Publication Laka-library:
Nuclear Plant Risk Studies: Failing the Grade (2000)
| Author | D.Lochbaum, Union of Concerned Scientists |
| Date | August 2000 |
| Classification | 6.01.3.20/41 (NUCLEAR SAFETY - REACTORS - PRESSURIZED WATER (PWR) / BOILING WATER (BWR)) |
| Front | 
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From the publication:
Nuclear Plant Risk Studies Failing the Grade Executive Summary An accident at a US nuclear power plant could kill more people than were killed by the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki. (1) The financial repercussions could also be catastrophic. The 1986 accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant cost the former Soviet Union more than three times the economical benefits accrued from the operation of every other Soviet nuclear power plant operated between 1954 and 1990. (2) But consequences alone do not define risk. The probability of an accident is equally important. When consequences are very high, as· they are from nuclear plant accidents, prudent risk management dictates that probabilities be kept very low. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) attempts to limit the risk to the public from nuclear plant operation to less than 1 percent of the risk the public faces from other accidents. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) examined how nuclear plant risk assessments are performed and how their results are used. We concluded that the risk assessments are seriously flawed and their results are being used inappropriately to increase-not reduce-the threat to the American public. Nuclear plant risk assessments are really not risk assessments because potential accident consequences are not evaluated. They merely examine accident probabilities-only half of the risk equation. Moreover, the accident probability calculations are seriously flawed. They rely on assumptions that contradict actual operating experience: • The risk assessments assume nuclear plants always conform with safety requirements, yet each year more than a thousand violations are reported. • Plants are assumed to have no design problems even though hundreds are reported every year. • Aging is assumed to result in no damage, despite evidence that aging materials killed four workers. • Reactor pressure vessels are assumed to be fail-proof, even though embrittlement forced the Yankee Rowe nuclear plant to shut down. • The risk assessments assume that plant workers are far less likely to make mistakes than actual operating experience demonstrates.
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