Introduction
After the 1997 decision to reject the plans for an underground Rock Characterisation Facility (RCF) in Sellafield, the government is now preparing for a review of its nuclear waste policy, to be conducted from the end of 1999. In this chapter we will concentrate on the RCF siting process, the parliamentary inquiry by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology and on the outcome of a Consensus Conference.
Several documents were studied for this chapter concerning the three issues that will be described. The Consensus Conference was visited by one of the authors; it gave him the opportunity to speak with several stakeholders. Comments on the draft text were given by Fred Barker, member of the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC), though in a personal capacity, and by Rachel Western of Friends of the Earth UK (FOE).
 

1. NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

In 1947, the UK's nuclear technology program actually started to develop nuclear weapons. By 1953, the government was fretting over the prospect of coal shortages and the power of the National Union of Mineworkers. It ordered four Magnox reactors for the site at Calder Hall, next to Sellafield, later followed by 22 more at other sites. Because of inefficiency of the Magnox reactors, a new generation called Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors (AGRs) was developed. A prototype opened in 1963 and a total of 15 AGRs went into operation. The first, and only, Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) was built in Sizewell. Apart from these types, two breeder reactors and a heavy-water reactor had been in operation. At present 35 of these reactors are still in operation and 10 were shut down in the past[1]. Since May 1995, it has been government policy not to build any new nuclear power plant[2]. Two commercial reprocessing plants are in operation in Sellafield: one for Magnox fuel and the Thorp facility for uranium oxide fuel from AGR's and water-cooled reactors from foreign countries.
Nuclear energy has now a share of 26.5% in the UK's electricity production and a generating capacity of 12.8 GWe. Eight of the power stations are run by British Energy which was privatized in 1966, with its subsidaries Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear. The older Magnox stations remained in the public sector because of the very high liabilities (dismantling, reprocessing and waste management costs)[3]. The decommisioning of aging reactors could run up to BP£ 18 billion (Dfl 60 billion), members of parliament warned[4]. Six of the Magnox stations are run by Magnox Electric and two others by British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL)[5].
 

2. PRODUCERS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

As the UK has an extensive nuclear energy program, most of the waste in storage or disposal comes from this source. Only 1 volume percent comes from hospitals and industry, including isotope production facilities.
In May 1996, a waste inventory (up to 1994) was published, made on request of Nirex and the Department of the Environment. Seven main producers were identified. Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear run the nuclear reactors for British Energy. BNFL operates some older Magnox stations and has facilities for enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing. The UK Atomic Energy Authority is responsible for waste from its research facilities. Urenco owns an enrichment plant in Capenhurst. Amersham International operates two isotope production facilities for use in industry or hospitals. And finally the Ministry of Defence produces radioactive waste in its nuclear weapons program and submarine bases[6].
 

3. CATEGORIES OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

The UK has four main categories of radioactive waste: high-level or heat-generating waste (HLW); intermediate-level waste (ILW); low-level waste (LLW) and very low-level waste (VLLW).
Most of the spent fuel that arises is being reprocessed. For Magnox metallic fuel the choice was made to reprocess it, also because it is difficult to store it for long periods due to corrosion vulnerability, especially when it has been wet-stored once. For half of the AGR spent fuel to be produced, contracts were made with BNFL for reprocessing. No contracts were made for the fuel from the Sizewell PWR[7].
 

4. AMOUNTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

4.1 Present amounts
According to the above-mentioned inventory, as of April 1994, 78 m³ of vitrified HLW had been stored, and 1,560 m³ HLW was in storage in an unconditioned form, as highly active liquid waste. For ILW, 2,180 m³ had been conditioned and 59,300 m ³ still has to be. LLW in conditioned form totals 4,180 m³ for the 1994 stocks. The "present" amount of LLW looks very small in the figures because the waste that was "disposed of" at the Drigg and Dounreay facilities is not calculated as "waste in stock". When we include this waste it will be about 1,000,000 m³ of LLW[8]. The category VLLW was not explicitely mentioned in the inventory and is included in the LLW category.
In the inventory, spent fuel and plutonium from reprocessing is not accounted for as it is not seen as a waste but as a useful resource. Of course, it will later end as HLW or ILW from reprocessing if all fuel will be reprocessed. Also not included are the uranium stocks that arise from reprocessing and enrichment.

4.2 Future amounts
In 1996 it was estimated that the following waste amounts will arise and be stored in the future (after being conditioned): HLW - 2,280 m³; ILW - 289,000 m ³ and LLW - 1,910,000 m ³ (excluding LLW that was disposed of at Drigg). This total of 2,200,000 m³ will include the present (up to 1994) amounts.
In making up the 1994 inventory, however, it was assumed that eight further PWRs would be built in the future and a life-time extension of facilities beyond what was committed at that time (fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities). If the number of reactors would not be expanded and no life-time extension would take place, which could be assumed, the total volumes would be less. For HLW, about 1,480 m³, for ILW 255,000 m³ and for LLW about 1,820,000 m³[9].
Uranium stocks, reprocessed uranium and depleted uranium from enrichment, could run up to 100,000 MT and plutonium up to 150 MT when it would not be re-used[10].
 

5. WHERE IS IT STORED?

VLLW is waste that contains less than 4 Bq/g activity. It mainly arises in materials that contain natural activity, for instance in the ore-processing industry. It is mostly disposed of at landfills. Due to local opposition, the government decided not to encourage greater use of that method, although it is still used by non-nuclear industries[11].
LLW is "disposed of" at Drigg, a surface disposal facility near Sellafield where waste is buried. Some LLW can not be placed at Drigg because of its specific volume, activity or chemo-toxicity. This is mainly stored at Sellafield, or elsewhere. Drigg's use already started in 1959 and in its earliest phase it consisted of trenches in which the waste was simply buried and covered with sand. A 1985 government inquiry learned that the operator BNFL used a philosophy of "dilute and disperse" and that it was sometimes unclear what was actually dumped. As late as the end of the 1980s, improvements were made like concrete vaults and impermeable layers[12]. Drigg will receive more wastes for the coming decades. It is said that its "radiological capacity" would be reached around 2050. That would say that by that time no more activity could be added anymore because of possible long-term radiological impact on the environment, as this is the vision of the operator[13].
ILW is for the biggest part (65%) stored at Sellafield. Mainly it is fuel cladding that comes from reprocessed fuel elements and other contaminated reprocessing equipment. Other ILW is on-site stored at research facilities and nuclear power stations. The strategy at the nuclear station sites is to keep it on-site. When the station would be decomissioned, a special building called "safestore" would be built around the reactor part as a kind of sarcophagus, 30-35 years after having closed the reactor. Within this building, the ILW could be placed, after which the building would remain in place for another 100 years, when final dismantling would take place.
Most of the HLW arises at reprocessing in the form of liquid waste or later, after conditioning, vitrified high-level waste. These wastes are stored on site at the Sellafield and Dounreay reprocessing plants[14].
 

6. RESPONSIBILITIES

For the disposal of nuclear waste an authorisation according to the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 is needed from the Environment Agency (England and Wales) or the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (Scotland), that both operate under the national Department of Environment. For operating and managing a waste facility a license according to the Nuclear Installations Act 1995 is to be granted by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII), part of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) under the Department of Trade and Industry[15].
In 1978, the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) was set up. It has to advise government and consists of experts from different disciplines, including nuclear, medical and environmental. In 1982, the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Management Executive was founded, that became UK Nirex in 1985. It is responsible for research and implementation of a disposal site for LLW and ILW, not for HLW.
 

7. HISTORY OF WASTE POLICY

After a 1976 report by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), it was government's policy to create a disposal site as a long-term solution of the waste problem. The Department for the Environment was made responsible for this task.
In 1979, first test drillings were taken at Altnabreac (Scotland) and Harwell in a search for a place for HLW disposal. These drillings were stopped in 1981 due to public opposition.
In 1982, Nirex was established with the task to implement disposal facilities for LLW and ILW. In 1983, Nirex announced it had selected a clay site in Elstow for a subsurface repository for LLW and short-lived ILW. Besides, it had chosen a disused anhydrite mine at Billingham for the disposal of long-lived ILW. Protest by local citizens and the owner of the mine let the government drop the idea. A year later, the government decided to investigate three possible sites for near-surface disposal and another three for deep disposal. In 1986, Nirex announced to have selected four sites for the near-surface facility: Killingholme, Fulbeck, Bradwell and Elstow. The government announced in a policy paper that only LLW could be placed in such an underground disposal. At that moment there was still no official policy for underground disposal of HLW. Aboveground storage for 50 years was the only strategy.
For economic reasons, the policy was changed again in 1987, when it was decided to place both LLW and ILW together in a deep disposal site. The four selected sites for near-surface disposal therefore were dropped[16].
During the late 1980s, Nirex had initially identified 500 possible locations for deep disposal. Reviewing these sites, the amount was narrowed to 120, then to 39 and finally to 11[17]. At present, the list of locations is still secret, both the "long list" of 500 sites and the "short list" of 11. Until now, NIREX has refused to make both lists public[18]. Sellafield was later added to the list of 11 for consideration. It was thought that the presence of four nuclear reactors (Calder Hall) and the reprocessing plants would have created an "existing nuclear culture", which would lead to an easier acceptance of a waste repository. In 1989, Nirex announced to have chosen Sellafield and Dounreay as potential sites for deep disposal and started test drillings, two at each site. In 1991, Dounreay was dropped due to the reason that most wastes arose in Sellafield[19].
 

8. SELLAFIELD ROCK CHARACTERISATION FACILITY (RCF)

A 1986 government White Paper (policy document) on the siting issue said: "Nirex have made it clear from the outset that they will make available the data gathered from the geological investigation of the four sites, which will enable its validity to be checked independently. They will also want to involve the public as fully as practicable in their further work." At that time, the Cumbria County Council was content with the consultation commitment for the general situation of site selection.
But when, in March 1989, Nirex announced that it had selected Sellafield as a potential site, the council was disappointed. Details of the selection criteria were not made public and the community itself was not informed about the process. In the council's view, the site was not selected because of favourable geological conditions but by the thought that the surrounding communities would have a "measure of support"[20].
In 1994, the RWMAC and the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) conducted a review of the followed approach. It was government's reaction to the growing concern that Sellafield was the only site left for research. From the opponents it was argued that the promised "open and transparant approach", as mentioned in the 1986 White Paper, had not been carried out. In its 1995 report the study group concluded: "The general view was that the current process of site selection and site characterisation, and the criteria on which site selection is based, are not sufficiently transparant to ensure public confidence. From the evidence presented therefore public safety is considered to be the paramount issue in siting a repository." The study recommended a change of the procedure and the creation of an Independent Commission to oversee the process. With this and using clear disqualifying criteria, 10 to 12 sites had to be found in which in an early stage consultation should start. That should be conducted by the proposed independent commission. The commission should select three sites for test drilling and including public hearings, after which it should recommend to the government which site was favourable[21].
In the 1995 White Paper on waste management, the government made clear that it did not consider to follow the recommendations. Although it recognised the need of transparancy, the idea of public consultations at 10 to 12 sites was found to be impracticable. Besides, apart from only geological criteria the government considered the issue of transports and the issue of costs as a relevant factor in the site selection. The idea of an independent commission was not welcomed as this would "diminish the responsibility of the waste producers and create confusion", between regulators, communities and the commission[22].
To qoute a reaction of the Cumbrian County Council Manager for Environmental Planning: "The good intentions have been present in policy and remain there to an extent in the 1995 White Paper, with the right buzz words used, 'openness', 'transparancy', 'publication of results' and so on." Nirex was considered not open and transparant enough, the working culture to be too much goal driven instead of driven by the needs of science or the need to build community trust[23].

In 1994, the planning application for the RCF was submitted by Nirex and an inquiry started in 1995. In March 1997, the Secretary of State for the Environment decided to reject the proposal. He based his decision on a report of the inquiry inspector. Two main reasons had made him to take the decision: "straightforward planning matters" and reasons "particular to the RCF", concerning scientific uncertainties and technical difficulties of the proposal. The straightforward planning matters concerned the visual impact of aboveground constructions, traffic and natural conservation. The particular reasons concerned a lack of knowledge about hydrology and geology, a doubt whether the best location was chosen and the potential damage the RCF construction itself could have on the future repository zone[24]. According to the inspector, too little was known about chemical retention mechanisms of leaked isotopes and the isolating effect of vault backfill. The possible build-up of gases due to degradation of waste and containers formed another uncertainty. On one hand it should not lead to dangerous pressures in the repository zone, on the other hand it could form a transport mechanism for radionuclides through fractures[25]. Other underlying reasons that were mentioned were concerns about the process of selecting the site and its suitability. It would be more geologically and hydrogeologically complex than expected[26].
 

9. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Procedure
Because of the failure to get permission to construct a research laboratory at Sellafield, no practical plan for a future disposal site for LLW and ILW was present. The government decided to start an inquiry, to be conducted by the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology. This inquiry on the "management of nuclear waste" took place from 1997 and its report was released in March 1999. Whereas the history of siting was concentrated on finding a disposal site for LLW and ILW, the House of Lords process did concentrate more on ILW and a strategy for HLW[27].
One of its first actions was a call for evidence that were received from "witnesses", both as written comments as well as from hearings. A total of 119 individuals, organisations and authorities gave evidence. Comments were from a broad range of groups, varying from the nuclear industry, community councils, regional and country-wide environmental groups, individuals, etc[28].

Deep disposal or surface storage?
For the nuclear industry, deep disposal is the preferred option for the long-term. But the industry also emphasized that time is not pressing. It thinks that waste can be stored in surface facilities for decades. And when a deep repository has been realised, the wastes could be kept monitored and retrievable for another period of a few decades, during the operational phase of the repository.
Environmental organisations, however, have a contrary opinion. For Greenpeace, surface storage is "the least environmentally damaging and most responsible option" available at present. In future, better options can be chosen based on better knowledge of the environment and improved technologies. Greenpeace explicitly stated to be opposed to deep disposal as this "inevitably involves future contamination of the environment".
A similar view is held by FOE UK, which sees aboveground storage for the next 50-100 years as the only practicable way forward, in combination with scientific research. With this, future generations are able to judge about better solutions. Both for Greenpeace, FOE UK and other environmental groups, the closure of nuclear reactors and a ban on reprocessing are a vital part of future waste policy[29].
In its final conclusions, the Lords Committee recognised a too much fragmented management strategy. The policy for ILW differs from that of HLW, and for certain materials it is still unclear whether these could be seen as re-use materials or as wastes. Thus, it concluded that a fully comprehensive strategy was needed for all wastes. For instance, a clear policy is needed for plutonium from reprocessing, with a minimum strategic stock and the rest to be declared as waste.
For the Lords Committee, the preferred approach is geological disposal. Such an underground repository should include a certain degree of retrievability, during the period of emplacing wastes and doing scientific research. According to the Lords Committee, one or more deep repositories should be operational within 50 years, as otherwise a replacement program should be started for existing storage sites[30].

Public acceptability
For the realisation of such repositories, public acceptability is considered to be essential, "but achieving it will be difficult". Uncertainty, inherent in long-term risks and a level of distrust in certain organisations are some of the reasons for this. Many of the witnesses criticized the nuclear industry for not being open enough, where the RCF inquiry was mentioned as an example in which Nirex often refused to give data. The Lords Committee recognised that there is no one general "public perception" and that they change in time, but that there is "no simple means of changing them". More openness and transparency is needed to build trust, but other mechanisms also are needed. Referring to the past, it concluded that the earlier strategy of "decide, announce, defend" had failed. To overcome the problem of local acceptability, the Lords Committee suggested "supporting measures" as a means of compensation for accepting a waste repository[31].
In its final conclusion, the House of Lords Committee repeated that: public acceptance is essential; openness and transparancy are necessary to gain trust, but in themselves are not enough; and "offering compensation [...] would do much to achieve acceptance"[32].

Governmental policy
The Lords Committee concluded that there is a need for an overall policy, that should be laid down in a new bill and undergo Parliamentary debate and decision. Before this, a proposal should be made, in the form of a "Green Paper" (policy document) for public review.
The Lords Committee recommended to set up a new body, the "Nuclear Waste Management Commission" (NWMC) to oversee the national program. In time, it could possibly replace the existing RWMAC. As a first task it should undertake the consultations on the Green Paper. Its members should be appointed by the Secretary of State and should have "a wide range of backgrounds"[33][34] .
A second body suggested is the "Radioactive Waste Disposal Company" (RWDC), which in time would include the work that Nirex is doing. The company should be responsible for site selection and the construction of the disposal site. The company itself would be a nuclear industry organisation.
The method of site selection differs not that much from earlier attempts, apart from the aspect of voluntariness. Initially, the RWDC would use desk studies to identify a "long list" of 15-20 potential sites. From this, a list would be made for possible field investigations. The final list for test drillings is "derived by consultation or by using a volunteering aproach". But this volunteering approach has an important limitation. Once the field investigations have begun, the local community cannot withdraw anymore as government would take the final decisions. Only after the final selection would a public inquiry start. According to the Lords Committee, this inquiry should be less extensive than previous inquiries, and be limited to local impact issues. It argues that broad issues, as the national policy, would be under discussion in developing the new bill[35].

Critical reactions on the outcome
With the strong choice to proceed with the quick realisation of deep disposal, the report got critical reactions from nuclear critical groups. The proposed recommendations on the other hand got support as well. As Nuclear Free Local Authorities (NFLA), a coalition of nuclear critical local councils, said: "Despite important flaws, the Lords' report makes some useful proposals. It also provides a guide to many of the issues that will be exposed to public scrutinity once the Government review--and subsequent public consultations--begins." According to the NFLA, too little attention was given to the "main alternative to deep disposal--interim surface storage combined with research on longer-term options". They hope it would be included in the review of the Green Paper by consulting proponents of this concept.
The idea to let the new NWMC conduct the consultation on the Green Paper was not welcomed. NFLA would rather have the proposal for the commission itself being subject of the Green Paper consultation, as it will be an important commission that will oversee the national policy. The recommendation that the proposed RWDC should be a nuclear industry organisation could mean a risk that it will be difficult to reach public trust, in contrary to when it would be an independent company. That Nirex work is to be handed over to the new company, however, was welcomed as Nirex had built little credibility.
For NFLA, the recommendation that a volunteer community in site selection can not withdraw once field investigation had begun, was a guarantee for future conflict and dispute. Instead of this proposal, NFLA refers to international experience where communities have more abilities to withdraw at any stage and final decisions are made by a local referendum.
Overall conclusions of NFLA were: the consultation on the Green Paper should not be rushed; all relevant issues should be included, also reprocessing; siting should not be pushed through and more attention should be given to international experience with voluntariness; and the government should consider whether acceptance might be more easily reached by establishing a phased closure programme for the nuclear industry: "it may be a necessary prerequisite for achieving social consensus on the long-term management of radioactive wastes"[36].
FOE UK criticised the main conclusion to proceed with a deep disposal strategy and feared that it could only lead to a costly repeat of Nirex's failure at Sellafield and stated that: "deep disposal remains a concept which can only be considered compatible with sustainable development if the actual practical, scientific and technical realities are ignored".

They referred to a 1995 White Paper that said that "decision should be based on the best possible scientific information and analysis of risk" and that "no fixed Government deadline should be set for the completion of this process". This was ignored by the House of Lords Committee.
Referring to the "precautionary principle" of sustainable development, FOE UK called "retrievable disposal" to be a "contradiction in terms". The concept of retrievability is still in a rudimentary state. Earlier, the Department of Environment had asked the Lords Committee for further advice on that issue, but when the Lords reported, it only said that it "should be able to retrieve the waste if this became necessary". Key questions how to achieve, at what costs or risks, were not answered. Retrievability needs special design measures, structural materials to prevent collapse of a repository, no backfill can be used, equipment must be replaced over time, a decontamination facility. This all could double the necessary costs, thinks FOE UK. With present technology, only aboveground retrievable storage would be realistic.
The Lords Committee waived away the idea of interim surface storage as that would be a too big risk, concerning societal stability. But FOE UK pointed to the fact that the Lords Committee had no critique on the dismantling strategy for nuclear reactors, that assumes aboveground storage for over a century. And the argument could also be applied to other parts of the nuclear industry: "It may be seen that concerns over the reliance that may be placed on the stability of society brings into question the acceptability of the whole of the nuclear industry".
On the question how to build public trust in governments policy, FOE UK considered the Lords Committee's conclusions too much goal driven, as the chapter on that issue "is marred by its presumption that the outcome of the consultation excercise would be a phased approach to geological disposal". Like the NFLA, it thought that the proposed NWMC should be subject of the coming public consultation. The idea to compensate hosting communities raises an ethical dilemma. Future generations that will be exposed to radiation are not the ones that benefitted from the money offered. FOE UK feared that compensation was only being used to realise a disposal site, as of course is the proposal of the Lords Committee.
The main conclusions of FOE UK were: the fundamental lesson that was learned by the outcome of the RCF Inquiry, that is, the models used for predicting radioactivity releases from a repository were unreliable, was not recognised by the Lords’ Committee; the Lords Committee failed to adopt an interim approach to develop a scientifically robust long-term solution and thus a 50-100 years monitored and retrievable aboveground storage; and to solve the shortcomings of earlier disposal proposals, the Lords Committee introduced retrievable disposal, which is impossible thinks FOE UK.
As a final remark, FOE UK said: "The Lords report cannot be seen as the basis of the way forward for long term radioactive waste management policy. Following the Lords recommendations in this area would simply result in a repeat of the mistakes of the past."[37]
 

10. CONSENSUS CONFERENCE

Procedure
After the release of the Lords Committee report, a Consensus Conference was held in London, 21-24 May 1999. The organisation for the conference started in the summer of 1998. The conference was organised by the UK Centre for Economic and Environmental Development (UK CEED), in conjunction with the Science Museum. It was the second Consensus Conference being held in the UK, the previous one being on plant biotechnology.
The conference actually consisted of a Citizens' Panel that had to make up its opinion on the nuclear waste policy, after having studied relevant literature and having heard selected witnesses at the conference itself. The panel was not forced to reach an actual consensus, but rather to search for the extent to which they could agree.
The main aim of a Consensus Conference was to influence policy by having a dialogue between citizens, experts and politicians. The conclusions of the panel are not officially binding for any party, but it is said that worldwide experience of panels proved to be influential on development of policy[38].

The first initiative was to set up an advisory committee of nine members. The committee had to consist of a balanced group of experience [39]  and should oversee the whole process. It had to define the broad scope, select the method for recruiting the panel and make a list of possible witnesses. The panel itself could choose the witnesses to be heard. Apart from the advisory committee, a facilitator was appointed. His task was to monitor group dynamics, ensure all members have a fair say and helping in writing the final report. He explicitly should not in contents contribute to the discussions or the report.
The panel was selected by firstly selecting randomly 4,000 names from the national election register. These persons received a letter with an invitation to become a panel's member, without mentioning the topic of the conference. The 125 people who reacted positively were told what the actual topic was and what was expected from them, after which 70 people became the final candidates for the Panel. A group of 15 people finally formed the panel.
In preparation of the conference, the panel members received an information package and held two preparatory weekends. The information package was compiled by the advisory committee and had to be a balanced set of information. The preparatory weekends had the goal to get known to each other and get an overview of the relevant issues. It had to result in key issues, to be discussed at the conference and a selection of witnesses to be heard.
To prepare a list of potential witnesses, a letter was sent to people that submitted evidence in the House of Lords inquiry, the RCF inquiry and a 1984 Nirex consultation. Those again were asked to do suggestions for further witnesses. The panel could choose on the basis of the registration forms, filled in by the potential witnesses.
At the conference, the first two days were used for discussing the key questions and hearing the witnesses. At the third day, the panel met behind closed doors to work on the consensus statement, that was presented at the press conference at the fourth day[40].

The Conference
The hearings for the Consensus Conference took two days. A number of 32 witness hearings were held on nine key questions. In the nine sessions, the witnesses had the possibility to give a short introduction, after which the panel members could ask further questions. During the hearings, it became clear that the panel gave priority to the asking of questions to witnesses. The witnesses’ presentation contained more general introductions, where the panel had already in its preparatory weekends read and discussed a lot of information[41].
Some questions raised among environmental groups were about the balance between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear witnesses. Of the 32 hearings, only six can be said to come from anti-nuclear, being sessions from Greenpeace UK, FOE UK and freelance consultant Dr. Sullivan[42]. For instance, the hearing on the future of nuclear energy question consisted of two witnesses that can be said to be pro-nuclear. A British Energy representative and a safety consultant held a presentation strongly in favour of nuclear energy. After asking a question about the selection of these two witnesses, the panel answered that apart from the conference, a lot of information was studied before and its balance had been correct. And secondly, that the safety consultant had not worked in the nuclear industry and the panel had selected him as an independent witness. The panel could not answer the question why it had not, exactly for this nuclear energy hearing, asked for an anti-nuclear witness to gain some balance[43]. FOE spoke about a "mishandling" of that question[44].
Besides the unbalanced witness list, it was also a fact that among the public at the conference there were more representatives of government and nuclear industry than from local and national anti-nuclear groups. Exact reasons for this absence can not be given. But from conversations with visitors it might be due to: a certain level of distrust in the conference or in talking with the nuclear industry; the hearings were held just before and at the weekend of Whitsuntide; or the possibility that people were unaware of the conference[45].

Key questions
The nine issues on which hearing sessions were held dealt with: deep disposal vs. surface storage; regulation; R&D; privatisation; informing the public; reprocessing; nuclear energy future; the military and waste classification. In short we will go only through the most relevant themes for our study and the Panel's conclusions, whereafter we describe panel's main conclusions[46].

Q: What do you see as the primary advantages and disadvantages of deep disposal? What do you see as the primary advantages and disadvantages of shallow/surface storage?
The discussion about the choice whether to store nuclear waste aboveground or underground knew two opposing visions. Representatives from Nirex, the Royal Institute for International Affairs and British Geological Survey were proponents of deep disposal as they consider the long-term storage aboveground too risky. On the other side, Dr. Sullivan and FOE UK argued that there are too much uncertainties in "burying" nuclear waste and thus prefer a monitored retrievable aboveground storage, to give future generations the chance to make other choices. Both parties although recognised that any choice that would be made had its own advantages and disadvantages. For long-term aboveground mainly on the question of social stability, and for underground on the question of uncertainties[47].
In their conclusions at the fourth day, the panel unanimously agreed that for an acceptable solution, the waste "MUST remain accessible and monitorable". This for the case that in future a solution may be found. The panel rejected the ideas for a deep repository as presented by some witnesses, that is, one that would be backfilled. They feared a future leakage of radioactive material from a deep disposal that could "lead to passing on to future generations bigger problems than managing and monitoring the radioactive waste in below surface storage". Below surface storage is the concept the panel favours. Storage near the surface should protect it against environmental changes and human intervention, like sabotage. The emplacement near the surface would guarantee access to the waste and the possibility to retrieve it. One member of the panel, however, disagreed with the others, he felt very strongly that by placing wastes underground it would become forgotten - "Out of Sight, Out of Mind". On the question how deep such a facility should be placed, the panel had no answer. It could be at tens of meters as well as a hundred meters. For the panel, it was important not to seal off the wastes and keep them retrievable.
The panel also unanimously proposed not to use the word "disposal", as it would be misleading to the public. Disposal would too much suggest that one can "get rid off" it. Seen the choice to "give future generations a chance to deal with the problem", they rather prefer "storage"[48].

Q: Currently, what R&D is there into nuclear waste treatment?
This session had as theme the research that is being conducted on waste management. An important discussion point in this hearing was transmutation as it was of influence on the panel's choice how to store waste. Mr. Beck of the Royal Institute for International Affairs mentioned three concerns about deep disposal that would plead for intensified research into transmutation: the very long-term problem, the possible radioactive spread due to faulty design or natural events, and the risk that repositories might become "plutonium mines", which is a proliferation threat. Dr. Sullivan on the other hand argued that transmutation feeds the myth of "final solutions" and that it "gives carte blanche to the nuclear industry to continue". Besides, transmutation needs extensive chemical reprocessing, is expensive and enlarges the volume of waste to be stored, which is not to be favoured[49]. The discussion took place at a rather theorethical level. There was no input on the technical aspects of transmutation, for example, the almost impossibility to fission certain long-lived fission products and the separation of these to condition them, the real costs and implications for the reprocessing industry, etc[50].
The panel welcomed more and increased research on transmutation, because when successful, "then clearly the issue of the acceptable disposal would be close to resolution". How optimistic they were on transmutation was already made clear in the conclusions of another session: "The Panel hopes and believes that science will find an answer, to make waste non-hazardous, in the not too distant future" [bold as is used in the report][51]. This strong belief in a future scientific solution was also part of the reasoning to place wastes in a near-surface storage, that is, to keep it on one hand protected against external influences and on the other hand accessible to deal with it in the future: "waste must be removed from the surface and placed underground as an interim solution"[52].

Q: What is the current/future policy with regard to informing the public about radioactive waste?
These hearings dealt with the question how to communicate with people. Dr. Brown from the Department of the Environment confessed that the previous strategy of "decide, announce, defend" had not worked and that other ways have to be found. In general, the need for open and correct information was recognised. Mr. Thompson of the US Institute for Research and Security Studies pleaded for a new strategy based on "decision-making partnership among public, government and industry", use of openness, public debate and peer review, a complete workout of alternatives and the preparedness to adjust[53]. The panel concluded that indeed there was a lack of trust among the public and that a neutral body might increase trust. Hereby it referred to the NWMC as the Lords Committee was to propose[54].

Q: What is your opinion on the continuation of nuclear power? What are the financial, environmental and social costs?
Both presentations were made by proponents of nuclear energy and used arguments like the greenhouse effect. The panel said that it would welcome a phaseout of nuclear energy, if it were possible with pollution-free alternatives. At the moment it should not increase due to the unsolved waste issue. The issue, whether there exist such "pollution-free alternatives" was not discussed, maybe due to the absence of a proponent of alternatives[55].

Q: What are your opinions on the current terminology used for the classification of radioactive waste?
All the three contributors recognised that waste classification knew shortcomings. Mr. Duncan of BNFL said that classification is only based on concentration or activity, but that an ideal system should take into account the toxicity, half-life and chemical properties, but that this would be unlikely to be adopted. Dr. Sullivan agreed by stating that wastes should be classified by the lifetime of the materials. Dr. Wallace of Greenpeace argued that plutonium had to be classified as waste.
The panel's view was that a new method of classification was needed. There was no consensus that plutonium should be regarded as waste, but "as a harmful substance it still needed to be included in the classification"[56].

Overall conclusions
The panel made the following main conclusions, that were presented at the press conference at the last day (shortened and if relevant from the perspectives of this study): "Radioactive waste must be removed from the surface and stored underground, but must be monitorable and retrievable. Cost cannot be an issue. We must leave options open for future solutions. We recommend the appointment of a neutral body. Criteria for site selection should be open and publicised. Research and development must be continued on a much larger scale and international cooperation should be encouraged. At present there is a lack of trust and understanding and public awareness must be raised. Decision-making must be open and transparent. We are not fundamentally opposed to nuclear power, but it should not be expanded until a way is found to deal adequately with the waste problem. A new method of waste classification is needed, clear and openly communicated. Finally, while the industry has in the past had a well-deserved reputation for secrecy, we have in the course of the conference noted a welcome shift."
The panel expressed its wish to be consulted in the future on nuclear waste policy[57].

Reactions
After the presentation of the panel's conclusions a number of relevant authorities reacted. The minister of environment, Mr. Meacher, announced that the expected Green Paper with a policy proposal will be released at the end of 1999. He welcomed the concept of retrievability and the possibility to monitor stored wastes, and thus not to use backfill material in a repository. But on the other hand, he also doubted the advantages of easily accessible near-surface storage as some wastes are very long-lived.
Lord Flowers, one of the House of Lords Committee members, did not welcome the idea of near-surface storage, as it would imply that later a deep disposal site still has to be realised to definitely isolate the waste from the environment. An interim subsurface storage would mean extra costs and risks. For transmutation he referred to the consequence that either new reactors should be built or a choice should be made for the expensive technology of accelerator-driven systems.
Mr. Murray, managing director of Nirex, was in of favour retrievable deep disposal and that this would fit in the criteria of sustainable development as "options were kept open". However, he did not explain for how long such retrievability should be assured.
Mr. Secrett, director of FOE UK, said he welcomed the panel's conclusions as their opinions were close to FOE UK, in not agreeing with deep disposal. That conclusion means that government has to rethink its policy, and wastes should be stored monitored and retrievable. He welcomed the panel's conclusion that plutonium should be classified as a waste. But he opposed the idea of near-surface storage, as FOE UK prefers aboveground storage at the site of the producer to prevent transports. The arguments the panel used in its plea for subsurface storage, the issue of human threats, had another implication: that this argument is also valuable for existing installations. The waste problem can be said to be a "very tricky, scientific and political problem."[58]

Dr. Western, witness during the conference for FOE UK, was said to be content with the outcome of the conference: "my impression is very good. The choices the Panel made on waste storage are a move forward, and away from disposal. But the question is whether Nirex will take over the Panel conclusions and whether the panel's favoured subsurface storage is suitable from an engineering point of view." She does not think that Sellafield will be put on the agenda again, because of the intense opposition that has grown. A near-surface storage is a totally different concept for which other sites could be considered by Nirex.
Western is not sure whether the government will try to combine the preference of the Lords Committee to continue with deep disposal and the expressed wish of the panel for retrievability into a concept for a deep repository that is retrievable as well. In that case, the government has to prove the real abilities and guarantees of retrieving waste. FOE UK was said to be very sceptical about proposals for retrievable disposal as they fear that it is likely that it would be turned into final disposal facilities. It thinks the nuclear industry will presently act more slowly and carefully than in the past as it have lost credibility. But there is also another reason why it could take more time, as at the time it planned the Sellafield RCF there were plans for four new nuclear power stations. That urged a quick solution for the waste problem. Western hoped that the panel will be consulted again on the contents of the upcoming Green Paper[59].
 

11. SUMMARY

The United Kingdom has an extensive nuclear energy program that started in the 1950s. It includes enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing. There are no plans for building new nuclear power reactors.
Since the 1970s, studies have been conducted on the possibility to realise a deep disposal site. The test drillings that were undertaken faced opposition. Apart from some drillings to high-level waste disposal, most of the attention was given to finding a site for low-level and/or intermediate-level waste disposal. In the late 1980s, Nirex had, from a (not public) list of 500, selected 11 sites. Later, Sellafield was added with the idea that a "nuclear culture" might lead to an easier acceptance. Data on how Sellafield was considered to be suitable for a Rock Characterization Facility (RCF) were kept secret and local communities were not informed about the selection process.
In March 1997, the plans for the RCF at Sellafield were rejected by the Secretary of State of the Environment. The effects of the aboveground works and the uncertainties from a geological and hydrological perspective were too high. It was also doubted whether the RCF itself would have negatively influenced the safety of a repository.
With no prospects of a disposal site, the UK needed a change of its waste policy. A House of Lords Committee started an inquiry as a first step. The inquiry was more directed to high-level waste. The House of Lords concluded that one or more underground repositories were necessary within the next 50 years. Environmental organisations protested that there was no discussion possible about a long-term aboveground storage. They consider the 50-year goal too hasty since a 1995 White Paper earlier had spoken about "no fixed deadlines".
The Lords Committee concluded that the earlier strategy of decide-announce-defend had failed and that public acceptance is necessary to realise plans, but that it would be difficult to achieve. In order to ease that process, it proposed offering compensation for a hosting community. Environmental groups consider this as a too-much-goal-driven process with the use of compensation to "buy" acceptance.
The Lords Committee recommended the creation of two new bodies. The first would be known as the Nuclear Waste Management Commission (NWMC) to oversee national policy. As a first task, it should conduct consultations on the Green Paper on waste policy, to be expected at the end of 1999. Environmental organsations, however, think the NWMC itself should be subject of the consultations.

A second body, the Radioactive Waste Disposal Company (RWDC), should be responsible for site selection and construction. The Lords Committee mentioned the possibility of voluntariness. But this voluntariness has the limitation that once a community has agreed, it can no longer withdraw, according to the Lords' proposal. According to the Lords Committee, a site-specific inquiry should be limited to site-relevant issues, as broader aspects would have been part of the Green Paper consultation.
A second event in the process of restructuring government's policy was the Consensus Conference in May 1999. A randomly selected Citizen's Panel had to study literature and hear witnesses to form an opinion on nuclear waste policy. In a two-day session, hearings with 32 witnesses were held. It was perceived that there was an imbalance between pro- and anti-nuclear witnesses and visitors.
The panel rejected the idea of deep disposal because of the risks of leakages. Secondly, it concluded that the waste MUST remain accessible and monitorable, and thus retrievable. Because of the risks of human intervention and climate change, a storage should be placed below the earth's surface.
Much attention was given to the technology of transmutation, and the panel was strongly convinced that in future this would be feasible. Transmutation played an important role in the panel's motivation to keep the waste accesible in a near-surface storage as an "interim solution".
Although the outcome of the Consensus Conference is not binding, it is said that such conferences are of influence on policy making. Responsible Minister Meacher of Environment expressed his reservations about subsurface storage due to the longevity of some wastes. Nirex used the words "retrievable deep disposal" as another possibility.
 

12. CONCLUSIONS

1. The secrecy about the list of 500 and the criteria upon which Sellafield was chosen did not contribute to public confidence, and is still of influence on the public's trust.
2. On the basis of the negative outcome of the question whether Sellafield would be safe, it can be concluded that it was wrong to add Sellafield, on "nuclear culture" grounds, to the list of 11 sites that was derived from comparing geological information.
3. If the government will adopt the Lords Committee conclusion to proceed with constructing a deep disposal within 50 years, new conflicts with environmental organisations can be expected.
4. The Lords Committee mentioned the possibility of voluntariness, but once a municipality has shown interest, it can no longer withdraw, according to the proposal. This will not attract communities to volunteer.
5. The Lords' proposal to limit site-specific inquiries to only site-specific issues, as broad issues are discussed in the Green Paper consultation, can lead to conflicts.
6. Concerning the Consensus Conference, it can be asked whether a randomly selected panel of just 15 other individuals would have come to the same conclusions.
7. The panel's favour for a near-surface storage was not worked out, i.e., at what depth and how to realise it from a technical perspective. Therefore it looks as if the panel tried to combine the idea of supposed isolation at great depth and easy retrievability of an aboveground storage.
8. Transmutation played an important role in the panel's choices, but the real technical feasibility and problems were not discussed profoundly.
9. It is doubtful if the government will take over the favoured near-surface storage. It is possible that retrievable deep disposal will be the concept to be introduced, instead of working out for the UK the new concept of near-surface storage.