environmental groups
and will certainly not contribute to public trust.
4. The panel concluded that future expectations for nuclear
energy are of influence on public trust for waste management, but the issue
was actually outside the panel's mandate. The government, in its response,
stated that trust in waste management was necessary for the future of nuclear
energy. To connect these two now, where the government had forbidden the
panel from dealing with this relationship, is astonishing.
Summary
France has an extensive nuclear program, which includes
enrichment and reprocessing for foreign customers. Initially, like many
other countries, it considered the option of final deep disposal as a solution
for the high-level long-lived waste problem. Protest against four test
drilling sites, in the late 1980s, forced the government to temporarily
stop those drillings and develop a new policy.
The Nuclear Waste Law of 1991 regulated the new policy.
Research has to concentrate on transmutation, retrievability and long-term
aboveground storage. In the year 2006, an overall assessment is to be discussed
in Parliament, after which a final strategy has to be adopted. For an easier
acceptance of a test site, the government introduced the concept of the
laboratories: No waste can legally be stored in such laboratories. However,
there is always a possibility to adopt a new law that would permit the
conversion of a laboratory into a disposal site.
In 1993, MP Bataille acted as a negotiator to look for
a site in interested departements (in France, a departement is a
prefecture). A total of 30 showed initial interest, but of these, only
10 could meet geological criteria. He finally selected four departements
to continue in the site selection. Others were dropped due to their own
withdrawal or because there was too little departement council support.
In his final report, Bataille emphasized the importance
of guarantees for retrievability and a dialogue. Critics, however, criticized
his mission as not open enough and too short. They feared the conversion
of a laboratory into a repository. They said the population was not consulted
directly and sufficiently as required by law.
After having selected four sites, the process of public
inquiries and council votes started. Here again, opponents considered the
process as not open enough, and more, as an "alibi" to fulfill legal requirements.
Too little possibilities were said to be present to have a real discussion.
The amount of written objections in the Meuse departement reached 6,500.
Council votes varied in the municipal, departemental
or regional outcomes. But all the four departement councils voted in favour
of a laboratory. The possibility to receive financial compensation played
a role in this. Council votes have no real meaning, as these can be overruled
by the national government.
In 1997, a governmental decision on the laboratories
was postponed for a year due to the upcoming elections. During that year,
the National Evaluation Commission (CNE) advised on the issue of retrievability,
and recommended the storage of only transuranic wastes in a deep disposal
and high-level fuel and reprocessing wastes in a subsurface facility for
possible retrieval.
In the December 1998 governmental decision, Gard and
Vienne were dropped as sites because of geological reasons. It followed
CNE's recommendations of the two-way approach for different high-level
wastes.
The site located at the border of the Meuse and Haute-Marne
departements was the only one left at the moment. Because of this, opposition
is now growing. A granite formation site is now being sought in Brittany
and Massif Central mountains. Both laboratories still have to be constructed,
researched and evaluated before Parliament can make decisions in 2006 as
required by law.
Conclusions
1. In Bataille’s mission, the real decisions about cooperation
were actually being made by the departement council and Bataille. Opposition
remained after his mission. Critics said the population was not consulted
directly and sufficiently as required by law. So it cannot be said that
a departement council, unanimously or almost unanimously in favour of a
laboratory, gives a realistic reflection of the public's opinion within
the departement itself.
2. The amount of written objections indicates a lack
of public acceptance for a laboratory in Meuse/Haute-Marne. A lack of time
as the date of 2006 nears might be among other reasons that no real acceptance
has been obtained in the inquiry.
3. The presence of a Green minister in the cabinet could
eventually lead to more political problems and delays in further decision-making,
either by her standpoint on nuclear energy or because of the possibility
of resignation due to pressure from within her party.
4. It will be next to impossible to find a second laboratory
site, consult the population, construct the laboratory, and research and
evaluate it all before 2006. This can already be a concern for the Meuse/Haute-Marne
site as construction still has to begin. It is doubted whether thorough
conclusions on the safety of the sites can be made before 2006.
Summary
In February 1977, Gorleben was chosen as a possible site
for nuclear waste disposal and as a location for a reprocessing plant.
How did this come about? In 1973, the search for a suitable disposal site
began. Twenty-four salt domes in the state of Niedersachsen were checked
on a number of criteria. These criteria were published in 1977 when Gorleben
had already been selected. These were general criteria, like a sufficient
volume of the salt dome, homogeneity of the salt, the top of the salt dome
should be at least 200 metres below ground level, etc.
On the basis of these criteria, the salt domes at Wahn,
Lichtenhorst and Weesen-Lutterloh were selected. Gorleben was not part
of this selection because of its position near the border of the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR). But in February 1977, Gorleben was decided
upon. The then prime minister of Niedersachsen, E. Albrecht (CDU), brought
up two political arguments:
--the region of Lüchow-Dannenberg where Gorleben
is situated as an economically weak area;
--the expected public support.
This public support, however, proved to be non-existent.
On 12 March 1977, a protest rally was held with 100,000 participants. This
was the first of a long series of protest actions and discussions.
The doubts about Gorleben had an effect on the coalition
agreement between the SPD and the Green Party of the Schröder government
on 20 October 1998. In this coalition agreement, the government announced
it wanted the research at Gorleben to be terminated because of the existing
doubts about this salt dome, and that other locations should be looked
into. A selection should then be made on the basis of a comparison of various
locations. In July 1999, this policy was not executed yet, the research
in Gorleben was not halted yet as well.
The term consensus talks is an invitation to study precisely
how agreement can be reached, the more so as the storage of nuclear waste--besides
nuclear energy--played an important role. Further study, however, shows
that a clear description of the goal of the consensus talks is lacking.
The first discussion rounds concerned the consensus between political parties.
At that, it was not made clear whether consensus between a number of Parliament
representing parties would be sufficient to speak about public acceptance.
The consensus talks of the present government are between
the governmental parties and the electric utilities. Implicitly, this means
another definition of consensus. It also appeared that the government did
not want to have an open mind, but as a precondition, aimed for an immediate
ban on reprocessing. In February 1999, a difference of opinion arose on
the remaining life span of the nuclear power reactors. The government assumed
30 to 35 years. The electric utilities reckoned with a 40- year life span
at full workload; since a nuclear power station on average reaches an 80%
workload, the real life span would be 50 years, resulting in the first
nuclear power station being closed down after 2020. In June, a difference
arose between the government parties themselves on the remaining life span.
Minister Müller wanted a total life span to be pegged at 35 years,
but the Greens did not agree and wanted at least one nuclear power reactor
to be closed within the present governing period. The SPD and Greens, however,
agreed to try to reach an agreement before 30 September.
Conclusions
1. The discussion about the disposal at Gorleben was
tough from the beginning. This was mainly the result of a lack of openness
in decision-making. The criteria for the selection of Gorleben were not
made public. Afterwards, criteria were mentioned, but it was not clear
why Gorleben was the only one that would fit these criteria. For the people,
this resulted in the idea that the criteria had been adjusted to the findings
of research in the salt dome of Gorleben. Briefly stated, an unclear decision-making.
2. The consensus talks at a political level have reached
little, apart from a lot of media attention. This was caused by the fact
that the government had no clear idea on what issues consensus should be
reached. The government parties appeared to be divided among themselves
and the electric utilities disagreed with the government.
Summary
As in other countries, plans for an underground storage
or research program has faced public opposition in Spain. Siting work by
ENRESA--Spain's National Authority for Radioactive Waste SA--stopped in
1996 after this opposition. Although research continues with already known
geological data, no site drillings are to take place before 2010. By that
year the Senate has to decide on a final disposal strategy.
Government licensed the building of a spent-fuel storage
facility at the Trillo nuclear power plant. Environmental groups fear that
this storage might become a national storage facility.
An inquiry commission was set up to give guidelines in
the development of a new policy that could overcome public opposition.
But after having written a draft report, the final outcome was unsuccessful.
The report was not adopted in the Senate due to what appears to be political
reasons.
Conclusions
1. As it remains unclear what the exact reasons were
to reject the report, it looks more that the waste issue is so controversial
that political parties have difficulties in dealing with it.
2. The realisation of an interim storage at Trillo, firstly
meant for the station itself but with a possibility of expansion, can result
in decisions being easily postponed in the future.
3. The political hesitations and the practice of postponing
has not brought and will not bring an acceptable solution any closer.
Summary
Sweden has 12 nuclear power reactors and has a policy
of a nuclear phaseout, although there are no deadlines. Low- and intermediate-level
wastes from the nuclear program are stored at the final disposal site,
the Central Final Repository (SFR) in Forsmark, located below the bottom
of the Baltic Sea. High-level waste, spent fuel, is stored at the interim
near-surface Central Interim Storage Facility (CLAB) in Oskarshamn.
The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company
(SKB), responsible for waste management, developed the KBS-3 concept for
the final disposal of spent fuel in an underground repository. First construction
work for a repository should start around 2010 and should include a limited
possibility of retrievability. Only after the first five-year demonstration
period can the canisters be retrieved.
After the earlier failure to find a suitable site, SKB
introduced the concept of voluntariness. It invited municipalities to show
interest in conducting a feasibility study. SKB wanted to conduct at least
five feasibility studies, after which it will select two sites for test
drillings, to start from 2002. Around 2010, an underground repository should
be constructed at one site. Up until now, eight municipalities have shown
interest, either by volunteering themselves or after an invitation from
SKB. In two of these sites, Malå and Storuman, referendums were held
and both voted against the plans. Now, feasibility studies have been completed
or are underway at six other sites (Nyköpping, Östhammar, Oskarshamn,
Tierp, Hultsfred and Älvkarleby), all of them having nuclear activities
in their own municipality or in a neighbouring municipality. Possibly,
Nynäshamn will be a candidate soon as well. All of these still have
the opportunity to withdraw. Environmental groups have warned that the
system of volunteering has the risk that not the safest site is selected,
but one where there is an overall acceptance from a social point of view.
In 1996, a National Co-ordinator for Nuclear Waste Disposal
was appointed to co-ordinate the information flow between the different
authorities and municipalities. Apart from being an information source
for interested municipalities, he set up a National Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) Forum. This forum, which does not include representatives
from environmental organisations, should discuss the contents of the EIA
that is necessary for constructing the underground repository.
Conclusions
1. Retrievability (still) plays a minor role in the KBS-3
concept as it is only guaranteed for five years. It might be more difficult
to gain public acceptance for the KBS-3 concept as environmental groups
and the public often emphasize the importance of controllability and accessibility.
2. Environmental groups have criticized the idea of voluntariness.
And indeed it can be questioned whether the safest site is found in the
underground of a "nuclear municipality" or some other volunteer. Another
risk is the hurry with which SKB wants to proceed.
3. The exclusion of environmental groups, upon the behest
of the concerned municipalities, in the National EIA Forum can later lead
to new conflicts, when the EIA procedure really starts.
Summary
In 1972, the federal government and the operators of
nuclear power reactors founded the Nagra--the National Company for the
Storage of Radioactive Waste--in which the operators have a share of 95%.
In 1978, the Nagra started by choosing locations for
low- and intermediate-level wastes. In 1981, Nagra chose 20 from a list
of initially 100 locations to conduct further research. Evaluation of these
locations gave three preferred locations: Bois de la Glaive, Oberbauenstock
and Piz Pian Grand. In 1987, the Nagra added to the list the location Wellenberg
near the municipality of Wolfenschiessen in the canton Nidwalden. Wellenberg
was not on the initial list of 100 locations. Niederbauern, which is close
to Wellenberg, was on the list.
The research at the different locations faced resistance
and could sometimes begin only after a lot of delays. This resulted in
the fact that the Nagra only choose Wellenberg as number one, and this
was as late as 1993.
The storage plan was rejected in a referendum. If the
storage would have been controllable and retrievable, the majority might
probably have voted in favour.
The continuation of nuclear energy was a big obstacle
to reaching consensus among different parties on the issue of management
and storage of nuclear waste. Although the use of nuclear energy was not
included in the mandate of the working group "Energie-Dialog Entsorgung"
(Energy-Dialogue Disposal), the working group could not avoid this issue
and it was put on the agenda. No consensus could be reached and this had
an effect on all the discussions.
On the question of giving content to the responsibilities
for future generations, the points of view also differed. From this responsibility,
the operators and the Nagra choose for final disposal. The environmental
organisations stated that retrievable and controllable storage gives the
best options of handling to future generations. These organisations want
this storage method to be worked out further.
Conclusions
1. The Nagra choose the location Wellenberg for the storage
of low- and intermediate-level waste. Wellenberg was not on the initial
list of 100 locations. It is remarkable that a choice was made for a location
that was initially not considered.
2. The Nagra sticks to Wellenberg, regardless of the
outcome of the referendum. With a new storage concept, that includes elements
of retrievability, the politicians are trying to hold a new referendum.
The politically different opinions will not be solved with this. A new
referendum on Wellenberg will increase the present conflict.
3. The discussion about storage of nuclear waste in Switzerland
is overshadowed by disagreements about the future of nuclear energy. Discussions
about nuclear waste are difficult without clearness on the future of nuclear
energy.
Summary
The United Kingdom has an extensive nuclear energy program
that started in the 1950s. It includes enrichment, fuel fabrication and
reprocessing. There are no plans for building new nuclear power reactors.
Since the 1970s, studies have been conducted on the possibility
to realise a deep disposal site. The test drillings that were undertaken
faced opposition. Apart from some drillings to high level waste disposal,
most of the attention was given to finding a site for low-level and/or
intermediate-level waste disposal. In the late 1980s, Nirex (Nuclear Industry
Radioactive Waste Management Executive) had, from a (not public) list of
500, selected 11 sites. Later, Sellafield was added with the idea that
a "nuclear culture" might lead to an easier acceptance. Data on how Sellafield
was considered to be suitable for a Rock Characterization Facility (RCF),
an underground laboratory, were kept secret and local communities were
not informed about the selection process.
In March 1997, the plans for the RCF at Sellafield were
rejected by the Secretary of State of the Environment. The effects of the
aboveground works and the uncertainties from a geological and hydrological
perspective were too high. It was also doubted whether the RCF itself would
have negatively influenced the safety of a repository.
With no prospects of a disposal site, the UK needed a
change of its waste policy. A House of Lords Committee started an inquiry
as a first step. The inquiry was more directed to high-level waste. The
House of Lords concluded that one or more underground repositories were
necessary within the next 50 years. Environmental organisations protested
that there was no discussion possible about a long-term aboveground storage.
They consider the 50-year goal too hasty since a 1995 White Paper, a parliament
policy paper, earlier had spoken about "no fixed deadlines".
The Lords Committee concluded that the earlier strategy
of decide-announce-defend had failed and that public acceptance is necessary
to realise plans, but that it would be difficult to achieve. In order to
ease that process, it proposed offering compensation for a hosting community.
Environmental groups considered this as a too-much-goal-driven process
with the use of compensation to "buy" acceptance.
The Lords Committee recommended the creation of two new
bodies. The first would be known as the Nuclear Waste Management Commission
(NWMC) to oversee national policy. As a first task, it should conduct consultations
on the Green Paper on waste policy, to be expected at the end of 1999.
Environmental organsations, however, think the NWMC itself should be subject
of the consultations.
A second body, the Radioactive Waste Disposal Company
(RWDC), should be responsible for site selection and construction. The
Lords Committee mentioned the possibility of voluntariness. But this voluntariness
has the limitation that once a community has agreed, it can no longer withdraw,
according to the Lords' proposal. According to the Lords Committee, a site-specific
inquiry should be limited to site-relevant issues, as broader aspects would
have been part of the Green Paper consultation.
A second event in the process of restructuring government's
policy was the Consensus Conference in May 1999. A randomly selected Citizen's
Panel had to study literature and hear witnesses to form an opinion on
nuclear waste policy. In a two-day session, hearings with 32 witness were
held. It was perceived that there was an imbalance between pro- and anti-nuclear
witnesses and visitors.
The panel rejected the idea of deep disposal because
of the risks of leakages. Secondly, it concluded that the waste MUST remain
accessible and monitorable, and thus retrievable. Because of the risks
of human intervention and climate change, a storage should be placed below
the earth's surface.
Much attention was given to the technology of transmutation,
and the panel was strongly convinced that in future this would be feasible.
Transmutation played an important role in the panel's motivation to keep
the waste accessible in a near-surface storage as an "interim solution".
Although the outcome of the Consensus Conference is not
binding, it is said that such conferences are of influence on policy making.
Responsible Minister Meacher of Environment expressed his reservations
about subsurface storage due to the longevity of some wastes. Nirex used
the words "retrievable deep disposal" as another possibility.
Conclusions
1. The secrecy about the list of 500 and the criteria
upon which Sellafield was chosen did not contribute to public confidence,
and is still of influence on the public's trust.
2. On the basis of the negative outcome of the question
whether Sellafield would be safe, it can be concluded that it was wrong
to add Sellafield, on "nuclear culture" grounds, to the list of 11 sites
that were derived from comparing geological information.
3. If the government will adopt the Lords Committee conclusion
to proceed with constructing a deep disposal within 50 years, new conflicts
with environmental organisations can be expected.
4. The Lords Committee mentioned the possibility of voluntariness,
but once a municipality has shown interest, it can no longer withdraw,
according to the proposal. This will not attract communities to volunteer.
5. The Lords' proposal to limit site-specific inquiries
to only site-specific issues, as broad issues are discussed in the Green
Paper consultation, can lead to conflicts.
6. Concerning the Consensus Conference, it can be asked
whether a randomly selected panel of just 15 other individuals would have
come to the same conclusions.
7. The panel’s favour for a near-surface storage was
not worked out, i.e., at what depth and how to realise it from a technical
perspective. Therefore it looks as if the panel tried to combine the idea
of supposed isolation at great depth and easy retrievability of an aboveground
storage.
8. Transmutation played an important role in the panel's
choices, but the real technical feasibility and problems were not discussed
profoundly.
9. It is doubtful if the government will take over the
favoured near-surface storage. It is possible that retrievable deep disposal
will be the concept to be introduced, instead of working out for the UK
the new concept of near-surface storage.
POINTS FOR ATTENTION DERIVED FROM A COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY COMPARISON
We have compared the information presented in the country reports in the light of a number of themes, and have come to eight points for attention.
A. Relation with general discussion about nuclear energy
In the UK, a Consensus Conference was organised about
nuclear waste, where the Citizen's Panel recommended that there be no increase
in the nuclear energy capacity. In Germany, Environmental Minister Jürgen
Trittin mentioned the end of nuclear energy as a condition for public acceptance
for a solution of the nuclear waste problem. In Switzerland, disagreements
about the use of nuclear energy was such an important obstacle that the
dialogue about storage of nuclear waste among different public groups did
not lead to a consensus of opinion. In Canada, nuclear energy also played
a role in the nuclear waste discussion. The independent panel on nuclear
waste recommended, upon the demand of participants, that there be more
public discussion on nuclear energy. The government, however, refused to
set up such a discussion. For many groups, this government position was
no obstruction for participation. Although the government failed to organise
the desired discussion about nuclear energy, the government itself did
connect nuclear waste and nuclear energy. In its response to the panel's
report, the government stated that working on a disposal site for nuclear
waste is of importance for the building of new nuclear power reactors.
Environmental organisations in many countries state that
ending nuclear energy, either immediately or within the foreseeable future,
is a necessary condition for a discussion about how to handle the nuclear
waste that was inevitably produced.
Point for attention A: Nuclear energy is an important
source of nuclear waste. Therefore, it is obvious that the issue of nuclear
energy will play a role in each discussion about the storage of nuclear
waste.
B. Retain to a once announced storage location (decide,
announce, defend)
Up to the present, we find the traditional decision-making
method of "decide, announce and defend" in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Switzerland
and the UK. An example of it is the plan for disposal in the salt dome
in Gorleben. The salt dome was selected in 1977, the decision was consequently
announced, and the decision was defended afterwards. From the very beginning,
this gave rise to differences of opinion that carried over into the coalition
agreement of the present government for a moratorium on research at Gorleben.
The criteria for selecting Gorleben had not been published but criteria
had been established which Gorleben could fulfill. That fits in with the
concept of defending a decision once it is taken.
The mentioned traditional decision-making method was
also used in Belgium (a list of 98 locations followed by a list of 25 military
locations). As a reaction to the massive protests, the lists of locations
were withdrawn and a new procedure was developed.
In the UK, the location of Sellafield was just added
to an earlier list of potential locations and chosen as the future research
location. In a similar way, in Switzerland a potential location was selected
and proposed as disposal site.
The plan to study 30 regions in Spain for the disposal
of nuclear waste faced so much resistance that the Senate decided to set
up an inquiry commission. That commission had to develop a procedure that
would be acceptable. It resulted in so much political conflict of opinion
that the commission was dissolved before a final report was ready.
Contrary to the abovementioned examples, where locations
had been decided upon, announced and defended afterwards, many countries
are looking for another strategy to finding a location. The French MP Bataille
succeeded in a mediation mission to find four departements where the councils
agreed to look for a location on its territory for an underground laboratory.
In Sweden, after earlier protests against test drillings, the choice was
made in a voluntary approach. Until now, this has led to eight interested
municipalities. In Canada, the procedure has been independent of any concrete
location.
Point for attention B: The traditional policy
of announcing locations for nuclear waste storage and the consequent defence
of these did not result in public acceptance. Therefore, a move towards
other approaches can be observed in many countries. However, any change
of policy should not be welcomed as a postponement for difficult decisions.
C. Strive for consensus
The German government chose for consensus talks as a
way out. That might look like an attractive idea. But it appears that there
exists no clear vision on who, with whom and in which way consensus shall
be reached about what issues. The recent consensus talks are at present
in an impasse. The discussion in Canada under the supervision of an independent
panel was indeed well organised and well considered. This discussion did
lead to results. It was a discussion independent from a location, where
no location was chosen and possibilities existed for alternative concepts
like aboveground storage. A Consensus Conference in the UK with a clearly
described procedure also led to results. Switzerland is a country that
is dedicated to consensus. However, it was not able to reach consensus
on the storage of nuclear waste because of the different opinions that
existed about nuclear energy.
Point for attention C: Attempts to reach consensus
on nuclear waste are only useful if, in advance, it has an open mind and
has no biases. A discussion independent of locations, where minds are still
open, gives more prospects for results.
D. To store nuclear waste at existing nuclear locations
The procedure in Belgium has now been limited to existing
nuclear facility locations. The idea behind this is that public acceptance
can be found at the existing nuclear locations because one is used to nuclear
energy. The same approach has also been used in Sweden, where the municipalities
of nuclear locations applied for feasibility studies. In the UK, Sellafield
was selected as a potential location. This limitation to nuclear locations
can raise a certain level of distrust. It is questioned whether exactly
below the existing nuclear installation is coincidentally where the most
suitable disposal site can be found. For Sellafield, indeed, it appears
that this location was unsuitable.
Point for attention D: The limitation of possible
locations to existing nuclear installations can give the impression that
potential public acceptance for a disposal site prevails over safety issues.
E. Voluntariness and compensation
The local population in a Belgian community rejected
in a referendum the voluntary application of a municipal council. Then
Belgium chose the procedure of a local partnership at existing nuclear
locations. Forms have to be given for this. It is yet unclear whether this
partnership will be established. Some nuclear locations do not want a partnership.
Partnership means that next to a nuclear waste storage, another project
should be realised for the local population, so that the overall effect
is considered as positive. The partnership is directed towards the provision
of an advantage for the current generation.
The UK investigated the possibility of voluntariness
and compensation. The proposal of a House of Lords committee is that once
volunteered, a municipality can no longer withdraw in the future.
In France, the protests against the announced disposal
of nuclear waste reached such a level that the government decided to switch
to a new procedure. Three locations had been found for the construction
of an underground laboratory. Volunteer departements were found and the
departement councils agreed. The possibility to receive financial compensation
was a factor that played a role in this. One location remains--Bure in
Meuse. Despite the financial compensation offered, the protests are growing:
a majority in the departement council may agree, it can be questioned strongly
if this also applies to the people of the departement itself.
Point for attention E: In the countries we studied,
nowhere was there a disposal site for nuclear waste duly agreed upon that
was based on a voluntary basis. The instrument of financial compensation
did not create sufficient public acceptance among the people.
F. Retrievability
In several countries, for instance in France, Sweden,
Switzerland and recently the UK, retrievability played an increasingly
growing role. In Switzerland, retrievability seemed to give prospects in
a referendum for agreement on a disposal site. Further analysis, however,
showed that in Switzerland it concerned a not-thoroughly-elaborated concept
that required further study.
Sweden only took into account a limited period of retrievability
during the demonstration phase of five years. In the UK, the House of Lords
committee recommended retrievability without giving specifications. France
assumes that a retrievable storage of high-level wastes--aboveground or
near the surface--is for at least tens of years. French law only allows
for licenses for retrievable storage, but new laws can be made for unlimited
periods. Canada's policy is that this generation has to construct a disposal
site where future generations can make decisions about its closure.
Point for attention F: Retrievable storage is
mentioned in more and more countries, but the concept is insufficiently
thought out and worked out. Sometimes it is unclear whether retrievability
has the aim to validate calculation models, the possibility to re-use materials,
or to meet a public wish to control a storage and make repairs possible
and so the realisation of public acceptance.
G. Guidance by an independent panel
The discussion in Canada had been guided by a commission
independent of the interests of the nuclear industry and environmental
organisations. That gained enough trust that many groups wanted to participate.
Canada was the only country which succeeded in organising a discussion
with such dimensions. However, the government handed over to the nuclear
industry the next phase. This directly led to protests from environmental
organisations.
The Consensus Conference in the UK also had been guided
by an independent Citizen's Panel. For this case, however, it had been
a one-off meeting. We see that the House of Lords' is proposing the establishment
of a new commission NWMC that should oversee the UK's new policy on nuclear
waste. Environmental groups attach much value to the independence of such
a commission.
Point for attention G: Actually, it was only in
Canada that we observed a discussion guided by an independent panel which
held hearings for a long period of time. Though we derive the conclusion
that the guidance of a discussion by an independent commission is a qualitative
requirement and of great importance to gain the trust and participation
of the population.
H. Organising a referendum
In Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland, referendums were
held for the establishment of a storage for nuclear waste. With this, the
people were consulted and asked for their opinion. In all cases, the proposals
for a storage site were rejected.
Point for attention H: In the countries that we
studied, local or regional referendums led to the rejection of a proposed
storage.