Publication Laka-library:
Power Plays. Developments in Russian Enriched Uranium Trade (2024)
| Author | Darya Dolzikova, RUSI |
 |
2-34-6-50-13.pdf |
| Date | March 2024 |
| Classification | 2.34.6.50/13 (RUSSIA - EXPORT / ROSATOM) |
| Front |
From the publication:
Power Plays. Developments in Russian Enriched Uranium Trade Darya Dolzikova RUSI Special Report, March 2024. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Whitehall London SW1A 2ET United Kingdom Introduction and Report Overview On 17 February 2024, almost two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenksy addressed the Munich Security Conference, pleading for unity against the aggression perpetuated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and for continued support for Ukraine in its fight. Among his calls to action, Zelensky stressed the need to close ‘all loopholes in the sanctions against Russia’, singling out Russia’s nuclear industry in particular. ‘There should be no sectors of the Russian economy involved in its aggression that are still free from sanctions’, he said. ‘This particularly relates to the nuclear sector’. Russia’s Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is an important player in the international nuclear energy industry, with a major presence across various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The company, through its subsidiaries JSC TVEL and Techsnabexport LLC (better known as TENEX), is the biggest supplier of uranium enrichment to the global market, and has continued to export significant volumes of enriched uranium product since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In 2022, Russia accounted for 30% of the separative work units (SWU, the unit of measurement for uranium enrichment services) delivered to EU utilities and for 44% of global enrichment capacity. In the US, 24% of SWU purchased by US utilities in 2022 came from Russia. This report examines the extent of Western (European and US) dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and identifies ways in which Rosatom may be continuing to access global, including Western, nuclear fuel supply chains, despite some efforts in the US and Europe to diversify away from Russian supply. The report studies changes in Russian enriched uranium trade patterns since the start of 2022 to identify possible indicators of efforts to adapt to restrictions on Russian uranium supply that have been or may be introduced by governments and companies. The report examines four main case studies. In the first case study, the report outlines possible Chinese displacement activity using Russian material, identifying trade patterns that suggest that increased imports of Russian enriched uranium into China may be facilitating greater exports of Chinese enriched uranium supply, including to the US. The second case study addresses well-documented increases in enriched uranium imports from Russia to France and considers a range of possible explanations for this growth. While the precise flow and use of the additional Russian material that is being imported into France is difficult to ascertain definitively, it appears that France may be offering an outlet for Russian enriched uranium that is no longer welcome in other countries. This may be facilitating the reallocation of Russian supplies across European utilities’ supply chains, allowing Russia to continue accessing the European nuclear fuel market even as some countries seek to diversify away from Russian supply. The third case study examines reported deliveries through France and possibly the Netherlands of Russian enriched uranium to a French-owned fuel fabrication facility in Germany. The trade data reviewed for this report could not confirm the extent of deliveries to Germany of Russian material through third countries, or whether there have been shifts in such activity since the start of 2022; however, any such deliveries to Germany may be providing an additional option for Russian enriched uranium imports no longer welcome in other countries and may potentially be used in the future fabrication of VVER assemblies in Germany. The fourth case study touches on US dependencies on Russian enriched uranium and the likely limits of a proposed US ban on imports of Russian uranium in limiting Russia’s role in global nuclear fuel supply chains and Rosatom revenues.