Publication Laka-library:
Nuclear waste in Sweden - The Problem is Not Solved!

AuthorM.Goldstick
2-07-4-10-01.pdf
DateAugust 1986
Classification 2.07.4.10/01 (SWEDEN - WASTE (SKB))
Front

From the publication:

                           Introduction
    In an unprecedented international public relations ploy, the Swedish nuclear
industry has gained an international reputation for having "solved" the nuclear
reactor waste problem, be it low-, medium-, or high-level waste.2 For example,
SwedPower, an organization representing three Swedish power companies,
wrote in 1986:
             " ... under Swedish law, the owner of a new reactor is obliged
         to prove that the radioactive waste can be disposed of in a safe
         manner. This proof has been provided by the Swedish
         utilities ... "3
    In recent years, official foreign delegations have regularly visited Sweden to
see the "solution" first hand, and representatives of the Swedish nuclear industry
have often traveled abroad to promote their system. By invitation, in January
1987, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) made
a presentation to the United States Senate Committee On Energy And Natural
Resources.4
    The information presented here proves that the nuclear waste problem is
NOT solved, and that in Sweden there is strong resistance against the nuclear
industry. Municipalities in Sweden have used their veto power to stop uranium
mining and construction of nuclear reactors. Further, public protest has helped
stop constmction of a reprocessing plant and site investigations for a high-level
waste storage facility. Despite these and other victories (such as a Government
policy against food irradiations), public opposition has not been able to stop the
nuclear industry entirely. However, its expansion has been severely limited.
Sweden is the only nuclear nation that has set a date (the year 2010) by when all
its nuclear reactors will be shut down.
    The following pages examine the basis for the Swedish decisions, concerning
low-, medium-, and high-level nuclear reactor waste. The focus is on the storage
problem of high-level waste, or used reactor fuel, as this has been the subject of
the longest and greatest controversy (used reactor fuel is also called "spent" or
"irradiated fuel"). In recent years, the public has also strongly protested against
the under seabed storage plans for low- and medium-level nuclear reactor
waste. Thus, a summary of this problem is also included. Few technical details
about waste storage facilities and nuclear reactors in Sweden are presented.
Rather, a summary of statistics about the Swedish nuclear industry is given in
Appendix 2, and an annotated address list of the Swedish nuclear industry is
included in Appendix 3.
    The problem of uranium mine wastes is beyond the scope of this booklet.
Only 250 tonnes of uranium have been mined in Sweden, 200 tonnes at Ranstad
and 50 at Kvarntorp. Production stopped because the environmental problems
were unacceptable, and at the same time it became much cheaper to buy abroad.
Industry's attempts to open mines at Pleutajokk and Lilljuthatten continued until
December 1985 when the Energy Minister announced an end to Sweden's
uranium exploration program. Thus, all plans for uranium mining in Sweden
have been stopped, and purchases from abroad must continue. The 12 nuclear
reactors in Sweden consume about 1,400 tonnes of uranium per year. The
Energy Minister stated that uranium can be purchased abroad cheaply.
However, the Minister did not mention the many long-term social and
environmental problems at the source.6
    Also not discussed in this booklet is the import into Sweden of low- and
medium-level reactor waste by the two companies Studsvik and ASEA-ATOM.
The volume of radioactive garbage is reduced by burning it in a high-
temperature furnace operated by Studsvik. The type of garbage burned and
storage of the ashes, is a controversial topic.
    High-level nuclear waste has existed in Sweden since the first research
reactor started to operate in the 1950's. But the serious, public nuclear power
debate did not begin in Sweden until the 1970's and was mostly concerned with
problems of reactor operation and security. At that time there was a low public
consciousness about the difficulties of handling nuclear waste. Further, no
economic planning of waste management had been done.
   In 1972, the amount of waste began to grow quickly. In that year, large scale
nuclear waste production began with the start-up of the first commercial nuclear
reactor, Oskarshamn 1. Also in 1972, the first "investigation" was initiated by
the Swedish Government to try to solve the waste problem. More studies were to
follow.
    The spent fuel problem became more and more controversial during the
1980's. By then the Swedish Government had approved a strategy of storing
high-level waste 500 meters underground in copper canisters. Test drilling into
bedrock had to be carried out to find a site for the storage facility. In each area
targeted for test drilling, local opposition groups, now totalling 12 over the
whole country, of varying size and organizational structure were spontaneously
formed. Some of these are conventional registered societies, whereas others are
action groups organized with a minimum of formality.


   The first chapter reviews some of the general problems with nuclear waste,
particularly from the military and global perspectives. Specific information
about the nuclear waste problem in Sweden begins in Chapter 2. Some terrifying
information about political decision making in Sweden is presented, for example
that important parliamentary decisions dealing with nuclear weapons in Sweden
were not obeyed.
   Chapter 3 explains how in 1979 Sweden became the first country to officially
declare the nuclear waste problem "solved". A historic decision was made, with
which few people now agree. Reports were written by the nuclear industry to
conceal the fact that bedrock had been approved as suitable without field
investigations having been carried out; and that the "solution" did not include the
total quantity of spent fuel. Falsifications of this kind opened the way for nuclear
power. Sweden eventually had more nuclear power per capita than any other
nation in the world. Consequently, Sweden also had the most nuclear reactor
waste per capita to take care of.
    The 1980 referendum on nuclear power is discussed in Chapter 4. To the best
of our knowledge, this chapter and the "Karnkraftavfall" booklet are the only
published sources of information about how the responsible authorities used the
referendum to manipulate the waste issue.
    Sweden has the reputation of being a neutral and peace-loving country totally
opposed to nuclear armament. You wouldn't think it possible that any political
party or any government would allow over four billion crowns (US$615
million) of electric power taxes to be diverted to foreign nuclear weapons
interests, partly in order to finance the construction of a plant where plutonium
for more weapons is to be extracted. No, this of course sounds completely
unbelievable. Reading Chapter 5 will help you decide for yourself what the
situation is. This Chapter also mentions the role of the IAEA and Swedish
participation in it.
    Chapter 6 briefly outlines how economic responsibility for nuclear waste in
Sweden is to be dealt with. Again we explain how laws act more to protect the
nuclear companies than to guide them.
    Chapter 7 describes protests and company tactics at four different test
drilling sites for a high-level nuclear waste storage facility. Incidents at the
different drilling sites are not described in detail, except when such description
serves to clarify questions of tactics and pdnciple,7
    In Chapter 8 the focus switches to low- and medium-level reactor waste.
Here, the problems of the waste storage facility called The Final Storage For
Reactor Waste (SFR-1) are summarized. A history of the opposition to SFR-1 is
also given.
    Chapter 9 explains the role of the municipal veto and the attempts to weaken
it. A conclusion and epilogue then follow. A solution to the waste problem is not
proposed. However, an attempt is made to establish what must be done in order
to get out of the moral quagmire surrounding the nuclear waste problem.