NUCLEAR MONITOR

A PUBLICATION OF WORLD INFORMATION SERVICE ON ENERGY (WISE) AND THE NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE (NIRS)

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NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE

APRIL 20, 2007 | No. 654

MONITORED THIS ISSUE:

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JAPAN'S NUCLEAR INDUSTRY PLAGUED BY SCANDALS. POWER COMPANIES BUT ALSO GOVERNMENT NOT QUALIFIED TO OPERATE NUCLEAR REACTORS

On March 30th twelve Japanese electric power companies submitted reports to the Minister for Economy Trade and Industry (METI) about malpractices at their plants. These malpractices included data falsification and fabrication, deliberately duping safety inspectors, and failure to report problems such as uncontrolled criticality incidents at Boiling Water Reactors and emergency shut-downs. Confronted by rumours and reported incidents, Japanees Ministers responded by demanding that all electric power companies check their records.

(654.5792) CNIC - The March 30 reports included 306 cases of malpractice. Of those, 97 related to nuclear power plants (104 if each incident is counted separately). In addition, malpractices which occurred at experimental reactors, such as those owned by the government's principal research agency, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, were reported. These included failure to report emergency shut-downs and problems with control rods. (see also In briefs in latest issues)

The most spectacular involved an uncontrolled criticality incident at Hokuriku Electric's Shika-1 (BWR, 540 MW). On June 18, 1999, preparations were being made to test the reactor's shutdown function. All control rods were supposed to have been fully inserted at the time, but three rods dropped out of position. Hokuriku Electric presumes that an incorrect valve adjustment caused the rods to drop. The reactor went critical and remained in that state for fifteen minutes. The manager of the Shika plant decided not to report the incident to the government and records of the incident were not kept. In 1978, five rods fell out of position at reactor number 3 of Tokyo Electric Power Company's Fukushima I power plant. On that occasion criticality continued for seven and a half hours. And in 1998 34 rods slipped 15 cm out of position at Fukushima I unit 4, although the reactor did not reach criticality.

Some of the malpractices breached laws and regulations, while others did not, but that does not mean that there is any justification for the incidents which were not actually illegal. Rather, it serves to illustrate the inadequacy of the regulatory system. The endless malpractices revealed in these reports demonstrate once again the hollowness of the "safety first" mantra, which has been repeated again and again over the

years by the management of electric power companies.

Neither the power companies, nor the government are qualified to operate nuclear reactors. At the very least, the licenses should be revoked for those reactors where criticality incidents were covered up.

The malpractices revealed on this occasion are not isolated incidents. They are a manifestation of the very nature of the nuclear industry. Over the years there have been all sorts of cases of data fabrication and falsification at nuclear, thermal and hydroelectric power plants. Each time the power companies and plant makers apologize and say that they will lance the wound, but then they go and repeat the same behavior over and over again.

Confronted by rumours and reported incidents METI and the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport responded by demanding that all electric power companies check their records. On 10 January 2007 TEPCO submitted a report to METI entitled "Causes of and measures to prevent a repetition of falsification of sea temperature data at the condenser outlets of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant, Reactors 1 and 4". The report said, "An investigation of power plants was instigated, because the Shimonoseki thermal power plant case reminded a worker that corrections had been made to sea temperature data." As a result, falsification (referred to by TEPCO as "corrections") was discovered at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa reactors 1 & 4 and Fukushima I reactors 1, 4 & 5.
The hot wastewater referred to here is seawater, which has been used to cool and condense the steam used to drive the turbines of thermal and nuclear power plants. When the steam from the turbine condenses, its heat is transferred to the coolant, which in this case is seawater. The temperature of the seawater is raised in the process. If the seawater released is too hot, it can affect the ecosystem. Therefore, the temperature at both the intake and outlet points is measured and monitored to ensure that the temperature difference is not too big. At some power plants computers were programmed to record a higher than actual intake temperature, while at others they were programmed to record a lower outlet temperature. The readings were thus falsified to show a lower temperature difference than was really the case.

Already on 31 January 2007 TEPCO released details of data falsification at its nuclear power plants. A few examples:
1. During a periodic inspection in May 1992 at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa reactor number 1 (K-K-1), the day before it was to be tested it was discovered that, due to a fault with the electric motor, the residual heat removal pump (part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)) was not working. TEPCO staff made some adjustments to make it appear from the central control room that the pump was working. In this way, they were able to trick the METI inspector into awarding a pass for the inspection.
2. Again at K-K (the reactors are not specified), from around 1995 to 1997, measurements of the concentration of radioactive iodine released from the exhaust stack were made to appear lower than they really were by taking the measurements on the reverse side of the filter. In May 1995 the concentration of radioactivity from rare gases emitted from the exhaust stack of reactor 4 was also falsified.
3. From 1979 to 1998, in order to pass inspections, internal pressure readings for steam pipes connecting the reactor to the turbines at Fukushima I reactor 1 were falsified to match the specifications in the inspection guidelines. It was said that the specifications were inappropriate and that they were later amended so that falsification ceased to be necessary.

There were many instances of malpractice besides these, in relation to periodic inspections and also in other areas. Fabrication and falsification had indeed become standard practice, investigations are still proceeding, there is much more to come.

Of course, the cases revealed so far are already serious enough. In some cases the management of the companies were involved, while in other cases subcontractors were at fault. It is a very serious matter when the whole company, including management, is involved but its also very serious when management is not involved. When malpractice occurs at the work site and judgements are made at the whim of individuals, data ceases to have any meaning. All data becomes suspect and the basis on which nuclear reactors have been judged to be safe has been completely undermined. Moreover, data falsification, which was carried out so freely, at times involved considerable effort and ingenuity: for example, altering computer programs related to the measurement of sea temperature, or changing the wiring of instruments to deceive government inspectors.

According to the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) the February 9, 2007 issue of the Japanese industry magazine Denki Shimbun, makes the following comment. "The production sites of electric power enterprises are all huge assemblies of technicians. For better or worse, these places are governed by the values of technicians....The thing of most concern [to technicians] is protecting the process."
If this analysis is right about the values of technicians, it is hard to see how TEPCO's explanation in its 10 January 2007 report has any basis in the "values of technicians". TEPCO claimed that "falsification occurred because passing the inspections became the objective". However, if this is indeed a truer indication of the values of technicians, the problems go beyond the safety of nuclear power plants. As the CNIC put it "Japan's conception of technology is fundamentally distorted".

TEPCO advisor Masao Takuma (manager of K-K at the time of the cover-up of the fault in the reactor 1 ECCS) was cited in Niigata Nippo, 2 February 2007, saying (translated by CNIC), "People at the site have great pride in their technology. However, the regulations covering nuclear power are very strict. It seems that this had the opposite effect to that which is intended. People ended up thinking that all that was necessary was to pass the inspections."
And a nuclear industry newspaper, the *Genshiryoku Sangyo Shimbun*, did

some more on trying to turn the world upside down. According to translation by CNIC it stated in its February 8, 2007 edition "if scientific and rational regulations which everyone could accept were introduced, the incentive for malpractice would be naturally reduced."

Apparently the nuclear industry is hoping to repeat its success after the cover-ups which were revealed in 2002. After those cover-ups a "fit for service" rule, which allows them to keep operating reactors even after defects have been discovered, was introduced.

TEPCO claimed after the 2002 revelation of cover-ups related to inspection data that it had created a culture and a system in which malpractices would not occur. It says that the incidents that have emerged this time all predate these changes and that they were not discovered during periodic inspections. However, if these practices really stopped as promptly as TEPCO claims, they must have shown up during periodic inspections. Until 2002 malpractices such as doctoring computer programs were carried out on a daily basis. In order to stop such practices TEPCO would have had to take corrective measures, including returning doctored computer programs to their proper state. They couldn't do this if they didn't know about these malpractices.
This tells us that the TEPCO has not changed its nature since the inspection data cover-up. This time, TEPCO once again tried at first to conceal its malpractice. It euphemistically said that it had "corrected the temperature difference between the intake and outlet points" at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP. Due to the local outcry against TEPCO's lack of remorse, it chose different words to describe its behavior at the Fukushima I NPP. In that case TEPCO admitted that it had "handled the temperature measurement data inappropriately", but it still refused to admit that it had "falsified" the data. Since then it has admitted that it made a mistake, but the style of its announcements reveals TEPCO's true colors even more clearly than its past malpractices.

In fact, TEPCO's claim that there have been no instances of malpractice since 2002 is false. On 1 June 2005 TEPCO reported a case at Fukushima I-5 related to the system which controls the concentration of flammable gases. A correction coefficient for a flow control device was "set inappropriately". This situation continued from 1983 to 2005. TEPCO says that this case began before 2002 and that it went unnoticed thereafter. TEPCO is desperate to find excuses, but malpractices which began after 2002 have been discovered in fossil fuel plants and it is just a matter of time before they are discovered in nuclear plants too.

It is probably just as important to question METI's lax inspection system, which was so easily deceived. On February 16, 2007 METI issued a press release in which it listed three areas which needed to be strengthened:

1. Simultaneous observations of the central operations rooms and the actual operation sites;
2. Onsite confirmation before inspections are carried out of such things as whether or not valves are open;
3. Strict examination of measuring instruments.

It makes one wonder what on earth they were inspecting for all these years. Over and over again METI has demanded that electric power companies "report on their investigations into the causes". However the roots of this massive malpractice go very deep. Time should be taken to carry out a thorough investigation.

A laid back response will achieve nothing.

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"FOUL NUCLEAR WASTE DEAL" ALLEGED BY GERMAN ACTIVISTS

Opponents of Germany's main dump for highly radioactive nuclear waste are crying foul over a deal the environment minister is proposing. The deal would be to resume exploration of a salt deposit as a final repository if the minister's opponents agree to a wider search for alternative sites. Local opponents to dumping near the northern village of Gorleben point out that since the early 80s there has been scientific proof that the salt dome there cannot prevent atomic waste from entering the biosphere because it lacks rock cover.

(654.5793) Diet Simon - Opponents of Germany's main dump for highly radioactive nuclear waste are crying foul over a deal the environment minister is proposing. The minister, Sigmar Gabriel, a Social Democrat, is reported to have offered the conservative Christian Democrats that he'll allow further exploration of a salt deposit as a final repository if they agree to a wider search for alternative sites. I know, a bit much to try to comprehend if you're not close to the action, so let me explain.

Although the Social and Christian Democrats govern together in a coalition, from the beginning of this fractious arrangement they have been at odds over nuclear policy. But on paper they are committed to phasing

out nuclear power by 2021, a decision taken by the previous government of Social Democrats and Greens. This aggravates the pro-industry conservatives and the powerful electricity industry, which still runs 17 nuclear power stations and wants more time for them.

But what to do with the growing mountain of waste? At the moment spent fuel goes to France and once a year comes back for storage in a hall in the northern village of Gorleben under a gigantic police guard of up to 20,000 personnel.

Right next to the hall is a man-made salt mine explored for some years as a possible permanent repository. The previous Social Democrat-Greens government stopped the exploration over safety concerns. Opponents in Gorleben allege it's all smoke and mirrors and that despite the safety concerns it's a done deal that the faulty salt dome will be the final storage. Which is what industry and Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats want.

The Gorleben activists argue that every consignment of waste that reaches the hall, officially described as an "interim storage", makes it more likely that the salt next door will become the final repository.

Which brings us back to the proposed deal. Sigmar is telling the conservatives he'll allow Gorleben exploration to resume immediately if they go along with his public promise to look for another site. "That's a fair offer," he told the daily Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung.

The umbrella organisation of the Gorleben resistance, the Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow Dannenberg (BI), says it welcomes the search for alternative dumpsites, but demands that under no circumstances should Gabriel end the moratorium on exploring the salt dome in a swap deal.

The BI media spokesman, Francis Althoff, writes in a release: "A political swap can't be the basis for seriously dealing with highly radioactive waste. "Since the early 80s there has been scientific proof that the Gorleben salt dome cannot prevent atomic waste from entering the biosphere because it lacks a sealing rock cover. "Over six square kilometres there are holes in this cover and in some places there is no cover at all, so that water will carry radioactive materials into the environment," Althoff writes. "Because of these long-known and unchangeable geological facts no more examinations of any kind are needed in Gorleben, from a scientific point of view the site needs to be closed down."

As another element in the proposed swap package the BI fears the establishment of an underground laboratory in the salt mine "as another door opener to making this the atomic waste loo".

The company running the Gorleben storage hall announced last year it would sponsor professorships at the Clausthal Technical University to fund such a project. Professor Klaus Kühn of that university explained the plans in an interview with the local paper in the Gorleben area, the Elbe- Jeetzel-Zeitung. For many years Kühn has been certifying the "safety" of the final repository Asse II near Wolfenbüttel, which is uncontrollably running full of water that could ultimately reach ground water along hundreds of kilometres and the Morsleben final repository near Helmstedt, a former mine whose ceiling is crashing down on the waste held there.

"From the fact that Gorleben would be an atomic loo with upward flushing the necessary political conclusions have to be drawn at last," demands the BI spokesman and predicts protests against ending the exploration moratorium.

The Gorlebeners fear that their area will become the final nuclear dump for all of Europe "because of substitution treaties already in place"

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On April 10, Paul Leventhal died.
Paul's work was at the heart of key security issues: nuclear terrorism, Iran's atomic aspirations, North Korea's atomic ambitions, and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which is up for review again in Vienna soon. He founded the Washington based Nuclear Control Institute 25 years ago, and during his 21 years as the NCI's president, he prepared five books, including the pathbreaking Nuclear Terrorism Taskforce final report (1985) and lectured on the threat of nuclear proliferation. The NCI website's research themes sum up his concerns: nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons; nuclear terrorism and how to prevent it; Saddam Hussein and the bomb; the role of India and Pakistan; plutonium and reprocessing; plutonium sea shipments; plutonium and the net; and plutonium disposal. "What distinguished Paul," wrote one of his colleagues, "was his deep-seated commitment, in a city (Washington DC) full of opportunists."
Paul Leventhal, educator, journalist and nonproliferation expert, born February 12 1938; died April 10 2007

WISE AMSTERDAM/NIRS

ISSN: 1570-4629

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Editorial team: Dirk Bannink and Peer de Rijk.

With **contributions** from WISE Amsterdam, Diet Simon, CNIC, Autonomous Action and Laka Foundation.

Next issue of the Nuclear Monitor (#655) will be mailed out on May 4, 2007

BELARUS: ACTIVISTS FOCUS ON FIGHT AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER

21 years ago, on April 26, 1986, the catastrophe at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant inUkraine, took place. Byelorussians were to suffer most from this worst nuclear disaster in history of mankind. Since the 1990's, the national-liberal opposition to the regime of president Lukashenko has been organizing an annual march called "the Chernobyl way ". More and more activists circles are participating and focus on resisting nuclear power. Antinuclear movement in Belarus, let alone social movements of the most direct victims of Chernobyl, is very weak and isolated.

(654.5794) Autonomous Action -
Purpose of the annual demonstration is to gain public attention to the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster, to criticize the government for the failure in liquidation and minimization of these consequences and voice protest against the nuclear plants of the government.

On December 1, 2006, Alexander Lukashenko declared that a new nuclear power plant will be constructed in Belarus. Engineering works on prospective places of accommodation of the nuclear power plant, and negotiations with the Russian and French suppliers of the equipment are conducted right now. Building of the plant is supposed to begin in 2008. Right now is the best possible opportunity to halt this process, and this is what several organizations in Belarus (including anarchists) are attempting to do.

Since 1996 anarchists have taken part in these annual Chernobyl commemoration demonstrations, but always in a separate bloc and with their own slogans. Purpose of the anarchists is to gain attention to those problems which are least interesting to leaders of the opposition. For example, to the problem of Chernobyl revisionism - conscious revision and underestimation of consequences of the accident.

During all years of governance by Lukashenko, an infringement of rights of the people who have suffered from Chernobyl has been going on. The program of resettlement of inhabitants of the regions polluted by radiation is halted. Healthcare of victims worsens. Benefits and allowances to victims of disaster and participants of liquidation of its consequences, which used to be provided by laws in Belarus, are reduced and cancelled. More and more often we hear official pseudo-scientific claims that all illnesses of victims are due to "mental issues", instead of constant influence of radiation.

We resolutely oppose this "Chernobyl revisionism" and infringement of social guarantees for victims. Not only the Lukashenko government is involved in this, but also the international organizations "helping" Belarus (Representation of UN in Belarus, World Bank, IAEA).

The main themes of anarchist mobilization this year is protest against the governmental plans to construct a nuclear power plant in Belarus, and protest against canceling benefits and allowances to people who have suffered from the Chernobyl disaster. It is also an occasion to spread information about alternative and decentralized forms of energy production. At last, we wish to talk about alternatives to the centralized nuclear energy, and to spread ideas about decentralized alternatives, which are able to end mutual power dependence between regions. We will create initiatives which apply alternative (small, ecologically and effective) energy sources.

The political climate in Belarus is adverse for any social and civil activity, especially what comes to street actions of direct action. In conditions of Belarus it not efficient to organize small actions which will not last more than five minutes. Longer lasting but small actions in crowded places will almost certainly be brutally dispersed, most of their participators arrested. Only mass demonstrations allow to avoid general arrest of activists.

As said, antinuclear movement in Belarus is very weak and isolated. Autonomous Action is asking activists to show solidarity and, if possible, come to Belarus to participate in the demonstration.
The real sensation of the international solidarity (and not just humanitarian help) can really help with building a antinuclear movement. Participation of activists from abroad will enable anarchists of Belarus to feel friendly support, very important during the present hard times. And, the international support in our action may increase interest from local and foreign media..

Contact: antinuclear07@gmail.com.

Fight against nuclear power theme at first Belarusian Social Forum

On May 15-20, the first Belarusian Social Forum will take place in Minsk, organised by Belarusian alter globalist groups, together with EYFA. The BSF will be an autonomous space where Belarusian and foreign grassroots activists will meet face to face to discuss local Belarusian as well as
global themes. One of the themes is the fight against nuclear power.
For Belarusian activists especially, this meeting provides an alternative to dictatorship style society building and the opportunity to develop political, social and cultural activities within a networked format, working in opposition to authoritarianism and neo-liberalism.
More info:
www.eyfa.org/belarus_forum or email if you're interested in participating: coen@eyfa.orgz

IN BRIEF

Regular water leaks at Temelín trigger tensions - First block's restart delayed twice. Political tensions over the Czech Temelín nuclear power station have reached a new peak following two leaks, totaling 3,100 liters of radioactive water in early March. Austrian opposition parties urged faster preparation of a lawsuit against the Czech Republic, alleging breach of a 2000 agreement. On March 14 and April 11, Austrian opponents of Temelín blockaded respectively four and seven border crossings. Dana Drabova, head of the Czech State Authority for Nuclear Safety said: "It is not so much the seriousness of the leaks, but their frequency which is unacceptable." On March 15, the Czech Ministers of Industry and Environment forced the power company CEZ and the State Authority for Nuclear Safety to submit a comprehensive report in a month's time listing all the technical faults at Temelín since it began operating and also the reactions of the nuclear safety authority to them. Government ministers will discuss the report and decide on the need for personnel changes. Environment Minister Martin Bursik, who initially accused the head of the Nuclear Safety Office of playing down the seriousness of the accidents, says the report will show how efficient the body is. At the time of printing, the report was not available yet.
The first Temelín block was to be originally restarted in late March, but the end of the stoppage was delayed over another leak of about 1,000 liters of radioactive water during a pressure test. According to analists, one day of stoppage cost about Kc12m (US$580,000 or EURO 430,000). The stoppage was prompted by troubles with fuel supplied by the U.S. Westinghouse company, some of which got deformed in the reactor more than expected.
After block 1 was finally started up, it quickly had to be run down again, according to officials because of a too high level of humidity in the turbine-hall. There are indications that another secondary cooling pipe burst or leaked, but these are not confirmed. The now scheduled start-up date is April 20th.
Earlier leaks of radioactive water at Temelín: 31 May 2001 (several 1000s l) - 21 December 2004 (20,000 l) - May 2005 (3,000 l) - 2 August 2006 (several 1000s l).
ENDS Europe Daily, 15 March 2007; Radio Praha (www.radio.cz) several reports March 2007; Prague Daily Monitor, 10 April 2007; WISE Brno 17 April 2007

U.S.A. Davis-Besse: owner looking for insurance money. First Energy Nuclear Operating Company has asked its insurer Nuclear Electric Insurance to pay for two years of lost production because of corrosion that it called "unexpected and unforeseeable," at the Davis-Besse reactor in Ohio. But First Energy had resisted government pressure to inspect for acid leaks just before the problem was uncovered in 2002. The corrosion in the lid of the reactor vessel at Davis-Besse almost ate through the steel, leaving a hole the size of a football and nothing but a thin liner of stainless steel holding in the cooling water that surrounded the radioactive core. Before the plant's owner discovered the problem during routine maintenance, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had ordered inspections of reactors of that type to see if there was any damage around the vessel head. The company had petitioned for a delay, which the agency granted.
In a report made public early April by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which was prepared as part of the company's insurance claim, First Energy said the corrosion might have occurred over a matter of weeks. When the company was seeking permission to reopen its reactor, it told the commission that the corrosion had occurred over a period of three years. Discovery of the corrosion shocked the industry. The General Accounting Office, as it was then named, called it "the most serious safety issue confronting the nation's commercial nuclear power industry since Three Mile Island in 1979." (see *Nuclear Monitor* 565, March 22, 2002: "Millimeters from disaster") The company is seeking US$80 million (EURO 60 million) for replacement of the vessel head, and US$106.7 million (EURO 79 million) for the cost of replacement power. The plant was shut for two years.
New York Times, 6 April 2007

Urenco: 23% of world-wide enrichment market. Urenco's share of the world's enrichment services market was about 23% in 2006, up from just under 20% in 2005, the company said March 20. In reporting its 2006 results, Urenco said that its order book stood at EURO 15 billion (US$20 billion) at the end of 2006, an increase of more than 90% compared to the European enrichment consortium's order book at the end of 2005. Urenco indicated that growth occurred in Europe, Asia, and North America. By comparison, the US enrichment company USEC Inc. reported recently that its sales backlog totaled US$7 billion. Urenco also noted that the first production from its LES enrichment plant in the US will occur in mid-2009 instead of the end of 2008. But according to Urenco, LES customer deliveries will remain on schedule because additional enrichment capacity will be installed at Urenco's European plants.
Nuclear News Flashes, 20 March 2007

UK: Nirex gone. The UK Government's policy of giving the job of building and managing a nuclear waste repository to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) has reached a major milestone. All staff and responsibilities of Nirex, the former waste management organization, have now been transferred to the NDA which has established a new directorate - the Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD). The RWMD will set up a subsidiary of the NDA to devise "a safe, environmentally sound, publicly acceptable, geological disposal solution" for the UK's high- level wastes - civil and military. The NDA said the next step is "proposals for a voluntarist/partnership approach to site selection".
Nirex was formed in 1982 to develop an intermediate-level waste disposal facility, with shares held by British Energy, BNFL,

the UKAEA and the government. It carried out detailed studies and in 1994 sought permission to construct an underground rock laboratory to investigate the suitability of a site near Sellafield for deep geological disposal. Permission was refused three years later and UK radioactive waste policy has been confused ever since.
N-Base Briefing 521, 15 April & AUA Weekly Digest, 13 April 2007

German waste site go-ahead incontestable. Germany's first disposal site for low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste is set to go ahead after the Federal Administrative Court ended years of legal argument and delay.
The plan to convert the Konrad site, a former iron ore mine in Lower Saxony, and to use it as a final repository, was first approved by the state environment ministry in 2002 after almost 20 years of proceedings. Local communities and farmers appealed against the licensing decision. Those lawsuits were dismissed in March 2006, without leave for further appeal, but subsequent appeals were made against the denial of leave to appeal. These were finally dismissed on 3 April, exhausting the legal process and rendering the site license to convert the Konrad mine into a final repository incontestable.
The Konrad site will hold up to 303,000 cubic meters of waste - some 95% of the waste volume with 1% of the radioactivity from Germany's nuclear industry. It may be operational about 2010. The low- and intermediate-level waste includes items like filters, tools, chemical wastewater, sludges/suspensions, cleaning materials and contaminated metals and non-metals. The waste undergoes treatment to reduce its volume before being packed into drums for disposal.
World Nuclear News, 12 April 2007

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WISE/NIRS NUCLEAR MONITOR

The Nuclear Information & Resource Service was founded in 1978 and is based in Washington, US. The World Information Service on Energy was set up in the same year and houses in Amsterdam, Netherlands. NIRS and WISE Amsterdam joined forces in 2000, creating a worldwide network of information and resource centers for citizens and environmental organizations concerned about nuclear power, radioactive waste, radiation, and sustainable energy issues.

The ***WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor*** publishes international information in English 20 times a year. A Spanish translation of this newsletter is available on the WISE Amsterdam website (www.antenna.nl/wise/esp). A Russian version is published by WISE Russia and a Ukrainian version is published by WISE Ukraine. The ***WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor*** can be obtained both on paper and in an email version (pdf format). Old issues are (after two months) available through the WISE Amsterdam homepage: www.antenna.nl/wise.

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US and Canada based readers should contact NIRS for details of how to receive the ***Nuclear Monitor*** (address see page 11). Others receive the ***Nuclear Monitor*** through WISE Amsterdam. For individuals and NGOs we ask a minimum annual donation of 50 Euros (20 Euros for the email version). Institutions and industry should contact us for details of subscription prices.

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