Introduction
This chapter will give a description of the Swedish KBS-3 concept for nuclear waste disposal, the attempt to find a site for deep disposal, and the role of the National Co-ordinator for Nuclear Waste Disposal in this.
A lot of material was received through Olof Söderberg, National Co-ordinator (the position has been changed to Special Advisor for Nuclear Waste Disposal). Information was also used from other studies on Sweden's waste policy. Unfortunately, environmental groups did not react to our requests. Their opinion, however, was found in articles, like a recent one in the WISE News Communique that gave a good insight into the position of environmental groups. Mr. Söderberg gave his comments on the draft text.
 

1. NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

In 1966, Sweden ordered its first nuclear power plant, a boiling water reactor, that was built at Oskarshamn. Plans for more reactors were made in the Swedish Parliament and 11 more reactors were ordered[1].
The 1973 oil crisis caused a turn in people's thinking on economic growth and environmental issues. Urbanization, large-scale production and high-technology faced sceptical reactions from parts of society. The Center Party favoured a new politics of small-scale production, environmental protection and regional balance and became the major opposition party in Parliament, in the 1973 elections gaining 25% of the votes. Nuclear power became one of the main issues of the party and a public debate was initiated on the ethical aspects of waste disposal and especially about the burdens on future generations[2].
When the Center Party won the 1976 elections, the nuclear energy discussion became more and more important in the new government of the Center Party, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Because of different points of view, several compromises were made. According to a December 1976 Stipulation Act, the operators of nuclear reactors were responsible for the "absolutely" safe handling and final disposal of nuclear waste. In 1978 a conflict arose when discussion took place on the first fueling of two reactors completed in that year. To save the cabinet, the Liberals and Conservatives agreed with the Center Party on a temporary refusal for loading as the utility did not succeed in showing a site for safe disposal of the waste. The ongoing disagreements led to the fall of the cabinet in the end of 1978[3].
After the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, the new cabinet, led by the Center Party, initiated a nationwide referendum, which the anti-nuclear movement had already asked for in 1973[4][5] . The outcome was that the 12 reactors could operate until 2010. The decision to phase out nuclear energy still stands, but the deadline of 2010 was dropped in an energy policy revision by Parliament in 1997[6].

At present, 12 reactors are still in operation--three pressurised- water reactors and nine boiling-water reactors. These reactors are located at four sites: Ringhals, Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Barsebäck. Total generating capacity is 10 GWe, and the share in electricity production is 45%[7]. The two reactors at Barsebäck have to close definitely in November 1999 and July 2001, respectively, as government decided in 1998. Owner Sydkraft AB started legal procedures against the decision. In June 1999, the Supreme Administrative Court backed the government's decision. Sydkraft also lodged a complaint with the European Commission. It has yet to make a decision[8].
 

2. PRODUCERS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

The 12 power reactors and a nuclear research center at Studsvik produce nuclear waste. Apart from this, hospitals, industry and other research facilities are responsible for a certain amount of waste yearly. In volume, it is less than the nuclear industry[9].
 

3. CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Sweden knows a categorization that is used in almost all countries. High-level waste includes spent fuel and highly active reactor components[10]. Low-level and intermediate-level wastes come from reactor operation, decommissioning and research. The category very low-level wastes can also include reactor wastes.
Wastes other than from the nuclear industry are managed separately and are either disposed of or incinerated[11].
 

4. AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

4.1 Present amounts
An amount of 9,000 m³ of very low-level waste had been produced until the end of 1995.
Till the end of 1995, 2,960 m³ of low-level and intermediate-level waste was produced by reactors annually, and disposed of at the Central Final Repository (SFR)[12]in Forsmark. The cumulative quantity of waste stored at SFR was 18,442 m³.
For high-level waste, 196 MT of spent fuel is produced yearly. Till 1995 2,395 MT of spent fuel were stored at the near-surface Central Interim Storage Facility (CLAB) in Oskarshamn[13].
Hospitals, the pharmaceutical industry and research laboratories generate about 2,000 m³ of low-level, solid waste annually. Partly, it is sent for surface disposal at Studsvik or to the SFR, but most of it is incinerated, after which the ashes are brought to SFR[14].

4.2 Future amounts
The production of radioactive waste from Sweden's energy program varies from highly radioactive spent fuel, operational low-level waste to decommissioning waste. The following table shows the amounts to be expected over the total lifetime of nuclear reactors[15].
Spent fuel HLW, long-lived 4,500 canisters (7,380 MT(U)[16])
Alfa contaminated waste
from research at Studsvik LLW/ILW, incl. long-lived 2,000 m³
Core components and internals LW/ILW, some long-lived 10,000 m³
Reactor waste LLW and ILW, short-lived 90,000 m³
Decomissioning waste LLW and ILW, short-lived 150,000 m³
 

5. WHERE IS IT STORED?

Since 1988, the SFR in Forsmark has been in operation for the disposal of low-level and intermediate-level wastes. It is meant as a final disposal site and is located 50 metres below the bottom of the Baltic Sea and has a total disposal capacity of 60,000 m³. The site was chosen by SKB as it had good relations with local authority, where the three nuclear reactors are important employers. Besides, the construction of it was welcomed as the third reactor had just been completed at that time[17]. The choice for this site, however, was criticized by the People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons as it should be seen as a kind of sea-dumping of nuclear waste. The rock on top of the repository is not completely tight and there is a fracture zone in the access tunnels[18]. The most active waste (its activity is about 90% of the total to be disposed) is disposed of in a special silo that is to be backfilled with bentonite clay later. Other wastes are disposed of in excavated caverns. Finally, an amount of 10¹⁶ Beqcuerel is to have been disposed of at closure time[19]. The capacity of SFR is insufficient to dispose of the future amount of waste that will arise. An enlargement of SFR is planned[20].
CLAB in Oskarshamn was opened in 1990 for the interim storage of spent fuel and highly active reactor core components. The installation is situated 50 metres below the surface and is excavated from rock[21]. In 1998 its allowed capacity was enlarged from 5,000 to 8,000 tonnes of spent fuel[22].

It is planned that a fuel encapsulation plant will be built at Oskarshamn to pack spent fuel in specially designed copper-cladded canisters for final disposal. The facility has to be ready when a disposal site is to be opened for storage. Since 1994, work has been done on an environmental impact assessment, including consultation of the Oskarshamn municipality[23].
As all nuclear units are located on the coast, almost all transports to the SFR and CLAB facility are conducted by a specially designed vessel, the MS Sigyn, built in 1982. Between 30 and 40 shipments are made every year from the power plants to the waste sites[24].
For very low-level waste, surface disposal facilities are located at the reactor sites of Ringhals, Oskarshamn, Forsmark and at the research center of Studsvik[25].
 

6. RESPONSIBILITIES

In 1980 the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) was founded. It is owned by the four nuclear utilities and has the task to develop a waste management strategy and a disposal site. It is supervised by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI); the Swedish Institute for Radiation Protection (SSI); and the Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste (KASAM). The SKI and SSI report to the Ministry of Environment and are responsible for nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. KASAM was established in 1985 as an independent expert committee and advises the government and ministries on the waste issue[26].
Waste research and storage and disposal costs have to be covered by a Nuclear Waste Fund. All four nuclear power companies are responsible for the future costs of disposal of waste and the decommissioning of reactors. A levy between one and two öre (Dfl 0.0025-0.0050) on every produced kWh should, in combination with growth by interest, provide enough money for present and future costs. Besides, when the fund would seem insufficient, the companies are to be responsible for unforeseen costs[27].
 

7. THE KBS-3 SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL CONCEPT

A Government Commission of Inquiry looked in the mid-1970s at the possibilities for radioactive waste disposal. It concluded that Sweden should not rely on shallow land burial because of the small amount of suitable locations and bad experiences in the U.S. As Sweden had experience in building in crystalline rock, the group recommended the disposal of radioactive waste in rock caves[28].
The electric utilities started, after the 1976 Stipulation Act's publication, a research program on waste disposal, the Nuclear Fuel Safety Project (KBS). It was conducted by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel Supplies Ltd. (SKBF), the precursor of SKB. The Stipulation Act required an "absolutely safe disposal of HLW" as a condition for starting up nuclear reactors[29]. Until now, it had been the policy that the licenses to operate Swedish reactors be made conditional on positive reviews of the SKB's research and development (R&D) programme at three-year intervals. Anti-nuclear groups observed a certain risk in this connection: "What are the chances that a government would refuse to approve SKBs FUD [R&D] programme? Minimal. What politician with normal survival instincts would willingly take on the responsibility of cutting the country's electricity supply in half with the stroke of a pen?"[30]
A concept was developed on final storage and research was carried out on geological, hydrological and geochemical effects. After a cooling period of 30 years, the spent fuel would be packed in containers and placed 500 meters underground, technical and natural barriers should prevent the spread of radioactivity in groundwater for 200,000 years. The outcome led to critical reactions by experts and laymen, discussing the proofs and safety presented, as well as the concept of "acceptable risk"[31].

The KBS project was, at its start, divided into the sub-projects KBS-1 (1977) for the storage of vitrified high-level wastes from reprocessing, then still a practice, and KBS-2 (1978) for the storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Due to the lack of governmental support for reprocessing more attention was paid to the KBS-2 project. The KBS-2 programme consisted of a sea-transport system, copper disposal canisters and disposal starting in 2020.
In 1983, a KBS-3 report was submitted following the KBS-2 principles: centralized storage of fuel for 40 years, the use of copper canisters for disposal and final disposal of waste in two separate repositories[32]. Critics asked for a review, including experts that were excluded between KBS-1 and -2 review. The energy minister however refused, stating that he was familiar with criticism on KBS-1 and -2[33].
The KBS-3 concept consisted of a repository 500 metres below the surface in bedrock. The spent fuel is contained in copper canisters and bentonite should surround the containers. Finally, the tunnels will also be backfilled.
In the first stage of a repository, around the year 2010, some 400 containers will be placed to demonstrate the suitability or unsuitability of the site. After this evaluation period of only five years, the containers can be retrieved if other methods for disposal are required or in individual cases because of safety reasons. For retrieval, methods have to be researched how to locate containers and freeing them from the bentonite backfill[34].
According to SKB's principles, the present generation is responsible for the management and disposal of nuclear waste. Therefore a disposal site should be developed within some decades to limit measures that would be required from future generations. Although SKB also takes into account the possibility for a future generation to modify the disposal concept when desired.

It is planned that this generation will build the repository and deposit the waste containers, but keep open the facility. A next generation then can choose to close the disposal, keep it open or retrieve the waste[35].
According to Greenpeace and other groups, SKB is too much in a hurry and convinced about the safety of the KBS-3 concept. Greenpeace questioned the several modifications that were made to the concept, the uncertainties about a system of monitoring and retrievability periods and aspects like proliferation, that is, that a disposal site might become a "plutonium mine" in the future. In its opinion, too much attention and effort is being given to find a site, instead of working out the method of storing waste more completely. It also stated: "There is also a risk that a certain prestige is involved: the desire to be the first country in the world to solve the unsolvable could turn our heads."[36]
From 1977, the old iron mine at Stripa had been used as an underground research facility. Studies were made on the properties of granite and proceeded till 1992, when the mine was abandoned.
In 1995 the underground Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory was completed as a KBS-3 research project, located close to the Oskarshamn units. It is situated 450 meters below the surface. Research is done on ground-water flow, mechanical damage and techniques for the refilling of a repository[37]. The site itself is not suitable as a possible disposal site as the volume of suitable rock is too small and crossed by large shear zones[38].
Swedish law prohibits the import of foreign nuclear waste, apart from some exceptions. The Act on Nuclear Activities states: "Final disposal in this country of spent nuclear fuel or nuclear waste from a nuclear plant or other nuclear activities in another country is prohibited without a special license." For instance, a special license could be granted for small amounts of waste arising from international research and testing on Swedish territory[39].
 

8. SITING AND VOLUNTARINESS

SKB has been conducting studies of geologic suitability in the country since the mid-1970s. Between 1977 and 1985, test drillings were made at about 10 sites[40].
The first drillings faced protests by local authorities and demonstrators. The 1977 drillings at Finnsjön (close to Forsmark), Kråkemåla (near Oskarshamn) and Sternö (near Karlshamn) attracted still little attention as the nuclear waste issue was rather unknown and therefore not very controversial.
The situation changed when drillings were planned in Kynnefjäll in April 1980. In that region plans had existed for building nuclear reactors and a reprocessing plant. Three nearby municipalities threatened to use their veto power against the storage plans. The local Save Kynnefjäll group started a 24-hour watch on the road leading to the test site and was supported by the local municipal council[41]. Even in recent years the group has still been active. They still note license numbers of unfamiliar cars, unknown trucks are "followed" by citizens, informing each other to find out whether they really leave the municipality[42].
Also at the Svartboberget (Ovanåker), the tests faced demonstrators blocking the road to the test site for three days in February 1981.
Drilling work at Klipperås started in 1983 and could not be stopped by protests. Local groups and politicians asked for adequate information and that an independent geologist could take part in analyzing the results. However, SKB refused the request of an independent geologist as he "would merely be in the way". In June 1984, some 40 metres of drill cores were stolen from a container. In an anonymous reaction to a newspaper, a geologist report said the drill cores showed the unsuitability of the bedrock for waste disposal.
In 1985 plans were made for drilling at Almunge, east of Uppsala. People criticized the lack of information. In a newspaper SKB said: "We do not have the time to sit in on a series of showy meetings. We consider that the meetings cried for by the public have nothing to do with public information." A blockade was organised on the road to the test site and was cleared by the police. Finally the energy and environment minister reprimanded SKB for its lack of information dissemination. An information meeting was set up, being followed the same night by the first test drilling work. Protestors occupied the machines and after a couple of months SKB withdrew its machines from the area[43].
After 1985, SKB focused on a more general desk study on identifying potential suitable areas in Sweden. SKB used the following strategy for finding a suitable site. Firstly, it conducted a general study on Sweden's deep underground. This should give, on a national scale, insight into which parts of the country are unsuitable, interesting or suitable. Secondly, it will conduct five to 10 site-specific feasibility studies in interested municipalities. Finally, at no less than two locations site investigations should be made, including test drillings. Site investigating work should start in 2002. Then a detailed site characterisation can start. But only after an environmental impact assessment (EIA) process has been completed can the underground laboratory be constructed[44].

No formal permits are needed by SKB to conduct the general studies, the feasibility studies or the site investigations. Only for the detailed site characterization, the realisation of a laboratory, will a permit be needed. Although SKB only started the feasibility and site investigations after consent from the concerned municipality[45].
Some areas are excluded as a candidate for site investigations. The Scandinavian mountain range at Skåne and Gotland are unsuitable because of geological reasons, and being an area of national interest with regard to nature conservation. Areas with potential natural resources are also less favourable to use, to prevent possible future human intrusion of a repository[46].
After the late 1970s and early 1980s test drillings and consequent protests, SKB recognised it had failed to find a suitable site. The concept of voluntariness was their new strategy and in October 1992, it wrote a letter to the 280 municipalities in Sweden, asking for their cooperation in finding a suitable location for nuclear waste storage. Eight municipalities agreed to conduct a feasibility studies, which have already been carried out or are under way. These eight are: Storuman, Malå, Nyköping, Östhammar, Oskarshamn, Tierp, Hultsfred and Älvkarleby. Possibly, Nynäshamn will decide soon on joining. Later, we will go more deeply into these municipalities.

But there were also municipalities that showed their initial interest, but later withdrew. During the years there were Överkalix, Arjeplog, Tranemo and Gällivare. Initial contacts with SKB were made by local politicians and administrative officers who were interested. But when the general public became aware of this interest, unrest and opposition started. The decision to withdraw was made to avoid local conflicts within the community and also in political parties.
To be a candidate for a feasibility study has in general a lot of social consequences for a municipality. On one hand, it is said that the feasibility study will result in the perovision of an expense-free in-depth review of the characteristics of the municipality concerning issues like geology, land-use, prospects for industry, population development, etc. But it also leads to high pressure on the municipality council with the risk of overshadowing other important issues. The intense debate that will start within the community is seen as positive by some, it would improve local democracy and people's interest in politics. Others, however, see the risk of a broken municipality. In one of the municipalities, indeed the process led to broken families, harassment and boycotts of local shops.
In all cases, the referendum played an important role. However, it is not laid down in rules when exactly and if it has to be conducted. The municipality can withdraw at any time it wants to. This can be after a council decision or after holding a referendum. The referendum is used by the local government to poll the opinion among its citizens before a next step in the process is undertaken. The referendum may be held before the feasibility study starts, after its results have been published or later, in order to evaluate whether the municipality should go on with SKB[47].
So the municipality has the right to veto plans to site a facility. Swedish municipalities have a strong position that is laid down in the Constitution and special legislation on municipality self-determination. The Act on Management of Natural Resources (replaced now by the Environmental Code) states: "Permission ... may be granted if there is no obstacle on the basis of the stipulations of Chapter 2 and 3 or on the basis of other general planning considerations and if the municipal council has given its approval." Under special conditions however the Swedish government has also the possibility to overrule such a veto: "... the Government may, if a facility is considered in the national interest to be particularly important, grant permission even if the municipal council has not given its approval. This does not apply if a suitable repository site has been identified within another municipality which it can be assumed will approve of the siting, or if another site elsewhere is judged to be more suitable"[48].

The voluntariness concept has also disadvantages from a safety point of view. It can be asked whether those municipalities that volunteered themselves are the most suitable sites, or what degree of safety they can meet, especially as there are only a limited number of volunteers. As Greenpeace said: "By limiting the selection process exclusively to those municipalities in their particular region, SKB has also severely limited the possibility of finding a site which is really best suited for a repository, since there is an exceedingly problematic shortage of voluntary municipalities."[49]
A municipality interested in a study has access to money from the Nuclear Waste Fund. As much as SK2 million (Dfl 493,000) per year can be spent on the setting up of reference groups and the organisation of debates, the spread of information, etc. When a preliminary version of a feasibility study has been presented, funds can be used for independent review[50].

Storuman
A feasibility study on Storuman was presented in February 1995. After its presentation, opponents of the plans for a repository criticized its conclusions. The report is not worth the paper it's written on. It had only positive things to say. Everything is perfect in Storuman", said local opponent Lundberg. She was afraid that local politicians would be on the side of SKB due to the resources it has for information campaigns and trips to the CLAB facility: "I don't know what the hell they did on these trips. People came home brainwashed. We have to campaign against our own politicians." SKB spent some US$ 1.5 million (Dfl 3.3 million) on its Storuman work.
The geologist Moerner, consulted by the People's Campaign Against Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons, said he did not believe in the safety of bedrock disposal: "Bedrock can not be depended upon. It's idiotic to put it in Storuman, just because there are mountains there." He pointed to the problem of predicting future geological events, as Sweden knew in earlier ice-ages very frequent earthquakes. He proposed the construction of long-term aboveground monitored storage[51].
In 1993, it was decided to hold a referendum as soon as the feasibility study would be ready. The 1995 outcome of it was 71% of the votes being opposed to the plans. One day after the referendum, SKB started preparations to leave the municipality, as was agreed before.
In a SKB-financed study, it was investigated what the reasons were for the negative outcome. In people's opinion it seemed that there were doubts about the safety of the KBS-3 concept and the necessary transports to a site. Besides, it was feared that a potential site would have a negative impact on wilderness tourism. It was also discussed why a municipality in the north of the country would have the duty to store waste that was produced in the south of it, it was seen as a threat from the industrialised south to one of the last remaining wild regions in the country[52].

Malå
In November 1993, the municipality council asked SKB to conduct a feasibility study, although the council was very divided over the issue. Fourteen members voted "yes", another 14 "no" and three abstained, the chairman made the final decision to participate. It was planned to hold a referendum after the results of the feasibility study would be ready.
A reference group was formed with 22 members from six political parties and 16 from different interest groups. It had to follow the work, spread information and contribute ideas.
In March 1996, the feasibility study was published after which an independent review started. This local working group consisted of members from political parties, local unions, local business, Laplanders, local tourism, local sports associations, senior citizen organisations, etc. Although opponents of the feasibility study were invited for comment, they refused to participate. The local working group formed four committees to study the issues of environment/safety, geology/hydrology, transport/facilities and socio-economics. Before the referendum, its results were published, including recommendations for further studies.
The outcome of the 1997 referendum was less negative than in Storuman, voting 55% against further cooperation. Reasons for this could be: the issue was better known at that time, Malå has an industrial tradition, no wilderness tourism, a massive information campaign by SKB, and extensive study work on the issue by the municipality itself[53].

Nyköpping
SKB decided not only to wait for volunteering municipalities, but also explicitly asked municipalities with nuclear activities on its territory to participate. Nyköpping, a municipality with such activities (research reactor and waste handling) on its territory, was asked by SKB in May 1997 to cooperate. The council declared it had officially no legal power to prevent SKB from doing a study, but were also not negative about the idea.
A working group for information was set up, with local politicians. Municipality administrative officers formed a second group and in 1996 a reference group was founded, consisting of members from different interest groups[54]. The twenty-four members of the reference group were selected by public nomination to the municipal board. It has only an advisory function, but it was tried to involve as much local groups and societies as possible[55].
During the process, sub-reports by SKB were discussed in these three groups and public meetings were held. In May 1997, the final report was published for review by independent experts[56]. A preliminary version of the feasibility study has been completed at the moment. After municipal review and comments to SKB, a final feasibility report will be made[57]. A council decision on further cooperation is expected when (and if) SKB formally will ask the municipality for a site investigation[58].

Östhammar
Östhammar, the municipality in which the Forsmark reactors are located, agreed in June 1995 to cooperate, with 36 council casting "yes" votes and 12 "no". In a formal agreement SKB was made responsible for conducting the feasibility study and the council for setting up the reference group. The reference group consisted of seven elected politicians and seven council members. Like in Nyköping, separate reports were discussed in the group and public meetings were held. A preliminary version of the feasibility report was presented in September 1997 for review[59].
The Östhammar study is limited in terms of public involvement. The reference group is a advisory body to the council only and has no formal contact system with the public[60].

Oskarshamn
The process in Oskarshamn, were the CLAB and three reactors are located, started not earlier than 1996. After the spring 1995 invitation by SKB, the council started a consultation process on the plans and in October 1996 the council agreed to go ahead with a feasibility study under certain conditions. It wanted to have influence on the issues being studied and on the forms of interaction between SKB and governmental authorities. For instance, a proposal for the study was subject of a formal municipality decision. The council itself would act as the reference group. Besides, working groups were set up with elected politicians and representatives from different interest groups[61]. These working groups were independent from the reference group and can hire their own experts and advisers when they thought necessary[62].
Some believe that the choice has already been made that Oskarshamn should be the site for a repository. This conclusion was made when SKB presented figures on transports among the CLAB, the encapsulation plant and a repository site. As in the R&D Programme 1992 no figures were given about transports among those three it was concluded that the repository should be at the same place as CLAB and the encapsulation plant, and thus Oskarshamn[63]. A preliminary version of the feasibility study has been completed[64].

Tierp
In May 1998, the municipality of Tierp, next to the municipality of Östhammar, was asked by SKB to cooperate, as SKB wanted to expand the Östhammar feasibility study to parts of Tierp. In June 1998 it agreed[65].

Hultsfred, Älvkarleby and Nynäshamn
In May 1999, the municipality of Hultsfred, close to Oskarshamn, decided positively on a feasibility study. In June 1999, Älvkarleby, neighbouring Tierp, agreed to cooperate. SKB asked the municipality of Nynäshamn, southeast of Stockholm, to show interest. The council has not taken a decision yet (as of July 1999)[66].
So, up until now, apart from municipalities showing only initial interest, eight have agreed to be candidate for feasibility studies, and one has yet to decide. Two of the municipalities (Mala and Storuman) withdrew when the local public voted against further steps in a referendum. Nyköpping, Östhammar, Oskarshamn, Tierp, Hultsfred and Älvkarleby are the six candidates left (later possibly also Nynäshamn) for the next phase of test drillings, that should take place at two of these, at least. At the moment, no referendums are yet planned for any of the municipalities. It might be that they want to wait for the outcome of the final feasibility reports. Municipal councils could also wait until site drilling results have been completed. The referendums in Storuman and Måla were held in an early stage. Other municipalities may decide to wait until more research results are known[67].
 

9. THE NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR FOR NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL

Four municipalities (Malå, Nyköpping, Oskarshamn and Östhammar) initiated the idea of a National Co-ordinator for Nuclear Waste Disposal. In a government decision of 15 May 15 1996, Olof Söderberg was appointed to this function for a three-year period, ending 30 June 1999[68].
The task of the National Co-ordinator is mainly to co-ordinate information and investigation work. The governmental decision states: "The task involves promoting co-ordination of information and investigating inputs found necessary by municipalities affected by Svensk Kärnbränslehantering AB's (SKB) studies concerning siting of facilities for spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste." In its decision, the government emphasized that the formal responsibility for finding a solution is for the reactor owners, and thus SKB. The government states that the proposal for a national co-ordinator "does not in any way relieve the reactor owners of responsibility for handling and finally disposing of the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste"[69].
The National Co-ordinator has to propose forms for information exchange and co-ordinate between municipalities and county administration. As the government has advised SKB to make 5-10 feasibility studies as a basis for future selection of a repository site, the national co-ordinator also has made contacts with municipalities in an early and informal way, with the aim of interesting them for contacts with SKB. However, such activities do not in any way relieve SKB from its responsibility in the site selection process[70].
His main task should thus be the co-ordination of information flow in all stages and not to find interested municipalities or negotiating with them on the conditions for feasibility studies. He should be an "independent point of contact at the Cabinet Office for representatives from municipalities that would like information on the implications of participating in feasibility studies". This is also meant for individuals wanting information[71].
On request of the municipalities, the national co-ordinator set up a discussion forum called "National EIA Forum for Nuclear Waste Disposal". This informal forum should discuss the forms and contents of a future Environmental Impact Assessment process that has to be conducted in order to make an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), necessary as part of the license request for construction of an underground laboratory[72].
In the phase of setting up the forum, around the end of 1996, Swedish EIA regulation was a recent invention and partly not quite clear. Municipal representatives interpreted the legislation as a possibility to have influence on SKB's work, while environmental groups saw it as a possibility to question the whole legal structure with SKB as the responsible entity.

In June 1997, an informal session was held with environmental groups, municipality representatives, SKB and other authorities. Environmental organisations wanted broader discussions than only SKB's study results. They wanted a discussion about the legal responsibilities of SKB, the procedure of decision-making, and actually a stop of SKB's work.
After having questioned the democratic representation of the elected municipal representatives, the municipal officials stated that they saw no point in further discussions with environmental groups. They also believed that the national level of environmental groups had urged local organisations to boycott local discussion groups. As the forum was an initiative of the municipalities, the national co-ordinator had to follow their will and environmental organisations were not invited for further meetings[73].
The National EIA Forum now has representatives from SKB, the four municipalities, county administration boards[74], SKI, SSI, Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, the National Board of Housing, and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities, and is chaired by the national co-ordinator[75].
The three main issues that were identified for discussion were: alternative options for disposal other than KBS-3, site selection criteria and related issues to the KBS-3 concept[76].
The alternative option included a zero alternative, when no disposal site would be made. The siting issue dealt with aspects like site selection criteria, feasibility studies, the structure of decision-making for the choice for two sites for site characterization, etc. It should also come to conclusions on when and how concerned parties, like municipalities, should be involved in the decision-making process. The KBS-3 related issues include alternative sites for the encapsulation plant, canister research and retrievability[77].
The National EIA Forum was planned to meet about two to four times a year and the memorandums from the meetings should be publicly available. Special drafting committees could be formed to study certain issues before they are discussed in the forum. Members of drafting committees are mostly chosen forum members[78].
In autumn 1997, a drafting committee was formed to discuss the alternative options issue from an ethical perspective. The drafting committee included members from the municipalities, the county administration, and was chaired by a member of KASAM. At a June 1998 discussion in the forum, it was underlined that discussions from the ethical perspective should also take place at local levels. After the discussion, it was concluded that the present generation is responsible for finding an optimum solution based on now known technology. However, because of the long-term perspective of disposal, the consequences of the present choices are uncertain. The disposal concept should therefore be in a way that future generations can make other choices for it[79].
The results of this discussion were published in a booklet in Swedish and is intended to form a basis for discussion, for instance in feasibility municipalities[80].
The memorandums of the forum meetings have also been sent by the national co-ordinator to five environmental and nature organisations (the Waste Chain, People's Campaign against Nuclear Power / Nuclear Weapons, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the Swedish Nature Conservation Society)[81]. The latest meetings of the forum were held in October 1998 and January 1999. The interest of the municipalities has shifted to other urgent issues, such as SKB's R&D Programme 1998 and the new Environmental Act[82].

Two more times, environmental organisations had a meeting with the national co-ordinator. In the fall of 1998, environmental organisations and concerned parties in the municipalities under evaluation were invited for a meeting on SKB's R&D report 1998. However, groups were divided about the pros and cons of taking part. So some accepted and others declined the invitation. Another meeting was held in February 1999, where again criticism of SKB and the KBS-3 method was raised. Much of the discussion was focused on the decision-making process and the roles of the regulatory authorities, the national co-ordinator, local governments and environmental groups.
The meetings are not always perceived as being constructive or of any influence. To quote a representative of environmental groups: "I have more and more come to suspect that the authorities look upon these meetings with environmental organisations as a purely therapeutic exercise. Therapeutic in the sense that they give anxiety-ridden, naive and disruptive elements (that's us!) an opportunity to vent, under appropriate constraints, their irrational feelings and frustrations. The authorities, for their part, sit back and listen and speak reassuringly to us in hopes that after the session we will go home and put our fevered minds to rest and let the experts get on with their important work."[83]
The EIA process is still less regulated and undergoes changes. In January 1999, a new EIA regulation was adopted which included provisions for environmental organisations for a role in preparing an EIS. And a new "Environmental Code" prescribed that the opinions of environmental organisations have to be considered seriously. SSI, SKI and KASAM have asked the government to give organisations some sort of support to give them the possibility to "provide well-founded advice"[84].
As the national co-ordinator had been appointed for the period of three years, ending June 30, 1999, his task officially ended at that date. In a government decision of June 1999, his task was reformulated, the name changed into "Special Advisor for Nuclear Waste Disposal", and he was appointed for another three years. Again, the co-ordination of information and investigation work is emphasized. The government decision recognised that his function should be clarified and the tasks more specifically defined, as desired by reviewing bodies and the National Co-ordinator himself. It also said that his function "should be more closely linked to the government offices"[85].
 

10. SUMMARY

Sweden has 12 nuclear power reactors and has a policy of a nuclear phaseout, although there are no deadlines. Low- and intermediate-level wastes from the nuclear program are stored at the final disposal site SFR in Forsmark, located below the bottom of the Baltic Sea. High-level waste, spent fuel, is stored at the interim near-surface CLAB facility in Oskarshamn.
SKB, responsible for waste management, developed the KBS-3 concept for the final disposal of spent fuel in an underground repository. First construction work for a repository should start around 2010 and should include a limited possibility of retrievability. Only after the first five-year demonstration period can the canisters be retrieved.
After the earlier failure to find a suitable site, SKB introduced the concept of voluntariness. It invited municipalities to show interest in conducting a feasibility study. SKB wanted to conduct at least five feasibility studies, after which it will select two sites for test drillings, to start from 2002. Around 2010, an underground repository should be constructed at one site. Up until now, eight municipalities have shown interest, either by volunteering themselves or after an invitation from SKB. In two of these sites, Malå and Storuman, referendums were held and both voted against the plans. Now, feasibility studies have been completed or are underway at six other sites (Nyköpping, Östhammar, Oskarshamn, Tierp, Hultsfred and Älvkarleby), all of them having nuclear activities in their own municipality or in a neighbouring municipality. Possibly, Nynäshamn will be a candidate soon as well. All of these still have the opportunity to withdraw. Environmental groups have warned that the system of volunteering has the risk that not the safest site is selected, but one where there is an overall acceptance from a social point of view.
In 1996, a National Co-ordinator for Nuclear Waste disposal was appointed to co-ordinate the information flow between the different authorities and municipalities. Apart from being an information source for interested municipalities, he set up a National Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Forum. This forum, which does not include representatives from environmental organisations, should discuss the contents of the EIA that is necessary for constructing the underground repository.
 

11. CONCLUSIONS

1. Retrievability (still) plays a minor role in the KBS-3 concept as it is only guaranteed for five years. It might be more difficult to gain public acceptance for the KBS-3 concept as environmental groups and the public often emphasize the importance of controllability and accessibility.
2. Environmental groups have criticized the idea of voluntariness. And indeed it can be questioned whether the safest site is found in the underground of a "nuclear municipality" or some other volunteer. Another risk is the hurry with which SKB wants to proceed.
3. The exclusion of environmental groups, upon the behest of the concerned municipalities, in the National EIA Forum can later lead to new conflicts, when the EIA procedure really starts.