Introduction
We will take up two points from the discussion in Germany on the handling of nuclear waste. Firstly, the discussion about why the Gorleben salt dome was chosen as a repository, as the management of this site is an important example to Holland as well. Secondly, we will pay attention to the recent nuclear energy consensus talks between the government and the electricity companies in which nuclear waste figures prominently.
The first part of this chapter is based on a survey report of the Gruppe Ökologie (Ecology Group), added with information from the Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz (Federal Office for Radiation Protection). For the second part, a big amount of articles in newspapers and press releases are used. The text was commented upon by Jürgen Kreusch of the Gruppe Ökologie, Detlef Appel of Pangeo - geoscientific office, Wolfgang Ehmke of the Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg (Citizens Initiative Environmental Protection) and Manfred Petroll, until recently employed at the Deutsche Atomforum (German Atomic Forum), who had little time to comment due to circumstances.
 

1. NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

In 1957 the collective nuclear industry in West Germany presented a plan--the "Eltviller Program"--for the development of five types of reactor. Since this would not lead to the development of competing reactors, the reactor builders Siemens and AEG joined forces with American companies. Siemens and AEG founded the "Kraftwerk Union" and built 19 nuclear power stations in Germany with a combined capacity of 22,000 megawatt. The first KWU reactor was in Stade (operational in 1972), while Neckar-2 would be the 19^th nuclear power station in 1989[1]. These power stations provide one-third of the required electricity[2]. By court ruling the license for Mühlheim-Kärlich was withdrawn. No nuclear power stations are under construction at the moment. Germany also has uranium enrichment plants in Gronau and a fuel element plant in Lingen. Sixteen nuclear power stations with a combined capacity of 4,000 megawatt--the products of the first nuclear programs-- have been closed permanently, as well as nine research reactors and a fuel element plant in Hanau[3].
 

2. PRODUCERS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

The industrial processes in both nuclear power stations and research reactors result in the production of waste by-products, apart from the spent fuel elements. Up until now the fuel elements were reprocessed, producing a large quantity of radioactive waste.
Uranium enrichment and the production of fuel elements also produce radioactive waste as well as various other industries, as do medical research and applications of radioactive materials.
Every two years the Bundesamt für Strahlenschutz (BfS) publishes a number of surveys on the amount of radioactive waste in Germany[4] in which seven sources of radioactive waste are distinguished:
1. reprocessing;
2. nuclear power stations;
3. temporary storage depots in the federal states (Landessammelstellen);
4. nuclear energy research institutions;
5. nuclear technical industries (e.g., fuel element production);
6. dismantling;
7. other.

The temporary storage depots in the federal states are assembly points for the radioactive waste from hospitals, universities, non-nuclear energy research institutions and industry. At present, there are 12 of these centres where radioactive waste is stored pending final disposal. The BfS has no data on, for instance, the contribution of hospitals to the total amount of radioactive waste[5].
In its surveys, the BfS does not take into account depleted uranium or the radioactive waste production resulting from uranium mining[6]. According to Wolfgang Neumann of the Gruppe Ökologie in Hannover, 500 million tons of radioactive by-products of the uranium mining in the Wismut mines in former East Germany have not yet been classified. This also goes for depleted uranium, which is a by-product of uranium enrichment. According to Neumann, depleted uranium can be seen as a residual product and it is therefore not included in the total amount of waste[7].
 

3. CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Until a few years back radioactive waste in Germany was classified under three headings: low-level, medium-level and high-level radioactive. For this classification the concentration of radioactivity was the norm.
With a view towards underground storage, the BfS now classifies radioactive waste according to the amount of heat it generates. There are two headings:
1. heat-generating radioactive waste (e.g., nuclear fission waste);
2. radioactive waste with a low level of heat-generation (e.g., industrial residual products from nuclear power stations).
Category 1 waste comprises a) unprocessed waste and b) processed and packaged waste. Category 2 comprises a) unprocessed waste, b) half-products and processed and packaged waste[8].
 

4. AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

4.1 Present amounts

Category 1
Thus far, Germany has 469 m³ unprocessed heat-generating nuclear waste from reprocessing and power plants, for which no precise location can be given. In addition to this, there is 1,900 m³ of processed and packaged heat-generating waste. The origins are: production process nuclear power stations (especially spent fuel high-temperature reactor THTR-Hamm-Uentropp) 65.3%; reprocessing spent fuel elements 16.4%; nuclear research centres 8.1%; industry 8%; and temporary storage depots in the federal states 2.2%.

Category 2
There is 30,100 m³ of unprocessed residual waste, produced by: nuclear power stations 47.5%; nuclear technical industry 22%; nuclear research centres 16.3%; temporary storage depots federal states 6.1%; and other 8.1%.
The volume of half-products is 2,860 m³, produced by: nuclear power stations 68.2%; nuclear technical industry 15.9%; temporary storage depots federal states 6.5% and other 9.4%.
The amount of processed and packaged waste with a low level of heat-generation is 60,800 m³ produced by: nuclear research centres 46.2%; nuclear power stations 28.5%; reprocessing 18.1%; industry 3.8%; temporary storage depots federal states 3.3%; and other 0.2%.

Total amount
The total amount of radioactive waste of categories 1 and 2 comes to 96,800 m³. This is radioactive waste in temporary storage. Since the 1970s, a further amount of 62,000 m³ has been finally disposed of in the of Asse and Morsleben salt domes. This brings the total amount of radioactive waste produced in Germany to date to 160,000 m³[9]. The exact storage locations are not known.

4.2 Future amounts
If the nuclear power stations reach their intended life span of 50 years the BfS calculates a total amount of 412,000 m³ of radioactive waste which needs to be disposed of. If the use of nuclear energy will be abandoned in the near future 142,000 to 166,000 m³ of nuclear waste will be produced on top of the existing 160,000 m³. A further 66,000 m ³ is to be generated by the dismantling of nuclear power stations[10].
 

5. WHERE IS IT STORED?

The heat-generating waste mostly consists of spent fuel elements and residual products after reprocessing. A small amount of the spent fuel elements has been reprocessed in the German reprocessing plant in Karlsruhe, but for most fuel elements there are reprocessing contracts with the plants in La Hague and Sellafield. All this radioactive waste is stored in temporary storage facilities aboveground. The BfS does not give a complete overview of which amount is stored where and confines itself to reporting that the utilisation of temporary storage capacity for heat-generating waste is of the same order as that for low-level heat-generation waste, which is about 40%, and will be sufficient till the year 2007[11].
The Gruppe Ökologie in Hannover made an overview of the free temporary storage capacity for spent fuel elements. The storage capacity at the nuclear power stations is 6,562 MT and a license has been granted for central repositories at Gorleben (3,800 MT), Ahaus (3,960 MT) and Greifswald (620 MT)[12].
In mid-1999, the depot in Gorleben held five containers with 39 tonnes of spent fuel elements and three containers with vitrified high-level waste. For this depot a license has been granted for 150 containers with 20 to 28 drums each of nuclear fission waste from reprocessing plants[13]. The temporary storage depot in Gorleben can therefore house another 245 Castor containers. In Ahaus, 50 of the 420 places are taken by fuel pellets from the high-temperature reactor THTR. There are six Castor containers so there is space for 3,700 MT of spent fuel elements. The Gruppe Ökologie has ascertained that there is free storage capacity for a total of 13,000 MT of spent fuel elements. To date, 8,600 MT of spent fuel elements have been produced at the nuclear power stations in the course of their industrial processes. If the use of nuclear energy would be abandoned immediately, there would be enough temporary storage capacity, from a purely mathematical point of view, even if the reprocessing contracts would be cancelled and the spent fuel would be returned by France and England.
Plutonium is released in reprocessing. To date, 42 MT have been produced, 30 MT of which are stored in La Hague. Eight MT of plutonium have been turned into so-called mixed-oxide fuel elements and two MT have been supplied to breeder reactors. Some 2,4 MT of plutonium are stored in the plutonium-bunker in Hanau[14].
There is still no clarity on where the plutonium returned from abroad will be stored. Staff members of Karlsruhe research institutions have pointed out the dangers of plutonium. They stated that insofar as questions are rising concerning the distribution of nuclear weapons there is "no discernible difference" between plutonium originating in nuclear power stations and plutonium specifically made for nuclear weapons. For this reason they think it highly irresponsible that this issue is not taken up in the German discussion on nuclear energy[15].
With regard to nuclear waste with a low level of heat-generation, there are temporary storage facilities at nuclear power stations, nuclear research institutions, the nuclear technical industry and the temporary storage depots in the federal states. According to the BfS, these storage facilities are used to an average of 37%.
 

6. RESPONSIBILITIES

Building and running of temporary storage facilities are the responsibility of the producers of radioactive waste, in this case the electricity companies. The central storage depots are built and maintained by the Gesellschaft für Nuklear-Service mbH (GNS, Company for Nuclear Service), a subsidiary company of the nuclear power station operating electric companies. GNS has its own subsidiary companies such as Brennelementlager Gorleben GmbH (Fuel storage Gorleben) and Brennelement-Zwischenlager Ahaus GmbH (Interim fuel storage Ahaus), taking care of storage at Gorleben and Ahaus.
The final disposal of nuclear waste is the government's responsibility. In order to give meaning to this task they established the BfS in Salzgitter. The BfS applies for planning permits to the federal state where the possible depot site is located. In actual practice, however, the BfS calls in another organisation altogether for the planning, building, and running of storage depots: the Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Bau und Betrieb von Endlagern für Abfallstoffe mbH (DBE, German Company for Building and Operation of Final Disposal of Waste) in Peine. The DBE was founded in 1979 by the GNS, the Industrie-verwaltungsgesellschaft AG (Industrial Management Company), Noell GmbH and Saarberg-Interplan GmbH. The electric companies are represented in the DBE through the GNS.
 

7. DISPOSAL IN GORLEBEN

In February 1977, Gorleben was designated as a possible site for nuclear waste disposal and as location for a reprocessing plant. How did this come about? Following is an attempt to reconstruct the events.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Bundesanstalt für Bodenforschung (Federal Office for Earth Reseach, now the Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, Federal Office for Geosciences and Resources, BGR) opted for final disposal of radioactive waste in a mine in a salt dome, working from the following starting-points: The waste should be stored in a mine especially dug for this purpose. All types of radioactive waste should be stored in this mine. Retrievability was not reckoned with; after disposal the mine should be sealed off immediately to prevent access by people or groundwater[16].
At the beginning of the 1970s, government policies were geared to the erection of the "Nukleare Entsorgungszentrum" (Nuclear Back-end Centre), consisting of a reprocessing plant, a fuel element packaging plant and a site for final disposal in salt. By the end of 1973, by government order the firm Kernbrennstoff-Wiederaufbereitungs-Gesellschaft (KEWA, Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Company) started looking for a site for the "Entsorgungszentrum". In 1975 this led to the selection of three salt domes in Niedersachsen: Wahn, Lichtenhorst and Weesen-Lutterloh, on the advice of the geologist Professor Gerd Lüttig, chairman of the Energy Advice Committee of Niedersachsen. According to Lüttig, Gorleben did not fall in the most suitable category[17] [18] .
In December 1975, licenses for test drilling were applied for. This triggered off the founding of pressure groups. In the towns around the Wahn salt dome, in the Hümmling, south of Papenburg near Wippingen, many protestrallies were held. In June 1976, action groups occupied the drilling site at Lichtenhorst, north of Nienburg. Drilling at Weesen-Lutterloh, near Celle, in June 1976, also met with great resistance. The government subsequently decided to postpone all work at the three salt domes[19].
In February 1977, the government of Niedersachsen designated Gorleben as site for the "Entsorgunszentrum". The salt dome lies on the border with former East Germany between the towns of Gorleben and Rambow (in the former GDR). The salt dome is approximately 30 kilometres in length, 14 kilometres of which are on formerly West German soil. Because of this situation the Federal government had initial objections against Gorleben. The proximity of East Germany would render extensive research impossible. Nevertheless, in July 1977 the Federal government agreed to use the site at Gorleben. In May 1979 the government of Niedersachsen decided not to build a reprocessing plant but to go ahead with the erection of a temporary storage depot, a fuel element processing plant and a final disposal repository[20].

Which criteria led to the selection of Gorleben?
As stated earlier, in 1973 the search for a suitable disposal site began, 24 salt domes in the state of Niedersachsen were checked against a number of criteria. These criteria were published in 1977 when Gorleben had already been selected. These were general criteria like, for instance, a sufficient volume of the salt dome, homogeneity of the salt, the top of the salt dome should be at least 200 metres below ground level, etc[21][22] .
On the basis of these criteria the salt domes at Wahn, Lichtenhorst and Weesen-Lutterloh were selected. Gorleben was not part of this selection because of its position on the border with the former GDR. Although in February 1977 Gorleben was decided upon. After this, the Federal government presented four geological criteria that should have led to this decision by the Lower Saxony government[23]:
--no drilling may have been done in the salt dome;
--the salt dome must have ample dimensions and must contain large volumes of pure rock salt;
--the top of the salt dome may not be positioned lower than 400 metres below ground level and it may not cross groundwater streams;
--there may not be any depots of groundwater intended for future use in the vicinity[24].

The Gruppe Ökologie and the geologist Detlef Appel noted that these are very general criteria and it should not be excluded that other salt domes would meet these as well[25]. In that case, the salt dome at Gorleben should have other properties to justify its selection. The then prime minister of Niedersachsen, E. Albrecht (CDU), brought up two political arguments:
--the region of Lüchow-Dannenberg were Gorleben is situated as an economically weak area;
--the expected public support[26].

This public support, however, proved to be non-existent. On 12 March 1977, a protest rally was held with 100,000 participants. This was the first of a long series of protest actions and discussions. There were a lot of possibilities for public input at the start of the test drillings and at the construction of the shaft. Everytime, the draft licenses were made public, mostly during a period of two months. Objections brought in could be explained more closely at hearing sessions. A lot of use was made from these possibilities for public input, but the objections were dismissed up to the highestcourt as described in sources[27][28] . The government’s reaction was the dissemination of information. The purpose of the activities first undertaken by the BfS (at that time still known as PTB, Physikalisch-Technisches Bundesanstalt--Physical-technical Federal Office) in 1978 was to create a climate of acceptance of this already selected location[29].
Gorleben repeatedly cropped up in the discussion. Those opposed to the repository used all available legal procedures to prevent licenses from being issued[30].

The Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) published two papers, in 1994 and 1995, on locations for the disposal of nuclear waste. These papers resulted from the coalition agreement between the governing parties CDU, CSU and FDP. In this agreement it was stated that if research into the disposal at Gorleben would yield a bad result, research into other locations should be undertaken immediately. To this end, the BGR had to draw up a list of other possible locations for disposal in salt or granite.
The BGR listed the qualifying and non-qualifying criteria. With regard to salt the BGR undertook a comparative study into 41 locations from which Gorleben was excluded. Four salt domes emerged from this: Wahn and Zwischenahn in Niedersachsen, Waddekath (Sachsen-Anhalt) and Gülte-Sumte (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern). The Gruppe Ökologie in a preliminary way applied the BGR's criteria to Gorleben: because this salt dome is not covered by a clay layer, among others, it seemed not to meet the BGR criteria and should not be considered to be a suitable location as they concluded[31]. In the region, this conclusion led to renewed discussions about the suitability of Gorleben. Some of the people were convinced that Gorleben would become a dumping place for nuclear waste. The people believed that if the nuclear waste would be in Gorleben, it would remain there. That is a reason for the protests against the transports to Gorleben. In March 1997, the employment of 30,000 policemen cost more than DM 111 million (Dfl 125 million), apart from the damage to roads and costs for the disruptions in train traffic[32][33] .

The doubts about Gorleben had an effect on the coalition agreement between the SPD and the Green Party of the Schröder government on 20 October 1998. In this coalition agreement, the government announced it wanted the research at Gorleben to be terminated because of the existing doubts about this salt dome, and that other locations should be looked into. A selection should then be made on the basis of a comparison of various locations[34]. On 10 February 1999, Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin announced that he wanted the research at Gorleben stopped this same year[35]. He further announced "to be willing to rectify the purely political instead of factually based decisions on Gorleben made by former Federal governments", as soon as it was clear how any compensation claims can be avoided[36]. The chairman of the Deutsche Gesellschaft zum Bau und Betrieb von Endlagern für Abfallstoffe mbH (DBE), Dr. Hans-Jürgen Krug, reacted immediately. He stated that up to February 1999, about DM 2,200 million (Dfl 2,500 million) had been spent on research, including the construction of shafts and galleries in the Gorleben salt dome. The DBE would lodge a compensation claim for these expenses[37].
According to the plan, the subterranean research is to be finished in the year 2003. At that time a decision should be taken about the suitability of Gorleben. Then a zoning plan should be drawn up: this would be finished in 2008. When objections against this would be rejected the first drum could be stored in 2013[38]. On 10 February, Trittin also announced the appointment of a new committee, consisting of 13 men, whose task would be to formulate new safety criteria for comparing various locations. It will take several years before a new location can be selected, according to the minister[39]. The first committee meeting was on 26 February. The Environment Ministry's press release was entitled "Wissenschaftlergruppe zu Standortkriterien nimmt Arbeit auf" (Group of scientists on location criteria start work)[40]. However, the group's own name for itself was "Arbeitskreis zur Auswahl von Endlagerstandorten" (Working party for the selection of final disposal locations).
The working party's job description was vague. It was not clear if the selection of disposal site locations was the same as the drawing up of criteria. It will be interesting to see whether the results of the committee will be accepted by the public and will improve the acceptance of a final disposal site found by means of a new selection procedure and new criteria.
 

8. ENERGY CONSENSUS TALKS

In the 1980s, several nuclear energy projects came under attack: the fast breeder reactor in Kalkar, the construction of a reprocessing plant, the workings of a fuel element plant in Hanau and the exploitation of a High Temperature Reactor (THTR). In 1986, shortly after the accident in the nuclear power station in Chernobyl, the SPD decided to ban nuclear energy. Klaus Piltz, chairman of the board of the VEBA, stated at the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 that the SPD policy had its effect on the granting of licenses and the monitoring in SPD-governed states. For the operators of nuclear power stations, the construction of new reactors "can therefore not be calculated and is economically unjustifiable", as he wrote. For this reason the "supporters of nuclear energy should also try to steer the nuclear energy controversy in an agreed direction to preclude any avoidable costs to the economy and to pave the way for a more commercial decision on the future use of nuclear energy"[41]. Piltz enumerated a number of building blocks for a consensus: the nuclear power stations will continue to be in operation for their anticipated technical-economical life span; the disposal at Morsleben will continue to be operated, the one in Konrad would be taken into operation; alternatives for Gorsleben will be looked for. Together with Gieske, chairman of the board of the RWE, Piltz sent on 23 November 1992, a letter to Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl in which they conveyed their thoughts on a nuclear energy consensus. Consensus was here defined as consensus at a political level, not as a consensus with the public. Over time, several governments remained at this definition of consensus.

1993
The government adopted the electric companies' plans. The government interpreted consensus as political consensus. In 1993, this led to a plan drawn up by the Environment Minister and the Niedersachsen prime minister of the day, Klaus Töpfer and Schröder, respectively, with as main points:
--the remaining operational life span of nuclear power stations will not be subjected to a time limit;
--a moratorium until 2005 for the research at Gorleben and, in the meantime, a search for other locations (in Europe if need be);
--Morsleben will continue to be operated and Konrad will be taken in operation[42].
The talks failed, especially because no consensus could be reached on the future of nuclear energy. Also, with the 1994 Bundestag elections approaching, the SPD could not afford to deviate from its decision to ban nuclear energy. Schröder was called back by his own party.

1995
In 1995, the Environment Ministry came with a new proposal for consensus talks. Regarding the disposal of nuclear waste, the ministry proposed to store spent fuel elements at the nuclear power station sites where possible. The ministry wanted to stick to Gorleben and will only agree to a moratorium when the disposal facility in Konrad will be operational. Disposal in Morsleben will continue till after the year 2000[43].
This plan had been the subject of three meetings between the governing parties CDU, CSU and FDP, on one side, and the SPD, on the other side. In this second round of talks, consensus also meant consensus between those political parties represented in the Bundestag. These talks did not lead to any understanding since the parties could not agree on the future of nuclear energy in Germany[44].

1996-97
At the beginning of 1996, Wilfried Steuer, president of the "Deutsches Atomforum", expressed his concerns about the lack of understanding between the major political parties regarding the nuclear energy policy. For this reason the "Atomforum" was in favour of trying to reach at least a consensus on processing and disposal of nuclear waste, aside from the fundamental positions. A clear understanding was needed to operate the temporary storage facilities in Ahaus and Gorleben and the final disposal facilities in Gorleben, Morsleben and Konrad, Steuer stated[45].
Environment Minister Angela Merkel offered Schröder a solution to come to an "Entsorgungskonsens" between the various political parties in the Bundestag. Schröder subsequently came with a proposal with as its main points:
--all radioactive waste should be stored in one location, to be decided upon by 2025;
--Konrad will be granted a license but this will not be used until the one disposal location was selected;
--Morsleben will be operational until after the year 2000;
--research into the suitability of the Gorleben salt dome for final disposal would be rounded off as soon as possible;
--decentralized storage of spent fuel elements with a temporary storage facility in Southern Germany[46].
An "Arbeitsgruppe für eine Verständigung" (Working Party for a Consensus), in which the various political parties were represented, started working from this proposal. This working party reached a compromise between Schröder's viewpoint and that of the CDU/CSU/FDP government. This compromise encountered resistance within the SPD. Both the Bundestag party and the party leaders cautiously distanced themselves from the compromise. They held their ground regarding the ban of nuclear energy[47]. One reason for this was the pending election in Niedersachsen in which the SPD wanted Schröder to secure an absolute majority in order for him to be up for the post of candidate for Federal chancellor. In this situation, an understanding between SPD and CDU/CSU was undesirable.

1998-99
The coalition agreement between the SPD and the Green Party, dated 20 October 1998, contained paragraph 3.2: "Stopping with nuclear energy" in which it was determined that irrevocable rules will be laid down for the ban of nuclear energy. The first step will be an amendment of the nuclear energy law in which reprocessing, among other things, would be banned. The second step entailed inciting the electric companies to enter into an agreement, by consensus if possible, about the steps necessary for the ban of nuclear energy, the disposal of nuclear waste and a new energy policy. Regarding disposal of nuclear waste, Konrad and Morsleben were disregarded and doubts were voiced about Gorleben. The government decides on decentralised temporary storage on the actual nuclear power station sites. The coalition agreement announced the fourth round of consensus talks.
While the first three discussion rounds consisted of talks among political parties, the coalition agreement now prescribed discussion with the electric companies. The government did not clarify this and also did not explain why, for instance, the unions and the environmentalists' organisations were not invited to take part. It was also not clear if the government attached any importance to a social consensus and, if so, which form this should take. Lastly, the government did not clarify if consensus talks served a purpose when statutory changes spelling the end of nuclear energy had been made beforehand. This lack of clarity led to a number of things happening, the main points of which follows.
Immediately upon his inauguration, Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin had drawn up an amendment of the nuclear energy law, which was not approved of by the minister for economic affairs, Müller, because reprocessing was outlawed immediately for one thing[48]. In December, Trittin was whistled back by Schröder, shortly after a meeting of Schröder with the chairmen of the boards of the RWE, VEBA, VIAG and Energie Baden-Würrtemberg on 14 December, a meeting Trittin was not invited to attend[49].
In December, Trittin decided to change the constitution of the Reactor Safety Committee (RSK) and the Radiation Protection Committee (RSK) so the members would not be all pro-nuclear energy. Schröder labelled this a high-handed action with which Trittin was endangering the coalition's survival[50][51] . The Green Party, however, put up a good fight. Gunda Röstel, spokesperson for the party leaders, stressed that the Greens would hold to the decision to ban nuclear energy and to end reprocessing, as stated in the promised amendment of the nuclear energy law[52]. Hereupon, Schröder and Trittin met in the end December in order to reconcile the open differences of opinion within the coalition[53].
At the beginning of January 1999, the government reached a compromise on reprocessing. Instead of an immediate ban, reprocessing should be forbidden only by the year 2000; this way, Schröder hoped to gain some time in which to negotiate with the operators of the reprocessing plants at La Hague and Sellafield[54][55] .
The amendment of the nuclear energy law, laid down by the government on 13 January, contained this compromise on reprocessing. Even if no decentralized storage sites were available, this might not be used as an argument for the closing down of nuclear power stations: this prevented an imminent closing down of the nuclear power station at Stade whose storage pools were nearly full. When the storage pools were full, the spent fuel elements should be transported to the central storage facilities at Ahaus and Gorleben. This amendment was also less strict on the banning of nuclear energy. The government allowed research reactors as well as an extension of the enrichment plant at Gronau[56][57] .

The nuclear industry reacted furiously to the compromise on the amendment of the nuclear energy law. From both France and England the operators of the reprocessing plants threatened to send back the spent fuel elements and to lodge a complaint for damages of several thousand million[58][59] .
Dieter Harig of Preussenelektra, also spokesperson for the electric companies, stated that banning reprocessing was contrary to the agreement with Schröder on 14 December[60]. According to Harig, a consensus was of the utmost importance but could only be reached if all parties were prepared to accept that their truth was not the only one. He further stated that the government acted just like that. This put a burden on the consensus talks[61].
The director of VEW, Gert Maichel, appealed to the government not to encumber the consensus talks with unilateral decisions, like the ban on reprocessing[62]. RWE voiced the same sentiments[63]. Wilhelm Simson, chairman of the board of VIAG stated that reprocessing should be permitted for at least another five years or there will have to be a 100 Castor transports yearly[64]. The abovementioned people threaten not to take part in the consensus talks[65].
The prime ministers of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Wolfgang Clement, and Niedersachsen, Gerhard Glogowski (both SPD), announced they wanted to prevent any nuclear transports. They stated that they failed to see why they should again take massive police action against nuclear energy opponents[66]. The action groups in Gorleben supported this point of view. Their spokesperson, Wolfgang Ehmke, said they were willing to prevent the transports. It was true that Ehmke was in favour of banning reprocessing but this did not mean that nuclear transports were justified: he did not discriminate between the "good" atom as a result of banning nuclear energy and the "bad" atom as a result of continuing with nuclear energy[67]. He also stated that he failed to see why only the electric companies were invited to the consensus talks and not, for instance, the church and environmentalists' organisations. That was why environmentalists' organisations planned to campaign at the consensus talks in Bonn on 26 January[68] and also planned their own round of consensus talks with three unions (IG Bau, IG Metall and GdED)[69]. Greenpeace published a 10-point plan aimed at switching off the nuclear power stations in the year 2005 at the very latest[70].
Schröder then announced, on 20 January, he wanted to have a preliminary discussion with the electric companies by himself, without Trittin, to prevent the consensus talks from failing. He also announced that the amendment of the nuclear energy law would take another two months at the very least[71]. These remarks severely irritated the Greens[72].

The result of the consensus discussion on 26 January was that reprocessing will not be banned by the year 2000 but later. The exact time will be decided upon, for each nuclear power station separately, by a study group. The Schröder-government and the electric companies also concluded that further deliberations should be held on the exact time the nuclear power stations will1 be closed down; the next round of talks would be held on 9 March[73].
Harig of Preussenelektra stated that the normal life span of a nuclear power station was 40 years. The eldest German nuclear power station, Stade, had been operational for 27 years[74]. The first nuclear power station to be closed down, therefore, would be taken out of the network around 2010, if Harig had his way. Other energy industries reckon with a 40-year life span at full workload; since a nuclear power station on average reaches an 80% workload, the real life span would be 50 years, resulting in the first nuclear power station being closed down after 2020[75].
The consensus discussion did take place as the government turned its position, firstly by giving up the requirement to abandon reprocessing quickly and, secondly, not to require the forthcoming closure of nuclear power plants. According to commentators, for Schröder it only counted that there was consensus regardless of its contents. The Greens considered the results to be a defeat for their party, but did not consider it to have lasting consequences and called it a bitter result of a coalition in which compromises must be made[76][77] . With this, the Greens indicated that in this case, consensus meant agreement between Schröder and the electric utilities and not consensus between the governing parties.

In the following period, the discussion shifted from reprocessing to the moment of closure of the nuclear power reactors. To support the points of view of the electric utilities, the employees of the nuclear power plant Stade organised a demonstration on 4 February for the continuation of the reactor and labour. In this demonstration in Stade, 4,000 people participated[78]. The employees of the Obrigheim nuclear reactor (in operation since 1968) also were active: they stated that DM 700 million (Dfl 784 million) was invested in improvement of the safety and therefore no reason to close the reactor soon[79]. Schröder announced he could not mention a date for phasing out nuclear energy[80], after which Trittin reacted with the announcement that certainly before 2002 the first reactor would be closed[81]. The works council of the nuclear reactors announced on 19 February to demonstrate on 9 March in Bonn for the preservation of nuclear energy.
On 23 February, the government then said it was willing to make a "total package" after talks with electric utilities, labour unions and environmental groups[82].
But a new conflict thwarted this plan. By the end of February, the government announced a new tax bill where it states that the electric utilities had to pay taxes on the funds they had made for the dismantling of nuclear installations and the storage of nuclear waste. The utilities reacted that this would mean an unacceptable assessment of DM 25 billion (Dfl 28 billion). They threatened to stop the consensus talks in the beginning of March[83]. Minister of Economic Affairs Müller announced on 8 March that he could only defend a tax amount of less than DM 10 billion (Dfl 11 billion)[84]. With this, he distanced himself from the tax plans of his government. But this was not enough to save the 9 March consensus round where the discussion was full of emotions and bitter disputes and where there was no final conclusion. It also was doubted whether further talks would take place. In Bonn, 30,000 people demonstrated for the continuation of their employment in the nuclear industry[85]. Afterwards on 11 March a conversation was arranged between Schröder and the labour unions. Points of views were exchanged and no decision was made. The government announced that it would take into account the aspect of employment in phasing out nuclear energy[86]. On 11 March, environmental organisations also proposed to Schröder to form two working groups: one for a new energy policy and one for phasing out nuclear energy[87].
On 10 April, the electric utilities declared they were willing to continue the consensus talks. From new calculations it would seem that the new tax law would result in an amount of DM 10 billion (Dfl 11 billion) to be paid, taking into account another calculation method[88]. On 15 April, Minister Müller of Economic Affairs repeated that he wanted to discuss together with the utilities the different opinions on the tax plans[89]. The planned discussion between the minister and the electric utilities on 16 April however, was cancelled some hours before because there remained questions on the taxes[90].

The theme of new nuclear transports also remained on the agenda. On 24 March, the utilities stated that they took account of new transports in the middle of 1999[91]. The environmental minister of Sachsen, Wolfgang Jüttner, called this a "high distrusting measure"[92]. On 8 April, Preussenelektra repeated that in the year 1999, transports from Stade should take place to avoid the closure of the plant[93]. Action groups announced on 11 April plans to blockade those transports. They considered the politics of the Red-Green coalition worse than the Kohl government because Kohl’s view was to control nuclear energy, whereas although the Red-Green government, on one hand, said it was willing to stop nuclear energy, but, on the other hand, did everything possible to guarantee the continuation of nuclear reactors[94]. In the beginning of April, there were messages that new transports would take place from the reprocessing companies Cogema and BNFL to Germany[95]. On 18 April, Heinz Klinger, the coordinator for the consensus talks for the electric utilities, let it be known that a continuation of these talks was only useful when it could meet two conditions. Apart from the issue of the taxes, within a short period the new transports should be allowed. He stated that within a few weeks, new licenses for these transports will be sought and he hoped to receive an answer soon, otherwise not only Stade but also Philippsburg, Neckarwestheim and Biblis had to be closed[96].
After April, no decisions were made. In June, Minister of Economic Affairs Müller presented a concept agreement between the government and electric utilities. A conversation on 20 June between the government and the utilities, however, reached no agreement. An important difference of opinion was the question how long the nuclear power reactors could remain in operation[97]. This was followed by a difference on the remaining life span. Minister Müller wanted a total life span of 35 years, but the Greens could not agree with this[98]. On 7 July, Chancellor Schröder decided to set up a commission to formulate a common governmental standpoint by September on life span, reprocessing and the storage of nuclear waste. After that, the talks with the nuclear industry could proceed again[99]. The government planned for 30 September new talks with the electric utilities[100].
With this, the open differences of opinion within the government had not been solved. In mid-July, Minister Müller stated that a life span of 25 years was a compromise for the utilities. The SPD and Greens would have to admit that. Therefore the Greens should review their standpoint. He also pleaded for new nuclear transports, already in 1999. He considered the stand of the SPD to allow only transports that the utilities had made compromises, to be like a threat. According to Müller, the electricity producers had a right to conduct nuclear transports[101]. Environment Minister Trittin reacted with the statement that the first nuclear reactors should be disconnected from the grid at the latest in 2002. Eventually there was no consensus. He also declared that a resumption of nuclear transports was out of the question[102].

How things went since the government had started, Environmental Minister Wolfgang Jüttner of Niedersachsen concluded that the electricity utilities had taken the reins. In his view, the federal government acted in a wrong way and was clumsy. Jüttner criticized the fact that a revision of the Atomic Law had not yet been made that would be necessary to prevent that he had to issue a license for the spent fuel conditioning facility in Gorleben[103]. On 19 April, Richard Meng of the Frankfurter Rundschau observed that an ultimatum had replaced the consensus, but that this attitude of the utilities was provoked by the earlier attitude of the government itself[104].
 

9. SUMMARY

In February 1977, Gorleben was chosen as a possible site for nuclear waste disposal and as a location for a reprocessing plant. How did this come about? In 1973, the search for a suitable disposal site began. Twenty-four salt domes in the state of Niedersachsen were checked on a number of criteria. These criteria were published in 1977 when Gorleben had already been selected. These were general criteria, like a sufficient volume of the salt dome, homogeneity of the salt, the top of the salt dome should be at least 200 metres below ground level, etc.
On the basis of these criteria, the salt domes at Wahn, Lichtenhorst and Weesen-Lutterloh were selected. Gorleben was not part of this selection because of its position near the border of the former GDR. But in February 1977, Gorleben was decided upon. The then prime minister of Niedersachsen, E. Albrecht (CDU), brought up two political arguments:
--the region of Lüchow-Dannenberg where Gorleben is situated as an economically weak area;
--the expected public support.

This public support, however, proved to be non-existent. On 12 March 1977, a protest rally was held with 100,000 participants. This was the first of a long series of protest actions and discussions. The doubts about Gorleben had an effect on the coalition agreement between the SPD and the Green Party of the Schröder government on 20 October 1998. In this coalition agreement, the government announced it wanted the research at Gorleben to be terminated because of the existing doubts about this salt dome, and that other locations should be looked into. A selection should then be made on the basis of a comparison of various locations. In July 1999, this policy was not executed yet, the research in Gorleben was not halted yet as well.
The term consensus talks is an invitation to study precisely how agreement can be reached, the more so as the storage of nuclear waste--besides nuclear energy--played an important role. Further study, however, shows that a clear description of the goal of the consensus talks is lacking. The first discussion rounds concerned the consensus between political parties. At that, it was not made clear whether consensus between a number of Parliament representing parties would be sufficient to speak about public acceptance.

The consensus talks of the present government are between the governmental parties and the electric utilities. Implicitly, this means another definition of consensus. It also appeared that the government did not want to have an open mind, but as a precondition, aimed for an immediate ban on reprocessing. In February 1999, a difference of opinion arose on the remaining life span of the nuclear power reactors. The government assumed 30 to 35 years. The electric utilities reckoned with a 40-year life span at full workload; since a nuclear power station on average reaches an 80% workload, the real life span would be 50 years, resulting in the first nuclear power station being closed down after 2020. In June, a difference arose between the government parties themselves on the remaining life span. Minister Müller wanted a total life span to be pegged at 35 years, but the Greens did not agree and wanted at least one nuclear power reactor to be closed within the present governing period. The SPD and Greens, however, agreed to try to reach an agreement before 30 September.
 

10. CONCLUSIONS

1. The discussion about the disposal at Gorleben was tough from the beginning. This was mainly the result of a lack of openness in decision-making. The criteria for the selection of Gorleben were not made public. Afterwards, criteria were mentioned, but it was not clear why Gorleben was the only one that would fit these criteria. For the people, this resulted in the idea that the criteria had been adjusted to the findings of research in the salt dome of Gorleben. Briefly stated, an unclear decision-making.
2. The consensus talks at a political level have reached little, apart from a lot of media attention. This was caused by the fact that the government had no clear idea on what issues consensus should be reached. The government parties appeared to be divided among themselves and the electric utilities disagreed with the government.