4. FRANCE
 
KEY FACTS
Nuclear Power: 55 nuclear power reactors; 59.0 Gwe; 77% Gen. Cap.; 1994 – EdF decided not to order new capacity before 2000.
Waste (present): short-lived L/ILW – 526,000 m3 disposed at La Manche (1969-1994) and 82,000 m3 at l'Aube (1994- ); Category B from reprocessing - 16,316 m 3; HLW – 1,500 m 3 stored spent fuel at reprocessing plants; Total: 635,816 m3.
Waste (future, cumulative): L/ILW – 952,000 m3; Category B - 49,390 m 3; HLW (C) - 5,020 m3; Total: 1,006,410 m3.
Waste authorities: Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs (ANDRA), research and waste management; Commission National d'Évaluation (CNE), advisory commission.
Retrievability: 1991 Law only allows for disposal for limited periods, future law should provide for unlimited periods.
Dialogues (among others): Bataille mission to find hosting departements, critic on public input; public inquiries in four departements, considered not open enough and "alibi" function; Meuse/Haute-Marne site only one left, consultation to find second site to be started.
Key issues: population not sufficiently consulted; amount of objections indicate too little acceptance; Green minister in cabinet can lead to more delays; legal deadline of 2006 will not be met?

Introduction
France is a country with an extensive nuclear energy program, including all steps of the nuclear cycle. For its high-level long-lived waste, it is searching for an underground disposal site. After resistance against test drillings in the late 1980s, waste policy was changed with the introduction of a new law and the main goal was now the construction of an underground research laboratory as a first step. The search for a potential site is the main theme of this chapter. It will concentrate on the Meuse/Haute-Marne site, the only candidate site available at the moment.
Information for this chapter was received through the ANDRA, the "Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs" (National Agency for the Management of Radioactive Wastes), an interview with representatives of the "Collectif Meuse contre l'enfouissement des déchets nucléaires" (CDR 55, Collective Meuse against Nuclear Waste Burial), and from other sources, mainly English articles from the magazines Nuclear Fuel and Nucleonics Week. Comments on a draft text were received from ANDRA, by Isabelle Forest, Thomas Busuttil and Armand Aboaf, director of the International Division. From the environmental groups, comments were received from Jean Franville and John Neelsen of CDR 55 and from Jean-Yvon Landrac, charged with international contacts for "Réseau Sortir du nucléaire".
 

1. NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

The French nuclear program started in the 1940s in order to create a nuclear weapons capability, and its first reactors were built for weapons plutonium production. The nuclear industry developed significantly during the 1950s when plans were made for domestic, commercial, nuclear power stations. First, nine gas-cooled graphite reactors were built. In the 1970s, the French adopted the US light-water technology. In 1994, Électricité de France (EdF) announced that it will not order any new nuclear power plants before the end of the century due to the oversized generating system[1]. As of February 1999, 55 nuclear power reactors were in operation in France, all pressurized-water reactors except for one[2]. Three more reactors, at Chooz and Civaux, went critical but are not yet in commercial operation[3]. About 77% of France's electricity production comes from nuclear power, whereas 15% of the generated electricity is exported[4]. Total generating capacity is 59 Gwe.[5] In the past, 12 nuclear power reactors had been shut down permanently[6].

Founded in 1976, Cogema (Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires) is a state-owned company. It is one of the world's main suppliers of uranium, and the only company that offers every single stage of the nuclear fuel process. Mining is one of its major activities and it has uranium mines all around the world. Cogema also offers fuel reprocessing in its reprocessing plants in La Hague and Marcoule and operates the enrichment plant in Pierrelatte. The nearby enrichment plant of Tricastin is larger and is operated by Eurodif, in which Cogema has the majority share[7].
In the past, more than 200 uranium mines were in operation in France, also for weapons production, and covered up to 57% of domestic use. Due to the discoveries of gigantic uranium deposits in Canada and Australia, the French uranium mines were closed[8].
 

2. PRODUCERS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

There are three main producers of nuclear waste in France. EdF operates the nuclear power plants, where operational waste and spent fuel arises. The spent fuel from power reactors is, after a cooling period, transported to La Hague for reprocessing. The second producer is the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA), which is responsible for nuclear reactor and fuel research, and for the military nuclear program. Cogema operates fuel and reprocessing plants[9].
 

3. CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Within the first Category A, which is low-level waste with little activity or short lifetime, a subdivision is made for waste with short half-life (<30 years) and long half-life (>30 years).
Type B wastes contain higher activity levels or certain specific radionuclides and mostly are reprocessing wastes that are not heat-generating, and contain transuranic elements. Type C wastes is the vitrified reprocessing waste or spent fuel[10].
 

4. AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

4.1 Present amounts
Short-lived low- and medium-level waste is disposed of at the surface disposal facility at Aube. Most of this waste comes from power plants (44%) and reprocessing (32%). Only 2.2% comes from non-nuclear sources, like hospitals or universities. A yearly "income" of about 13,700 m3 is foreseen. In Aube, 82,000 m3 have been disposed of. Earlier, the La Manche surface disposal was used for this purpose. A total of 526,000 m3 had been disposed of in La Manche[11]. Category B waste, at the reprocessing plants La Hague and Marcoule, had a volume of at least 16,316 m3[12].
Till the end of 1994 an amount of 1,500 m3 of Category C have been stored, mainly in the form of spent fuel[13]. Mining wastes, which are stored at 15 sites, total 45 million MT[14].

4.2 Future amounts
Until 2020 a cumulative amount of 952,000 m3 low- and intermediate-level waste is foreseen (including presently disposed volume), that is to be disposed of at a surface disposal facility[15].
Assuming that France will continue with reprocessing, until 2020, a cumulative amount of 5,020 m3 of vitrified waste (Category C) are expected for disposal. For Category B, it will be 49,390 m3 until 2020. For all categories the total amount of waste to be stored or disposed of is 1,006,410 m3. Due to the future dismantling of nuclear installations, an amount of 1.6 million tons of low-level waste will be produced[16].
 

5. WHERE IS IT STORED?

In 1969, the La Manche disposal site was opened near the La Hague reprocessing plant. Till 1994 waste was received and disposed of. The site is now covered and is to be in a surveillance period for 300 years[17]. The final sealing of the site was criticized because of measured tritium and plutonium leakages in its surroundings[18].
Till 1996 an amount of 82,000 m3 low-level waste had been disposed of at the Aube disposal site. This site was opened in 1992 and has a capacity of 1 million m3. Medium-level, long-lived wastes are stored at the production sites, because there is no central disposal or storage site for it. High-level reprocessing waste is vitrified and stored at the two reprocessing plants[19]. A total capacity of 3,850 m3 is available[20].
 

6. RESPONSIBILITIES

ANDRA was founded in 1979 as part of the CEA. In 1991, with the adoption of a Nuclear Waste Act, it became a "public, industrial and commercial establishment", independent from waste generators. ANDRA has three main missions, laid down in the Nuclear Waste Act: to manage nuclear waste, to research deep disposal and to make an inventory of all French wastes.
The Directorate for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (DSIN) is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear issues. It operates under the Ministries of Industry and Environment. It is advised by the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety at the CEA. Supervisor of radioactivity releases and radiation levels around nuclear installations is the Office for Protection against Ionizing Radiation (OPRI), under the Ministry of Health[21].
In 1991, the National Evaluation Commission (Commission Nationale d'Évaluation or CNE) was established by the Nuclear Waste Act. Its task is to review yearly the progress of three research objectives: partitioning and transmutation of actinides, geological disposal, and long-term storage of high-level wastes[22].
 

7. THE SITING OF UNDERGROUND LABORATORIES

7.1 History
On 9 February 1990, Prime Minister Rocard announced a moratorium, at least for 12 months, on test drillings that were undertaken at four potential laboratory sites. He took this decision after having had a meeting with politicians and local opponents from the Maine-et-Loire departement (French for prefecture)[23], where a candidate site was located in Serge/Bourg d'Ire. Also in the three other candidate sites, public protests arose against the plans. After the beginning of the tests under police protection and a demonstration with 15,000 participants in January, ANDRA decided to stop drilling. At that time, selection of one site for a laboratory as early as 1991 was still expected.
Also at that time, four potential sites were identified by ANDRA: Segre/Bourg d'Ire (Main-et-Loire), St. Julien-sur-Reyssouze (Ain), Neuvy-Bouin (Deux-Sèvres) and Montcornet-Sissonnes in the departement of Aisne. It was impossible for ANDRA to start up a dialogue in the first three departements, as people simply refused to talk with ANDRA. In the Aisne departement, however, local officials cooperated in ANDRA's work and test drillings took place[24].
Rocard asked a specially created advisory body, the College for the Prevention of Risks, how to proceed with its waste policy. This body advised the government to resume work at the four sites as quickly as possible to prevent a further fall-back in the international waste scene[25]. Studies were also conducted by the Parliamentary Office for the Assessment of Science and Technology Options and by the Ministry of Industry[26].
The Parliamentary Office released its report in December 1990. Its rapporteur, Christian Bataille, MP for the Socialist Party, announced that a new search round would start with 28[27] potential candidate sites. He recommended the creation of at least two underground laboratories, in which no nuclear waste would be disposed of. ANDRA's work should be more independent, and for that reason the organisation should be removed from under the CEA. According to the report, research on actinide separation and transmutation had to increase to reduce nuclear waste's toxicity. To implement all the recommendations, Bataille suggested the creation of a special law on nuclear waste policy. In his opinion, ANDRA should drop two of the earlier candidate sites (Maine-et-Loire and Deux-Sèvres) because of "the antagonism previous ANDRA work has created there"[28]. According to Bataille, the earlier years were characterized by secrecy and "the 1990s must mark the end of the cult of secrecy in nuclear affairs. [] The future of nuclear energy in our country depends on our capacity to develop democracy"[29].

7.2 The Nuclear Waste Law of 1991
On 30 December 1991, the proposed new law was adopted, officially called the "Law No. 91-1381 of 30 December 1991, on Radioactive Waste Management Research". It deals with the management of long-lived, high-level wastes and sets out the governmental policy for the next 15 years, till 2006. In that year, the government has to present an overall assessment of research and a new draft law on future waste management, to be adopted by the Parliament.
The law has a three-way approach to waste management: research on partitioning and transmutation; evaluation of retrievable versus non-retrievable options for disposal in the deep underground; and studies on conditioning of waste and long-term aboveground storage.
The law is meant as a legal instrument for the creation of underground research laboratories, where studies will be conducted in potential host formations, at least at two locations. It clearly prohibits the actual storage of nuclear waste in these laboratories. For this, a new law has to be adopted after 2006. Each laboratory would cost more than FF 1.5 billion (Dfl 0.5 billion). A real repository would cost more than FF 10 billion (Dfl 3.3 billion).
On the subject of public involvement, the law states in Article 6: "Locally elected officials and the population of the affected site shall be involved [in French, the word "concertation" is used] pursuant to the provisions of a relevant decree before any preliminary site investigation for a proposed underground laboratory shall begin".

For the next phase of constructing a laboratory, a license is needed, to be granted by the Conseil d'État (Council of State). Article 8 regulates public involvement for such a license "pursuant to an environmental impact assessment and the opinions of the affected municipal, general and regional councils, and following a public hearing [enquête publique]".
For communities interested in hosting a laboratory, and those within a circle of 10 kilometers, the law mentions the possibility for financial compensation to "benefit and facilitate the construction and operation of each laboratory". A yearly amount of FF 60 million (Dfl 20 million) would be available for a hosting community.
In each hosting community a Local Information and Oversight Committee should be created with, among others, members of government, officials from local communities, laboratory representatives and environmental protection organisations. The committee should meet at least two times a year and evaluate the research going on.
Concerning the storage of foreign nuclear waste on French territory, the law prohibits the disposal of these wastes in France and also states that temporary storage of foreign reprocessing wastes shall not exceed the time necessary for it (to cool down).
For the future underground disposal of nuclear waste, the law laid down that only licenses may be given for limited periods of storage. In that, it looks that retrievability is the only allowed storage method in French law. But the option of definite disposal is not excluded as the Law mentions the possibility to adopt new laws regulating disposal for unlimited periods[30].

7.3 Bataille's mission
Not included in the law, but adopted by the government, was the initiative to appoint a national negotiator for nuclear waste. In August 1993, Bataille was officially installed for this job[31]. He had to search for a departement that wanted to host an underground laboratory.
In preparation for his visits, an information package was sent to the concerned local authorities and organisations. It contained general information about the mission, waste in France, the history of waste policy, legislative frameworks, the laboratory program, costs, and an explanation of the "negotiating method" (open information and cooperative decision-making)[32].
An example of the social unrest that arose after showing interest was the village of Chatain in Vienne. It was heavily divided between proponents and opponents. Mr. Faudry, the mayor, decided to organise a referendum against the advice of the departement’s prefect, who said that it would be illegal and that no public funds would be available. The mayor thus paid for the costs and the referendum resulted in a 60% vote in favour of the laboratory, which would bring more employment in the village. Protest became sometimes violent and two weeks after the referendum, Faudry committed suicide[33].

In its final report of December 1993, Bataille recognised four main issues for which he made recommendations. First, in his view there was a shortage of reliable and good information. He referred to the 1991 law to start a Local Information and Oversight Committee when a laboratory site was confirmed and suggested to install information committees already in an earlier phase. A proposed study should give insight into the effect of a laboratory or repository on the tourist and economic image of a departement. After having recognised four potential departements, the time necessary for conducting geological research can be used to start a dialogue with the people.
During the research phase it should be clear that retrievability will be guaranteed. Another guarantee had to be given to the departement that a laboratory would be dismantled, when no repository will be constructed.
Third, Bataille pleaded for a better coordination between ministries, governmental authorities and departements. In continuing the search for a site, Bataille recommended a follow-up to his mediation mission, for instance by creating local mediators at possible sites.
Last, he proposed to supply a yearly amount of FF 5 million (Dfl 1.7 million) to communities that possibly wanted to host a laboratory. This is a fund prior to the FF 60 million (Dfl 20 million) that would be available when agreements were to be signed to really host a laboratory[34].

The scenario that a laboratory will be converted into an actual repository was for groups like Les Verts (the political party Greens) reason to strongly criticize Bataille's recommendations. The Greens observed a lack of real guarantees that a laboratory would not be converted. Bataille was not able to answer the question why an underground laboratory was necessary to study the properties of clay or granite whereas experiments with "samples of radioactive" material, as would be allowed, can also be done in a surface facility. Critical groups feared that an underground laboratory will absolutely be converted into a repository. Besides, a discussion about laboratories could be better placed in a broader framework, the total discussion about energy policy[35].
During his mission, a total of 30 departements or communities showed interest. Favourable geological conditions could be found in 10 of these. Bataille visited eight departements, of which two withdrew due to local opposition or because of upcoming elections. The earlier-mentioned four candidate sites where test drillings were undertaken until 1990 were not visited by Bataille[36].
Bataille thus identified six possible departements that wanted to cooperate, and continued in the process of site selection.
Critics however had doubts on the geological safety at a number of the sites and were cautious about their candidacy. One of the visited departements was Gard, in southern France, where the Marcoule nuclear research centre is located. Here, France's first plutonium production reactors were built, a reprocessing plant is present as well as the breeder reactor Phenix. The underground is connected near the deformation of the Alps and knows an increased level of seismicity. The formation to be investigated is clay.
The Marne and Haute-Marne departements have underground clay formations that would be suitable, although a site had to be found at a depth of less than 550 meters and a clay thickness of at least 100 meters. The Meuse departement is neighbouring the Marne and Haute-Marne and its clay formation continues in the Haute-Marne departement. The departement of Meurthe-et-Moselle also contains clay formations at two locations in the north and south. The south of Vienne departement is the one with a granite formation.
Of these six departements, Bataille chose four to continue with, because of broad council support: "Nevertheless, candidacy for the installation of underground laboratories, formulated in a unanimous--or practically unanimous--manner by the Assemblies in four of the departements confers valuable qualities of engagement and particular commitment in each of these requests"[37[. For instance, the departement of Meuse unanimously agreed with the plans for a laboratory. It was promised that the departement’s agreement would not be a positive vote for a repository. But the decision was made exactly at the same day when a meeting was held on the (positive) economic benefits. This caused scepticism among opponents[38].

7.4 Four candidate sites selected
On 6 January 1994, the government decided to go ahead with geological research at the four departements that were favoured by Bataille: Gard, Vienne, Meuse and Haute-Marne. ANDRA got permission to conduct a detailed geological investigation at more than seven locations within these four departements. With this permit, there came an end to a moratorium for drilling of four years[39].
In December 1997, the Conseil d'État rejected a complaint that was laid down in 1994 on the mission of Bataille and the license ANDRA got to conduct preliminary site investigations. The complaint was submitted by residents of Meuse and Vienne and concerned Article 6 of the 1991 Law. That article laid down that "locally elected officials and the population of the affected site shall be involved [] before any preliminary site investigation [] shall begin". The plaintiffs from Meuse argued that the meeting with Bataille only took two hours. The first was used for broadly outlining the waste issue and the second was only used by Bataille to give his own view, according to the complainers. They stated that there had never been a real involvement of the affected population, as required by law.
According to the Conseil d'État, Bataille had met with elected officials, union representatives and others. As the departement council agreed with the project, the Conseil d'État considered it as a representation of the population in it. The followed publicity would have given enough possibilities to express the necessary public opinion expected by law[40]. But others say that the meetings were not open to the public and only some environmental organisations were concerted. They went to the European Court of Human Rights for a judgment on the question of whether a consultation of the departement council could be seen as as a consultation of the whole population[41]. The law requires a "concertation" with elected officials and the affected population. With the decision, the Conseil d'État did not follow the advice of the so-called government commissioner, who agreed with the plaintiffs[42].
In May 1994, the prefect of Vienne gave permission to start the research. Around this time, information committees were founded in Haute-Marne, Gard and Vienne. Reason for the quick start was also said to be the government’s announcement for a FF 1 million (Dfl 0.33 million) for its committee work[43].
The "hearings" in Bar-le-Duc (chief town of Meuse) were considered not open enough, according to representatives of the CDR 55. Some members of organisations were invited, after they had requested it themselves, to sit at a round-table discussion, that was chaired by the prefect of the departement Meuse. Others had to take place in the back of the room and were not allowed to ask verbal questions. They could only write questions down, and the prefect decided whether or not to answer these.
The opponent groups experienced the meetings in Bar-le-Duc as a kind of "alibi affair". This was reason for the CDR 55 to retire for lack of a real discussion.
According to the opposition, the meetings were too formal: they were in government buildings, the discussions were too academic and one had to write in to participate at the round-table discussion[44].
There was criticism that ANDRA had a huge budget to inform people and sponsor communities, whereas opponents lacked funds made available by government[45]. Moreover, CDR 55 complained that there were little possibilities to consult independent experts. The incidental moments they were allowed to get the testimony of their own experts were experienced more as a kind of "showcase for democracy"[46].
CNE's first annual report, published in July 1995, warned that ANDRA still needed a lot of work to do before a site can be chosen in 1998, as projected. It urged EdF and Cogema to make clear the exact expected amounts of high-level reprocessing waste and eventual not to be reprocessed spent fuel for direct disposal. The commission asked to quickly develop new concepts of long-term storage of high-level waste, as it was one of the 1991 law's research objectives. Finally, CNE noticed a shortage of studies on socio-political aspects of waste management[47]. Also in its third annual report, CNE urged EdF, ANDRA, CEA and Cogema to cooperate more closely, as otherwise the legal deadline of 2006 will be missed[48].

During its research, ANDRA identified three locations in the four departements: the Gard site, located near the Marcoule research centre; a granite formation, located at La Chapelle-Baton (Vienne); the third formation was a clay one located at Bure, Meuse, near the border of Haute-Marne, hereafter to be referred to as the Meuse/Haute-Marne site"[49].
But with the CNE’s second annual review, published July 1996, it became clear that only the Meuse/Haute-Marne site's suitability was said to be "satisfactory". Geological uncertainties made the Gard and Vienne sites too unsuitable for approval. Gard was considered unsuitable due to tectonic activities. At the Vienne site, two aquifers were identified and the permeability of the granite was too high, and too many fractures existed[50]. In its third report, the doubts about Vienne were reiterated and recommendations were made to look for another site. The Gard site was considered more suitable than in CNE's second review[51].

Enquête publique
In February 1997, the first public inquiries took place. These were required by Article 8 of the 1991 law before a construction license can be granted. Although there was little time left to meet scheduled dates, ANDRA had to comply with the law, held the public inquiry and asked for a new vote from the municipal, district, departement and regional councils concerned. Otherwise the construction license could be annulled. First inquiry hearings started February 3 in the Vienne and neighbouring Charente departement, followed on February 17 in the Gard and neighbouring Vaucluse departement. The inquiry in Meuse and Haute-Marne started on 3 March. All the three inquiries took two to two and a half months[52].
In the Meuse inquiry, some 6,500 written submissions were made, opposing the siting. Some 10,000 arguments were mentioned concerning a perceived lack of participation (4,800), bribery because of financial compensations made (2,000), or an insufficient environmental impact assessment process (over 4,000)[53].
After the inquiry period, the commissions had to report their findings. The first report came from the Gard commission in June 1997. It was in favour of the project, although more in-depth studies on seismic activities were recommended[54]. The Vienne and Meuse/Haute-Marne reports were published September 1997.

Council votes
During or after the inquiry, the departement council had the possibility to vote on further proceedings. The French government was not obliged to follow a council vote nor an advice of the inquiry commission. In fact, it was not even obliged to follow a decision by the Conseil d'État, when this would give a negative decision on a license application. But the officials expected that the government would take into account the different opinions during the inquiry.
Just before the inquiry started in Gard, the municipal council of Chuslan, on whose territory the laboratory would be built, voted 10:5 against the project. The vote had no legal influence on the process as the licenses should be given by the departement prefect, who represented the national government. The negative opinion of the council was determined by the fear that local wines, like the Cotes-du-Rhône and Chateauneuf-du-Pape, might face a negative image in case a nuclear waste disposal site were located in the area[55].
During 1997, more council votes were made. After the Chuslan municipal council voted against the project in Gard, the regional councils of Languedoc-Roussillon where the departement of Gard is located also voted 45:9 against, and neighbouring Provence-Alpes-Cotes-d'Azur also voted 72:8. While the Languedoc-Roussillon regional council voted 45:9 against, its own departement council of Gard voted 25:13 in favour of the laboratory[56]. Seven out of 27 municipalities around the site voted against[57].
The Poitou-Charentes regional council followed its own Vienne departement by voting also in favour of the Vienne site.
And the regional council of Champagne-Ardennes, where the departement of Haute-Marne is located, voted in favour of the proposed Bure (Meuse/Haute-Marne) site[58]. When the regional council of Lorainne, where the departement of Meuse is located, met in October 1997, a majority voted against the plans. The vote, however, had no legal power as the official deadline had already elapsed[59].
The Meuse departement did not vote officially on the siting. Earlier, in the meetings with Bataille the council unanimously voted in favour of a laboratory. But when more information from ANDRA became available, they were less positive when they read about a "pre-study for disposal" and the discussion about retrievability in the case of Meuse/Haute-Marne. Where they first thought only to have agreed with general research, they now feared that the process for a disposal had begun. For instance, the mayor of Verdun, member of the Meuse council, now opposed the plans and spoke at a demonstration in Verdun, attended by some 5,000 demonstrators in March 1999[60].

7.5 Government decision
It was initially foreseen that the government would decide on licensing the laboratories by the end of 1997. In September of that year, however, it unexpectedly announced a postponement of the decision by a year[61], after the regional and cantonal elections (critics call this the "Not In My Election Year" effect [NIMEY effect]).
Parallel to this postponement, the CNE advised on the issue of retrievability in its third annual report of September 1997. The use of overpacks were considered to be necessary to guarantee the technical possibility of retrievability. The CNE suggested a period of "trial" after the last waste container was placed and before the mine was sealed. The CNE stated that a possibility for retrieval might not be used as an excuse to choose a poor geologic site[62]. According to Chairman Tissot, the retrievability concept was a result of the discussion between scientists, on one hand, and politics/society, on the other[63]. Groups like the nationally organised elected officials against underground laboratories, however, think that retrievability "is a snare". They rather prefer the storage of waste at the production sites[64].
In June 1998, the CNE submitted a special report on retrievability. According to this new document, the CNE recommended that only non-heat-generating transuranic (TRU) wastes be stored in a deep repository, with a retrievability period of three centuries. Heat-generating high-level wastes, either vitrified reprocessing waste or spent fuel, should be stored in a subsurface repository (tunnels dug in a mountain site), retrievable for potential recovery of useful isotopes. Concerning the volume, the transuranic wastes that are produced in reprocessing are much larger in quantities. The argument, to keep the potential useful high-level waste easily accessible, faced critical reactions by laboratory opponents. They think it was "a ploy to obtain acceptance" and that once a deep disposal for TRU is available, the high-level wastes will also be placed there[65]. On the other hand, there were also less negative reactions, stating that the idea to keep high-level wastes accessible and monitored corresponds with their arguments against deep disposal[66].
On 9 December 1998, the French government formulated its position on the laboratory issue and waste management. Surprisingly, the proposed Gard and Vienne sites were discarded. Both sites were considered to be unsuitable because of geologic reasons. As it was still intended to create two laboratories in two different types of formations, another granite site had to be sought next to the Bure (Meuse/Haute-Marne) clay location.

The government asked the CEA to design a subsurface facility for "certain" wastes, possibly to be realised at the Marcoule (Gard) location.
The government did not really make clear whether it will follow the advice of the CNE to dispose of only TRU wastes in a deep repository. It looked that besides deep-laboratory research, parallel research will take place on subsurface storage. The government will make final choices possibly after having studied the results of it. On the other hand, the government decided to store high-level wastes for at least 70 years in a surface or subsurface facility to cool down. Long-lived radioactive waste, like TRU waste, was considered to be disposed of in medium term in a definitive deep disposal. In this, it appeared to follow the CNE recommendations. It was defined that disposal should be "reversible", but no clear period was determined.
Apart from the decision on laboratory siting, the government also decided to create a new independent nuclear safety regulatory authority. An overall economic evaluation of energy policy, including the reprocessing discussion, had to be made by a three-man committee.
Bataille reacted critically to the government decision, and he spoke about "half a measure" and "ignoring" the law's demands. He considered the Gard site suitable enough, and feared a lack of time to search for a new site, create a laboratory and having it evaluated by 2006[67].
As Minister of Environment Dominique Voynet was a member of the Green Party, she got a lot of criticism for her cooperation on the decision to go ahead with the laboratory siting. The Lorainne branch of the Greens earlier had asked Voynet to resign when a positive decision on the Meuse/Haute-Marne site would be taken[68].
At a national Greens conference, however, a motion that asked Voynet not to sign the final permit for a laboratory was rejected. The party considered Voynet's role and influence in the cabinet of more importance[69].

In January 1999, a decree concerning licensing the construction of the Meuse/Haute-Marne laboratory was submitted to the Conseil d'État for review[70]. By July 1999, the Conseil d'État had okayed and passed it to the ministers to sign. In August 1999, Voynet signed the degree inspite of resistance within the Green Party. But she did this only when the government made retrievability an integral part of future repository policy. At that moment, a second decree was also approved. It laid down the organisation and financing of the Local Information and Oversight Commission[71]. ANDRA expected to create by the end of 1999 the first buildings, followed in mid-2000 by the construction of access shafts[72].
Opposition in Meuse remains, and as the Bure site is the only existent one in France at the moment, it will possibly grow as people fear that the site will be chosen because another one has failed. On Sunday, 21 March 1999, some 5,000 people mainly from the Meuse departement, including some 100 from German cities bordering the French territory, took part in a demonstration named "La Marche pour la Vie" in the Meuse city Verdun. It was organised by several organisations, for instance the Elected Officials in Meuse Against Radioactive Waste Burial and Greenpeace. The Green Party did not officially support the demonstration, but did so financially[73].
The German regional council of Saarland, led by Social Democrats, and its opposition parties of the Greens and Christian Democrats protested against the French plans. In a letter to the Saarland council, German Environment Minister Trittin made clear he also disapproved of the plans. The Saarland council considered clay formations unsuitable for waste disposal, and that only granite would be safe. As the disposal can have consequences for neighbouring Germany, Trittin asked France to "inform and consult" the German government, in accordance with European regulations[74].
The date of 2006 was nearing relatively quickly, and a second site still had to be found. ANDRA is now looking at sites in "about 20 granitic zones" in Brittany and the Massif Central mountains. It hopes to have found a suitable site by the end of 2002. A "consultation mission" should be organised to be conducted by three people and comparable to the earlier mission of Bataille[75]. It is doubted whether Parliament will take a decision on waste management in 2006. Some expect that by that time there would be too little information to choose a final option for waste storage and expect a delay for three to four years. As Bettina Laville, environment and regional advisor to PM Jospin, said: "You can consider that in 2006, they will opt to give themselves more time and reprogram the decision to 2009 or 2010"[76].
 

8. SUMMARY

France has an extensive nuclear program, which includes enrichment and reprocessing for foreign customers. Initially, like many other countries, it considered the option of final deep disposal as a solution for the high-level long-lived waste problem. Protest against four test drilling sites, in the late 1980s, forced the government to temporarily stop those drillings and develop a new policy.
The Nuclear Waste Law of 1991 regulated the new policy. Research had to concentrate on transmutation, retrievability and long-term aboveground storage. In the year 2006, an overall assessment is to be discussed in Parliament, after which a final strategy has to be adopted. For an easier acceptance of a test site, the government introduced the concept of the laboratories: No waste can legally be stored in such laboratories. However, there is always a possibility to adopt a new law that would permit the conversion of a laboratory into a disposal site.
In 1993, MP Bataille acted as a negotiator to look for a site in interested departements. A total of 30 showed initial interest, but of these, only 10 could meet geological criteria. He finally selected four departements to continue in the site selection. Others were dropped due to their own withdrawal or because there was too little departement council support. In his final report, Bataille emphasized the importance of guarantees for retrievability and a dialogue. Critics, however, criticized his mission as not open enough and too short. They feared the conversion of a laboratory into a repository. They said the population was not consulted directly and sufficiently as required by law.
After having selected four sites, the process of public inquiries and council votes started. Here again, opponents considered the process as not open enough, and more, as an "alibi" to fulfill legal requirements. Too little possibilities were said to be present to have a real discussion. The amount of written objections in the Meuse departement reached 6,500.
Council votes varied in the municipal, departemental or regional outcomes. But all the four departement councils voted in favour of a laboratory. The possibility to receive financial compensation played a role in this. Council votes had no real meaning, as these can be overruled by the national government.
In 1997, a governmental decision on the laboratories was postponed for a year due to the upcoming elections. During that year, the CNE advised on the issue of retrievability, and recommended the storage of only transuranic wastes in a deep disposal and high-level fuel and reprocessing wastes in a subsurface facility for possible retrieval.
In the December 1998 governmental decision, Gard and Vienne were dropped as sites because of geological reasons. It followed CNE's recommendations of the two-way approach for different high-level wastes.
The site located at the border of the Meuse and Haute-Marne departements was the only one left at the moment. Because of this, opposition is now growing. A granite formation site is now being sought in Brittany and Massif Central mountains. Both laboratories still have to be constructed, researched and evaluated before Parliament can make decisions in 2006 as required by law.
 

9. CONCLUSIONS

1. In Bataille's mission the real decisions about cooperation were actually being made by the departement council and Bataille. Opposition remained after his mission. Critics said the population was not consulted directly and sufficiently as required by law. So it cannot be said that a departement council, unanimously or almost unanimously in favour of a laboratory, gives a realistic reflection of the public's opinion within the departement itself.
2. The amount of written objections indicates lack of public acceptance for a laboratory in Meuse/Haute-Marne. A lack of time as the date of 2006 nears might be among other reasons that no real acceptance has been obtained in the inquiry.
3. The presence of a Green minister in the cabinet could eventually lead to more political problems and delays in further decision-making, either by her standpoint on nuclear energy or because of the possibility of resignation due to pressure from within her party.
4. It will be next to impossible to find a second laboratory site, consult the population, construct the laboratory, and research and evaluate it all before 2006. This can already be a concern for the Meuse/Haute-Marne site as construction still has to begin. It is doubted whether thorough conclusions on the safety of the sites can be made before 2006.



SOURCES:
1- "Country Status Report #1: France", Laka Foundation, 15 January 1995.
2- Nucleonics Week, 8 April 1999, p. 16-17.
3- "World Nuclear Industry Handbook 1998", Nuclear Engineering International, p. 18-19.
4- "Radioactive waste management programmes in OECD/NEA Member countries: France", OECD/NEA, 1998.
5- "The Present Situation and Prospects for Radioactive Waste Management in the European Union", Commission of the European Communities, 11 January 1999,
p. 85.
6- "World Nuclear Industry Handbook", Nuclear Engineering International, 1998, p. 20.
7- "Country Status Report #1: France", Laka Foundation, 15 January 1995.
8- "Country Status Report #1: France", Laka Foundation, 15 January 1995.
9- OECD/NEA, 1998.
10- "Report d'Évaluation No. 5" (Evaluation Report No. 5), Commission Nationale d'Évaluation, June 1999, p. 221-222.
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11- Nuclear Waste Bulletin, NEA, December 1998, p. 65-67.
12- "Rapport d'Évaluation No. 5", Commission Nationale d'Évaluation, June 1999, p. 37-38.
13- Commission of the European Communities, 1999, p. 86.
14- "French radioactive waste management: a preliminary overview", M. Davis, July 1995, p.1.
15- Commission of the European Community, 1999, p. 88-90.
16- OECD/NEA, 1998.
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17-. OECD/NEA, 1998.
18- "The Virtual Repository of Radwaste Information; France", http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/geodev/france.htm, Geosciences for Development and
the Environment, November 1997; and e-mail from Jean-Yvon Landrac, 6 July 1999.
19- OECD/NEA, 1998.
20- Commission of the European Communities, 1999, p. 96.
21- OECD/NEA, 1998.
22- Nucleonics Week, 6 July 1995, p. 19.; and fax from ANDRA with comments on draft text, 20 August 1999.
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23- France has 21 Regions, also called Provinces. Within these 21 regions, there are 96 departements, also called prefectures.
24- Nuclear Fuel, 15 February 1990, p. 2-3.
25- Nucleonics Week, 19 April 1990, p. 9-10.
26- Nucleonics Week, 15 November 1990, p. 3.
27- These 28 sites were in a confidential document of ANDRA, but published in several French newspapers.
28- Nucleonics Week, 20 December 1990, p. 10-11.
29- Nuclear Fuel, 24 December 1990, p. 10.
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30- "Law no 91-1318 of December 30, 1991, on Radioactive Waste Management", 30 December 1991, French version and English translation.
31- Nuclear Fuel, 18 January 1993, p. 14-15.
32- "RadWaste Politics France", e-mail news message by WISE-Paris, M. Pavageau, March 1994.
33- Independent (UK), 10 February 1994.
34- "Mission de médiation sur l'implantation de laboratoires de recherche souterrains" (Mediation mission on the realisation of underground research laboratories),
C. Bataille, December 1993, p. 52-60.
35- "RadWaste Politics France", e-mail message by WISE-Paris, M. Pavageau, March 1994.
36- "Mission de médiation sur l'implantation de laboratoires de recherche souterrains" (Mediation mission on the realisation of underground research laboratories),
C. Bataille, December 1993, p. 52-60.
37- "RadWaste Politics France", e-mail message by WISE-Paris, M. Pavageau, March 1994.
38- Visit to Verdun, interview with J. Neelsen and J. Franville, 21 March 1999.
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39- Gard: Bagnols-sur-C ze; Haute-Marne: Chevillon, Poissons, Joinville, Doulaincourt-Saucourt and Saint-Blin-Semilly; Vienne: Charroux and Civray; Meuse: the
greater part of it.
40- Nuclear Fuel, 29 December 1997, p. 9-10.
41- Visit to Verdun, interview with J. Neelsen and J. Franville, 21 March 1999.
42- Nuclear Fuel, 29 December 1997, p. 9-10.
43- Nuclear Fuel, 6 June 1994, p. 14.
44- Visit to Verdun, interview with J. Neelsen and J. Franville, 21 March 1999.
45- Nuclear Fuel, 22 September 1997, p. 10.
46- Visit to Verdun, interview with J. Neelsen and J. Franville, 21 March 1999.
47- Nucleonics Week, 6 July 1995, p. 19-20.
48- Nuclear Fuel, 8 September 1997, p. 5-6.
49- Nuclear Fuel, 20 May 1996, p. 15.
50- Nucleonics Week, 4 July 1996, p. 7-9.
51- Nuclear Fuel, 8 September 1997, p. 5-6.
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52- Nuclear Fuel, 24 February 1997, p. 9-11.
53- Visit to Verdun, interview with J. Neelsen and J. Franville, 21 March 1999; and "Rapport d'Enqu te publique", Commission d'Enqu te publique, October 1997.
54- Nucleonics Week, 3 July 1997, p. 17.
55- Nuclear Fuel, 24 February 1997, p. 9-11.
56- Nucleonics Week, 24 April 1997, p. 13-14.
57- Nucleonics Week, 3 July 1997, p. 17.
58- Nucleonics Week, 24 April 1997, p. 13-14.
59- Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, p. 6.
60- Visit to Verdun, interview with J. Neelsen and J. Franville, 21 March 1999.
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61- Nuclear Fuel, 22 September 1997, p. 9-10.
62- Nuclear Fuel, 22 September 1997, p. 9-10.
63- DISTEC '98, Conference on Disposal Technology, Hamburg, discussion meeting on retrievability, 9 September 1998.
64- Nuclear Fuel, 22 September 1997, p. 10.
65- Nuclear Fuel, 29 June 1998, p. 12-13.
66- Nuclear Fuel, 13 July 1998, p. 11-12.
67- Nuclear Fuel, 14 December 1998, p. 3-5.
68- Nuclear Fuel, 14 December 1998, p. 3-5.
69- Nucleonics Week, 17 December 1998, p. 5-6.
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70- Nuclear Fuel, 25 January 1999, p. 12-13.
71- Nuclear Fuel, 23 August 1999, p. 14-15.
72- Nuclear Fuel, 25 January 1999, p. 12-13.
73- Visit to Verdun, discussion day and demonstration, 21 March 1999.
74- Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 February 1999.
75- Nuclear Fuel, 28 June 1999, p. 4-5.
76- Nuclear Fuel, 19 April 1999, p. 12-13.
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