Introduction
In Switzerland, there is an ongoing discussion about the suitability of Wellenberg for the storage of low- and intermediate-level waste. A referendum has been held whose results rejected the proposal, but the location remains an issue of discussion: possibly a new referendum will be held in which retrievability will play an important role. That is the first subject of this chapter. The second subject is the "Energy Dialogue" of 1998, where experts of different backgrounds tried to reach consensus on the management and disposal of nuclear waste.
For this chapter, mainly information from governments, environmental organisations and the Nagra ("Nationale Genossenschaft für die Lagerung radioaktiver Abfälle" (National Company for the Storage of Radioactive Wastes) were used. A draft version of this chapter was commented upon by Armin Braunwalder, director of the Schweizerische Energie-Stiftung (SES, Swiss Energy Foundation); Prof. Hans Ruh, chairman of the Energie-Dialog Entsorgung (Energy-Dialogue Disposal); and Urs Frick of the communications division of the Nagra.
 

1. NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

Because of a 1963 governmental decision to be less dependent on fossil fuels, nuclear power plants were built. The oldest came into commercial operation in 1969, the latest in 1984[1]. Three pressurised and two boiling water reactors are now operating and have a capacity of 3,000 MWe and produce 40% of generated electricity (the rest is hydro power).
On five occasions, a referendum was held on the issue of nuclear energy. The latest was on 23 September 1990, when the people decided to implement a 10-year moratorium on the building of new nuclear reactors, but voted against the closure of the existing plants[2].
In 1998, about 40 environmental organisations took the initiative for two new referendums. The first referendum, which was called "Strom ohne Atom" (Electricity without Atoms), proposed the closure of the reactors Beznau 1 and 2 and Mühleberg within two years. The second referendum, called "Moratorium Plus", asked for a limitation of the lifetime of nuclear power plants to 40 years and was against the building of new reactors[3]. The existing reactors will reach the 40-year age around 2009 to 2024[4].
By October 1999, the environmental organisations are expected to present 100,000 signatures to the government to let the referendums take place. It will be a countrywide referendum. Apart from that, cantonal and communal referendums can take place. To let these take place, a much smaller number of signatures is needed[5].
Referendums can also be held on the storage of nuclear waste. The law gives several possibilities of public input, for instance through referendums on a number of issues: on preparing activities and the undertaking of test drillings, on the realisation itself of an underground storage site, and on the moment a storage site will definitely close[6].
 

2. PRODUCERS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

The nuclear power reactors produce most of the radioactive waste, including waste from reprocessing of spent fuel abroad and from the dismantling of nuclear installations. In Geneva, a particle accelerator at CERN is operated that produces radioactive waste, and later also dismantling waste. Apart from this, there is waste from other research and hospitals.
Of the existing radioactive waste, 80% of the volume comes from nuclear power and 20% from (CERN) research, industry and hospitals. On the share of hospitals, no separate figures have been published[7].
 

3. CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

Three types of radioactive waste are distinguished:
- low- and intermediate-level waste;
- long-lived intermediate-level waste; and
- high-level waste.
For these three waste types Switzerland plans two repositories. One would be for the low- and intermediate-level waste (LILW) which produces almost no heat, such as the production waste from nuclear reactors, waste from the industry, research and hospitals.
The second repository is planned for heat-generating high-level waste (HLW) and long-lived intermediate-level waste (i.e., alpha-emitting intermediate-level waste (TRU)) from reprocessing of spent fuel.
 

4. AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

4.1 Present amounts
To date, some 10,000 m³ of radioactive waste have been produced: 4,000 m³ production waste from nuclear power reactors, 4,000 m³ reprocessing waste (that is still abroad) and 2,000 m³ waste from industry, research and hospitals[8]. Between 1969 and 1982, some 5,300 MT were dumped in the ocean[9].
A rule of thumb is that 99% of the volume of conditioned waste is of the category low- and intermediate-level waste and 1% high-level, while 99% of the activity is high-level and 1% low and intermediately active[10].

4.2 Future amounts
Taking into account a production time of 40 years for every existing nuclear power reactor, 100,000 m³ low- and intermediate-level waste would be produced. Of this, 24,000 m³ would come from reprocessing, 12,000 m³ from plant operation, and 43,000 m³ from dismantling. Some 21,000 m³ low- and intermediate waste from industry, research and hospitals would be produced[11].Other figures speak about 80,000 m³, of which 15,000 m³ would be from industry, research and hospitals[12]. The differences are caused by changes in estimations about the possibilities to condition radioactive waste and compressing techniques[13].
The nuclear power reactors also give:
1. 3000 MT of spent fuel (high density, roughly 10 MT/m³; if all this would be reprocessed, which is highly unlikely, 500 m³ of waste glass in 2000 flasks could be expected (no overpack).
2. Some 2000 m³ of conditioned TRU waste are expected from reprocessing (there is no permit for this, but a so-called "Becquerel Swap" is still being debated by reprocessing plants and utilities, as the reprocessing plants would like to send back to Switzerland, instead of the ILW-barrels, a small additional amount of vitrified HLW waste)[14].
 

5. WHERE IS IT STORED?

Spent fuel is first stored in the cooling basins (pools) of the nuclear power plants. After transport, it may be stored at the reprocessing plants until reprocessed. Reprocessing wastes (long-lived intermediate-level and high-level) are still abroad awaiting transport.
In 1990, the operators of the nuclear power plants founded the ZWILAG (Zwischenlager Würenlingen AG) for the interim storage of reprocessing waste or spent fuel that is not being reprocessed, the high-level waste glass as well as other types of radioactive waste. The facility consists of eight buildings located within the area of the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), less than two kilometers away from the Beznau nuclear power plant. The PSI is one of the few facilities in Switzerland where nuclear research is being conducted on a larger scale[15].
The ZWILAG was able to buy a piece of ground from the government--the owner of the PSI--and has obtained approval from the municipality of Würenlingen. After a six-year license procedure, the government issued the license on 21 August 1996, and construction work started five days later. Animated discussions have been, and still are, present about this storage. Much protests has come from the neighbouring South German areas.
The ZWILAG facility was accepted by the local government, but one can hardly speak about broad public acceptance[16].
The storage of spent fuel from the nuclear power plant Leibstadt and canisters with high-level reprocessing waste will begin in February-March 2000[17].

The low- and intermediate-level waste is currently stored at the nuclear power plants which still have variable but limited capacity for storage. If a low- and intermediate-level waste repository could not be built in the next decade, additional central storage facilities will have to be constructed at the ZWILAG site--or the storage capacity of the plants will have to be increased. The first possibility is considered as ground being reserved near the PSI[18]. (The disposal of high-level waste is not that urgent because it has to cool down for at least 40 years. Research is being conducted and in 2001 a survey is expected on the possibilities for final disposal of this waste[19]).
According to the law, the federal government is responsible for the storage of waste from industry, research and hospitals. In 1984, the decision was made to build an interim storage at the PSI site. After a delay of five years, this storage--the Bundeszwischenlager (the federal interim storage)--became operational in 1992. Its capacity of 5,000 m³ is sufficient to store the waste that will be delivered until 2010[20].
 

6. RESPONSIBILITIES

As mentioned above, the federal government, according to law, is responsible for the storage of waste from industry, research and hospitals. According to a 1972 decision, the operators of the nuclear power reactors are responsible for the management and storage of their nuclear waste. In that year, these operators and the federal government together founded the Nagra, in which the operators have a share of approximately 95%. According to Swiss law, the wastes have to be stored within the borders of Switzerland, but for the long-term the option of an international storage is open for high-level waste, due to economic reasons[21]. Recently, Nagra President Hans Issler pointed to this possibility of international storage, especially for high-level wastes[22]. For instance, the Nagra already has a 10% share in the international company Pangea Resources Australia Pty Ltd., that wants to establish such an international disposal site in Australian deserts[23]. Environmental organisations fear that export will result in a shift of nuclear waste abroad. They see it as a recognition by the Nagra that the present waste policy has failed in Switzerland. Peter Steiner of the Komitee für die Mitsprache der Nidwaldner Bevölkerung bei Atomanlagen (NMA, Committee for the Involvement of the Nidwalder People Near Nuclear Installations) also points to the fact that country borders in Europe were formed quite arbitrarily and that therefore no discussions can be exluded[24]. The Nagra does not agree with this judgment: "That is what amateurs, and not national as well as international experts, say. Swiss ordinances and guidelines prescribe the same strict limits for the Swiss people as for any population, wherever waste is being disposed of"[25].
As a result of a governmental decision, a levy of 1 Rappen (0.01 Swiss Franc; Dfl 0.014) per kWh is paid for the interim and final storage of nuclear waste[26]. In early 1998, SF 6,700 million (Dfl 9,250 million) was set aside, of which SF 2,200 million (Dfl 3,010 million) has already been spent. The money is not managed by the Nagra but by the operators of the nuclear power reactors[27]. The operators estimate the costs for the storage of nuclear waste at SF 13.7 billion (Dfl 18.7 billion), but the Schweizerische Energie-Stiftung has calculated that this will be insufficient and pleads in favour of more funds[28].
 

7. WELLENBERG

The discussion about the storage at Wellenberg is relevant to the Netherlands because of the role of "retrievability of waste" and "Kontrollierbarkeit", i.e., long-term monitoring of a repository, which is under discussion in Switzerland.
In 1978, the Nagra started a selection process for low- and intermediate-level waste. Among others, the following criteria were used in this. The volume of the storage site should be sufficient. Disposal near the surface, that depends highly on technical barriers, is excluded because of the high density of population in Switzerland and a lack of thin populated areas, according to the government. The disposal in the deep underground has to be safe, without the necessity of long-term supervision. From the beginning, retrievability was therefore excluded. The choice for locations should take place on grounds of safety, and after the collection of sufficient data for this. Issues like infrastructure should play a minor role. If different locations could meet the criteria, then further research would be required.
From a list of 100 locations originally, the Nagra chose 20 in 1981. An evaluation gave three preferred locations: Bois de la Glaive (anhydrite), Oberbauenstock (marl) and Piz Pian Grand (gneiss). At the end of 1983, the Nagra asked permission for further research at these locations. On 30 September 1985, a license was issued but with certain conditions. The government only allowed test drillings and other research. Construction of a shaft was postponed until after the drillings at the three locations shall have been completed[29].
In 1987, the Nagra added to the list the location Wellenberg, near the municipality of Wolfenschiessen in the canton Nidwalden. At this location, the disposal could be conducted horizontally as well as vertically through accesible caverns and shafts. Another criterion for Wellenberg was--apart from the expected big volume and the good possibility to exploit from the earth’s surface--the possibility to ship the waste by train. A disadvantage was the lack of available geological knowledge at that time[30].

Wellenberg was not on the original list of 100 locations, but Niederbauern which was close to Wellenberg indeed was on it. The Nagra now presents Wellenberg and Niederbauern to be one and the same location. In the period 1981-1983, the Nagra wanted to make speed and thus available knowledge was an important criterion in its choice. Therefore, Wellenberg-Niederbauern was placed at the end of the list, stated the Nagra. When later, more time seemed to be available, the lack of knowledge could be made up by an extensive research. According to the Nagra, with this the mentioned advantages of Wellenberg became valid[31]. On 31 August 1988, a license for extensive research was issued. It concerned the entrance shaft as well as the construction of the disposal mine itself that would costs SF 50 million (Dfl 69 million)[32].
Peter Steiner, representative of a regional action group, disagreed with the Nagra’s presentation of the location choice. He said: "Everywhere Nagara wanted to conduct test drillings there was resistance. Hugo Waser, at that time an important administrator of the canton Nidwalden, made contact with the Nagra. In January 1986, the Nidwalden council decided to offer its canton to the Nagra for the storage of nuclear waste. A consideration in this was the fact that it was a structurally weak region which needed employment. The Nagra accepted the offer. We thought it concerned the location Niederbauern. However, the Nagra conducted research in the whole canton and selected Wellenberg as location. This came as a surprise, the more so since Wellenberg did not meet the criteria to be a location that could easily be researched. We are doubting the criteria for location choice. For instance, there are no criteria to exclude a location. That makes it possible to adjust the criteria on the basis of the results found. With this, it is not a clear and controllable process. That is one of our objections to the choice for Wellenberg"[33]. The Nagra reacted by saying: "So what? That's Steiner's activist view and is not a qualified statement."[34]
Research at the different locations faced resistance and could sometimes begin only after a long delay. This was the reason the Nagra could not choose Wellenberg earlier than 1993 as number one. The Nagra considered Wellenberg suitable because of safety reasons, the influence of the environment, but above all the sufficient storage capacity. The available storage capacity at Oberbauernstock would be just enough. At Bois de la Glaive there were questions about safety and at Piz Pian Grand, the tranport routes were less suitable than at Wellenberg[35].
For the building and management of Wellenberg, the Nagra founded the GNW (Genossenschaft für nukleare Entsorgung Wellenberg, or Company for nuclear disposal Wellenberg).

In the discussion about Wellenberg, critics of the project stated that the storage should be retrievable and controllable. The Nagra had strong doubts about this, but "the way and means of how certain amateurs planned retrievabilty and controllability was in contrast to existing guidelines from the authorities. Nevertheless, the Nagra and the GNW acknowledged that these are political issues which can be addressed by slightly adjusting the existing repository concepts"[36].
The discussion finally resulted in a June 1995 referendum, in which a majority of Nidwalden voted 52:48% (overall turnout was 72%) against a combined proposal, namely, to receive the state concession for an exploration drill plus repository construction. Given the distribution of powers in Switzerland, the storage had been abandoned with this outcome. The Nagra called it a serious setback[37].
The Nagra studied the voting behaviour of the people. It seemed that people, voters as well as non-voters, cared about the referendum. Mostly, the people informed themselves by magazines (72%), television (42%), radio (32%), conversations with relatives or family (29%), brochures (20%) or attending information hearings (16%). Only 4% did not inform themselves[38].
Main arguments to vote against were: lack of safety, fear for the future, and being principal opponent to nuclear energy. Only recently, the Nagra recognised that it underestimated the "emotions" of the people[39], as well as the campaign carried out on the TV, where the pro-Wellenberg people were left with a highly negative image[40].
Another aspect was the combined request for building an access research shaft and the building of the storage. The disposal concept included the direct closure of the storage caverns; in that way, retrievability might be costly. The Nagra studied how the citizens of Nidwalden would have voted if the license only covered the research shaft and not the building of the storage mine itself; and, secondly, what if the aim for retrievability and controllability had been followed. It seemed that in that case, 61 percent would have voted in favour of the storage in Wellenberg[41].
From this, the Nagra concluded that it would be worthwhile to ask for a new license, with a step-by-step implementation of the storage, in which decisions about closure of the disposal would be postponed. Future generations themselves would then have the possibility to decide[42]. So the Nagra did not want to give up Wellenberg and retrievability would give perspectives as "there exists an 'angepasstes Entsorgungskonzept' (adapted disposal concept) which left the control and the decision for backfill to future generations. It only required minor modifications of the waste emplacement procedures. The question then remained, what could happen within the life-time of men and what parameters could be monitored? This was the theme that was discussed among experts 10-15 years ago within the framework of activities in the Swedish underground facilities Stripa and Äspö. Within the possible timeframes and strict safety measures, there were no convincing concepts available for long-term monitoring"[43].
The government agreed with the Nagra. Swiss Minister of Energy Moritz Leuenberger announced to the canton Nidwalden in December 1996 that he considered Wellenberg suitable and not to have it excluded by a new referendum. After this, the council of Nidwalden, the Regierungsrat, agreed with a constructive cooperation[44].
A working group with all those involved should deal with the questions of a new referendum. The federal government and the canton council would require the storage to be retrievable and controllable. On 5 March 1997, the working group was formed by the government. In this group, some ministries, local and regional governments, supervising governmental authorities and opponents of the storage could participate. Opponents of Nidwalden and Swiss environmental organisations refused to participate[45]. Armin Braunwalder said: "A proponent of nuclear energy became chairman of the working group. And the goal of the working group was to turn back the results of the referendum. We, who won the referendum, did not feel like giving up our victory. Therefore, the environmental groups that acted as one group did not join the working group. I explained why we did not cooperate. I declared to be, and have been, indeed in favour of an international congress on the storage of nuclear waste. We also wanted a broad discussion at the national level. But they did not react on this"[46].
In the view of the Nagra, this was "a highly distorted view. The activists most probably did not cooperate because they had no realistic, useful and safe technical measures to support their often idealistic demands. Technical propositions can be scrutinized by the extisting national--and also international--expert guidelines. Activists had to avoid this due to common lack of know-how."[47]
The working group started two sub-groups, on technical and on economic aspects. The report on technical aspects was released on 15 April 1990 and the one on economic aspects in June 1998. The conlusion was: there were good technical as well as economic reasons to proceed with Wellenberg[48]. The storage should meet the criterion of retrievability and controllability[49]. The government announced that it would decide on Wellenberg Entsorgung" became available[50]. Although the results were now available (see next paragraphs), the government has taken no decisions up to now.
Steiner thinks there will be no new referendum: "The council of Nidwalden is no longer a proponent of the storage. And when a new license request will look like the old one, the council will refuse the request and not propose it to the people in a new referendum. If it comes to a new proposal, we will again try to let the storage be rejected"[51].
 

8. "ENERGY-DIALOG ENTSORGUNG" (Energy-Dialogue Disposal)

8.1 Background and procedure
In June 1997, the Swiss government recognized that there remained open questions on energy politics that would have to be studied in detail by a broadly composed working group. The management and storage of radioactive waste was one of the open questions. On 10 February 1998, the working group Energie-Dialog Entsorgung, chaired by Professor Hans Ruh of the Zürich University, started. Since the 1970s, Ruh has published works about ethics and energy.
The working group had the task to answer questions about the management and disposal of radioactive waste, and make proposals for a consensus on these aspects. The working group was composed of 14 members coming from operators of nuclear power reactors, the Nagra, environmental organisations and the ministries involved[52].
Ruh explained that "according to the government, a decision should be made about the future energy supply and the future of nuclear energy. For each open question, the government has formed a working group. The ministries participated because they were dealing with the problem and must conduct policy. Such a broadly composed commission that is directed towards consensus is of typical Swiss culture"[53]. After earlier doubts, the environmental organisations which acted as one group joined in. "A long time it has been: firstly, a policy to stop the use of nuclear energy and then discussing the storage. That was explained as a refusal to talk. We questioned what could be the results of participation in a working group. We saw it as a chance to bring in our arguments in an offical framework. Afterwards, the participation was worthwhile as our position was in the final report," says Braunwalder[54].
According to the procedures agreed upon, at the end of 1998 a final report should be available. The working group itself could decide about study methods and, in limited amounts, give research orders. Experts could be invited and hearings held. The task of the secretariat was done by the Ministry of Energy[55]. According to Ruh, the working group discussed storage concepts from foreign countries, but not their procedures to reach consensus: "In Switzerland one says: 'there are referendums to solve conflicts'. Only now, they are thinking of methods for discussion[56]."
Until the end of September 1998, the working group had met seven times. Experts were heard on ethical questions about the use of nuclear energy, about arguments pro and contra retrievable disposal and about reprocessing versus direct disposal. The operators of nuclear power reactors and environmental organisations brought in reports. Representatives of the government prepared proposals to reach consensus, Ruh says. No consensus could be reached on essential questions. It was the goal that the participants should together prepare a final report, but because of lack of agreement, in fact no report could be released. Therefore Chairman Ruh, in accordance with the tasks of the working group, himself made a final report[57]. This was not without criticism. For instance, the environmental organisations issued 10 pages of criticism on the concept’s final report[58]. In the following, we discuss two aspects of the report.

8.2 The obstacle of nuclear energy
One of the main obstacles to the attempt to reach consensus was the connection of disposal of nuclear waste with the use of nuclear power reactors. Prof. Ruh remarked that the theme of nuclear energy was beyond the mandate of the working group. But a decision to stop the use of nuclear energy would make it easier to discuss the storage of nuclear waste. Therefore, the working group did discuss the future of nuclear energy[59].
All members of the working group agreed that a referendum on the building of new reactors would be useful. The reactor operators, however, refused to talk about putting a stop to nuclear energy as a precondition for a solution for the nuclear waste. And this precondition was exactly what the environmental organisations wanted to hold onto[60].
Ruh tried to find a solution for this problem by seeking an agreement on ethical starting points: "I suggested proposals. In the beginning it looked hopeful, but as the discussion proceeded, it seemed that the operators wanted a solution for the nuclear waste problem as soon as possible to keep the nuclear power reactors open for another 20 years. Then the environmental organisations remarked on the unsolved problem of storage of nuclear waste and wanted to prevent the storage at Wellenberg."
Ruh had difficulties with the posture of the operators: "One of the operators said that opponents of nuclear energy would be responsible for a human disaster that exceeds Auschwitz. The reasoning was that if people opposed nuclear energy, there will be less energy available for, say, food production, and that would give rise to famine. Such a statement did not contribute to the willingness of environmental organisations to reach a consensus"[61].
Till the end, Ruh tried to reach consensus. He proposed to limit the lifetime extension of reactors to a maximum of 10 years. If it were more than 10 years, this would require a referendum. This proposal, however, was unacceptable to the environmental organisations. Braunwalder emphasized that it concerned a guiding choice: "We should now determine which energy supply we want to use in the future. The longer we keep nuclear reactors in operation, the more chances we lose. We should give a clear signal, also for the investors. Therefore, we cannot agree to operate nuclear power reactors until the year 2025. And our attitude was also inspired by the tough and polemical way of discussion by the operators of nuclear reactors and the Nagra. They were not prepared to change their attitude and were not looking for a consensus"[62].
The Nagra disagreed strongly: "This is an unwarranted statement showing the typical arguments of various interest groups such as photovoltaic or geothermal lobbyists. And for a long time now, the Nagra's philosophy is to avoid polemics, at least this is what we employees are told."[63]

8.3 Future generations and retrievable storage
The working group had different opinions on how to give content to responsibilities to future generations.
The operators of nuclear power reactors (who had the same points of view as the Nagra and GNW on all the cases mentioned below) aimed at a definite solution which will bring no problems to future generations. In their view, it is the present generation that has benefited from nuclear energy and therefore should be responsible for finding a solution that should also be safe if future generations are no longer willing or capable of maintaining the disposal. In their view, this is for the benefit of future generations. That means a choice for definite disposal. In the opinion of the Nagra, this is not a choice against retrievability: "Waste is always retrievable, whatever disposal concept is chosen. It's merely a matter of effort to do it. The Nagra may be against "retrievability" as viewed by activists, as its concept does not meet the criteria for final disposal but rather corresponds to infinite interim disposal. The "Angepasste Lagerkonzepte" allow for a politically accepted time, some "control" by man (whatever that should mean) and easier removal of waste containers. This can be implemented for L&ILW as well as HLW without changing the basic repository concepts."[64]

The environmental organisations stated that with the production of nuclear waste, a situation had been created that can not be turned back anymore, with consequences for thousands of years. With this, the present generation limits the freedom of action of future generations. By storing nuclear waste in a definite form, this freedom is even more restricted. Retrievable and controllable storage keeps open some freedom of action for future generations from the viewpoint of new technologies or the possibility to repair possible damage of storage canisters[65]. "But there is no word on the notorious unreliability of human society which, in the long run, is clearly unsuited for idealistic wishes. The right places in geology are far, far more reliable than any human society. Even on a historical time scale", is the reaction of the Nagra[66].
The working group could reach no consensus about this coherence between responsibilities to future generations on one hand and the question of non-retrievable storage, on the other hand. The operators pointed to the fact that retrievable storage needs societal control and thus a stable society. Environmental organisations considered retrievability to be a pre-condition in any form of storage. Also, beacuse of the fact that it is almost impossible to predict the behaviour of nuclear waste in the long-term. The representatives of the ministries stated that there should be further research on retrievable and controllable storage. That concept has been less worked out than definite disposal and therefore no good comparison could be made between the two concepts. Everybody agreed with this proposal[67].
Steiner referred to the fact that the concept of "controlled and retrievable storage" had not crystallised yet. For instance, the question has not been answered whether such a storage should be aboveground or underground: "We think that all aspects of this concept should be studied thoroughly. We should know better which storage can be controlled the best. That might be a storage at 50 metres’ depth. That study should be conducted by a group of international experts whom we trust. And the study should not only consider technical, but also ethical and social issues. The Nagra can participate, but should not be allowed to be the main performer, because we have little trust in the Nagra."
Steiner also considers the Nagra’s criticism of retrievable storage to be heavily overdrawn: "A long-term interim storage is planned. So the argument that a war could break out and could destroy the storage site also applies to an interim-storage."[68]
But what if there is no money left to control the storage? Steiner compares it to the problem of avalanches in Switzerland: "We are here dealing with avalanches. We take measures against such disasters. When we, as a country, would come to the idea to neglect this issue, then it will take revenge upon us. And we have to spend a large sum of money anyway to repair the damage. For me, the control of the storage of nuclear waste is a similar obligation as measures to prevent avalanches. But we have to reserve much money for this, and that hardly happens"[69].

There was no agreement on further working out the concept of controlled retrievable storage with the storage of low- and intermediate-level waste. A majority of the representatives of the ministries were of the opinion that the Wellenberg repository should be realised soon with an adapted concept. The operators of reactors supported this proposal even as the environmental groups rejected it. According to Prof. Ruh, this difference of opinion lay very clearly in the fact that the operators want Wellenberg and want a solution at the soonest possible time. In their view, the realisation of Wellenberg is a political condition for the continuation of nuclear energy. The environmental groups, for their part, do not want to improve the political framework for nuclear energy. This goal, as well as the attempt to prevent the disposal being built at Wellenberg, is the principal issue and their arguments are adapted to this, according to Ruh[70].
As a result of the Ruh report, the Nagra felt strengthened in its opinion to stick to the concept of definite disposal. According to the Nagra, controlled storage is too unsure[71]. The GNW has announced it is for the adaptation of the storage concept at some points. After storage, the mine would initially remain open. During some generations, the waste would easily be accessible and stored safely. Next generations have the possibility to keep the storage mine open or to close it definitely or to choose another option. The GNW further announced it is planning to bring into the attention of a broad public the safety shortcomings of the "controlled storage"[72].
Steiner points to the half-hearted attitude of the Nagra and GNW: "On one hand they want retrievable and controlled storage to make possible a new referendum on Wellenberg. On the other hand, they disagree with our concept. But we see the political motivation behind the vision of the Nagra and the GNW. You can say that each mountain has its own climate, and say that each has a system of water streams. The geology of Wellenberg is such that with the creation of shafts, waterstreams in the direction of the shafts could be developed. This is shown in recent studies. If you would store nuclear waste there and want to close the mine after 100 years, than you have to deal with a water problem. Given the geology of Wellenberg, retrievable storage means problems to future generations. This is why we oppose a new referendum on Wellenberg. We want a new discussion about the waste problem, apart from the question of where such waste should be disposed of."[73]
These are "totally unqualified and ridiculous statements of an uninformed person," the Nagra says, "and these statements indicate an ignorance about what the Nagra has really done, building up know-how at the expense of large amounts of money, together with Swedish, Finnish, American, French, Canadian and whatever partners. Steiner has not the slightest knowledge and education to assess what has really happened in the Wellenberg marl. This marl is on a scale of a few meters on up as impermeable as a rock ever can be, so no water shall move on a relevant scale. We spent tens of millions of francs to be sure of that."[74]
 

9. SUMMARY

In 1972, the federal government and the operators of nuclear power reactors founded the Nagra, in which the operators have a share of 95%.
In 1978, the Nagra started choosing locations for low- and intermediate-level wastes. In 1981, Nagra chose 20 from a list of initially 100 locations to conduct further research. Evaluation of these locations gave three preferred locations: Bois de la Glaive, Oberbauenstock and Piz Pian Grand. In 1987, the Nagra added to the list the location Wellenberg near the municipality of Wolfenschiessen in the canton of Nidwalden. Wellenberg was not on the initial list of 100 locations. Niederbauern, which is close to Wellenberg, was on that list.
The research at the different locations have faced resistance and could sometimes begin only after a lot of delays. This resulted in the fact that the Nagra chose Wellenberg as number one, as late as 1993.
The storage plan was rejected in a referendum. If the storage would have been controllable and retrievable, the majority might probably have voted in favour.
The continuation of nuclear energy was a big obstacle to reaching consensus among different parties on the issue of management and storage of nuclear waste. Although the use of nuclear energy was not included in the mandate of the working group "Energie-Dialog Entsorgung" (Energy-Dialogue Disposal), the working group could not avoid this issue and it was put on the agenda. No consensus could be reached and this had an effect on all the discussions.
On the question of giving content to the responsibilities for future generations, the points of view also differed. From this responsibility, the operators and the Nagra choose for final disposal. The environmental organisations stated that retrievable and controllable storage gives the best options of handling to future generations. These organisations want this storage method to be worked out further.
 

10. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Nagra chose the location Wellenberg for the storage of low- and intermediate-level waste. Wellenberg was not on the initial list of 100 locations. It is remarkable that a choice was made for a location that was initially not considered.
2. The Nagra sticks to Wellenberg, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. With a new storage concept, that includes elements of retrievability, the politicians are trying to hold a new referendum. The politically different opinions will not solved with this. A new referendum on Wellenberg will increase the present conflict.
3. The discussion about storage of nuclear waste in Switzerland is overshadowed by disagreements about the future of nuclear energy. Discussions about nuclear waste are difficult without clearness on the future of nuclear energy.