Despite “commitments”, Urenco Almelo continues to enrich Russian uranium

Yesterday, the ANVS, the Dutch nuclear supervisor, authorized the transport of up to six shipments of fissile enriched uranium from Russia to Urenco in Almelo. This is remarkable because after the Russian invasion, almost two years ago, the uranium-enriching state-owned company in Almelo claimed to be "very concerned" about developments in Ukraine and therefore "stopped all contracts" with Russia.
Local newspaper Tubantia now reports that Urenco is enriching uranium from Russia for "a French nuclear power plant operator." It would, according to a Urenco spokesperson, be a breach of contract not to do so.

The ANVS yesterday granted three permits for the transport of enriched uranium from Russia to Almelo. One permit for 120 small uranium samples, one for 24 empty uranium containers, and one for 24 containers filled with fissile enriched uranium.

EPZ: Continuation of the closed fuel cycle bron

According to the Urenco spokesman, in Tubantia, the route of the uranium from France is via Russia, because the uranium must first be converted into uranium hexafluoride (UF6) in Russia before it can be further enriched by Urenco. The license talks about "unirradiated" uranium, but since French EDF has a lot of reprocessed uranium, and Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear energy company, is the only party converting reprocessed uranium to UF6, Laka assumes that this shipment involves reprocessed (irradiated and processed) enriched uranium. It is remarkable that EDF then apparently chooses to let Urenco re-enrich this uranium. After all, why don't they let Rosatom do that in one go?

Namibian uranium
Something similar was going on in the late 1970s: Urenco was enriching uranium from South African-occupied Namibia. Urenco defended itself by arguing that one did not own the uranium, it was supplied by the customer and one could not see where it came from. One was merely providing a service by enriching it. The United Nations disagreed: if you can suspect that something is stolen, you are a fence if you earn from it. In 1985 the UN announced a lawsuit against the Netherlands (as owner of Urenco NL), but it was dropped when Namibia became independent.
But the message was and is clear: in addition to a contractual one, there is also a moral component to doing business. And Urenco seems to forget that here (again).

But before we lose ourselves in technical reflections of that kind, it is really and above all a great affront that Ad Louter, the director of Urenco Almelo, chairman of the nuclear lobby organisation Nucleair Nederland, first claims with much aplomb to have 'stopped all contracts with the Russians' and then that after two years it turns out that uranium is being enriched in Russia after all.

Does that remind us of anything? Indeed: EPZ, the operator of Borssele nuclear power plant also claimed to "no longer do any direct business with Russia." After which it turned out that Borssele actually does depend on the same Russian supplier that Urenco does business with.

And the Dutch government knew about this al along. Because upon re-examining the answers to GroenLinks' parliamentary questions from April 2023, about this:

6. The members of the GroenLinks Group further understand that after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Urenco terminated all its contracts with service providers in the Russian Federation. [...]

Reply Secretary of State for Infrastructure and Water Management
Immediately after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Urenco terminated its contracts with Russian parties. There have been no direct ties between Urenco and Russian parties since then, nor any open transactions or shipments.

Urenco was caught because the ANVS issued transport licenses from Russia. "But given the many shipments and permits, it is quite possible that Urenco never actually stopped enriching uranium from Russia," said Dirk Bannink, from Laka Foundation. "Because those 24 empty containers coming from JSC Siberian Chemical Plant at Seversk, I guess that's also not for charity."

This entry was posted in , , , and tagged , , on by .

About Stichting Laka

Het documentatie- en onderzoekscentrum kernenergie - Ketelhuisplein 43, Amsterdam - tel: 020-6168294 - mail: info@laka.org - Bsky: @laka.org - FB: facebook.com/stg.laka - Linkedin: company:stichting-laka - Mastodon: @laka@www.laka.org

Do you have a remark or did you spot an inconsistency? Let us know!

Related posts:

 

  • 10 February 2026: Authorized Noise: Normalising Risks

    Behnam Raeesian is an internationally recognized visual artist and poster designer from Iran, known for bold political and cultural works. Through exhibitions, workshops, jury roles, and collaborations with cultural institutions worldwide, he has built a strong voice in contemporary political graphic design. His projects confront complex issues such as nuclear risk and technological impact, transforming […]


  • 14 July 2025: The Nuclear Mirage: Why SMRs Won’t Save Nuclear Power

    Everywhere you look, the nuclear industry’s hype machine is in overdrive. Goldman Sachs, Microsoft, and the UK government all tout small modular reactors as the silver bullet for climate change and energy security. Tech billionaires are hiring nuclear veterans. Wall Street is whispering about “round-the-clock power” for artificial intelligence data centers. For those old enough […]


  • 25 March 2025: War games: aanval op Zuid-Korea’s nucleaire faciliteiten als ‘smoke-screen’ voor invasie Taiwan

    Kernenergie en veiligheid: A wargame sought to test if a major radiological release that would prompt the evacuation of millions of civilians in South Korea could distract key US allies from assisting and rebuffing an all-out military invasion of Taiwan. The short answer was yes. The game originally presumed that China, wanting to keep the […]


  • 22 November 2024: Problemen met nieuwe kerncentrale Olkiluoto in Scandinavië

    Big batteries and EVs to the rescue again as faults with new nuclear plant cause chaos on Nordic grids The Finnish nuclear power plant Olkiluoto was finally connected to the grid last year, at an estimated cost of €11 billion compared to the original budget of €3 billion. That cost blowout forced its developer, the […]


  • 6 May 2024: UK: Estimated cost of undersea nuclear graveyard now £66bn

    A vast subsea nuclear graveyard planned to hold Britain’s burgeoning piles of radioactive waste is set to become the biggest, longest-lasting and most expensive infrastructure project ever undertaken in the UK. The project [UK's nuclear waste dump] is now predicted to take more than 150yrs to complete with lifetime costs of £66bn in today’s money...The […]


  • 20 April 2024: Chemelot: SMR at Limburg chemical cluster undesirable

    Last year, the Dutch Province of Limburg started an alliance in which, besides the local government, research institutes, small nuclear reactor (SMR) developers, utilities, industrial customers and funders cooperated. With this "Limburg SMR alliance" Limburg  tried to lead the way towards an SMR in Limburg. The preferred site for a first SMR would be Chemelot, […]