Publication Laka-library:
The trade in nuclear weapon materials: the European Commission, Russia and highly enriched uranium (1996)
| Author | Greenpeace Int. |
| Date | December 1995 |
| Classification | 2.34.6.50/01 (RUSSIA - EXPORT / ROSATOM) |
| Front | 
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From the publication:
INTRODUCTION The proliferation threat posed by the trade in nuclear weapons-usable fissile materials has long been recognised by the international community. At the same time however, the commercial nuclear industry continues to undermine efforts to reduce the threat from these materials. The most recent example that threatens to destroy international efforts to stop the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) as nuclear reactor fuel, (1) are plans currently being developed by the European Commission through EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) for the purchase of bomb-grade uranium from Russia's nuclear weapons stockpile. This briefing summarises what is known about EURATOM's plans, what the implications are, as well as background details on HEU in Russia. The trade in bomb-grade uranium poses a major proliferation threat as it is a direct use nuclear weapons material. In the case of fresh HEU fuel it would be remarkably easy to get access to the material for use in a nuclear weapon. It is for this reason that international non-proliferation efforts, led by the United States, have been attempting to stop countries from using such material in their research reactors. EURATOM nations, led by Germany, France and Belgium, as well as EURATOM who operate research reactors using HEU (most importantly in the Netherlands), while resisting these efforts have now begun to seek out new suppliers. The proliferation fear is that if these negotiations succeed a new East-West trade will be established in nuclear weapons material. Before this happens EURATOM member states, which includes nations that have nothing to gain but everything to lose if bomb-grade uranium enters the European marketplace, should reject these talks as counter to the interests of national and European Union non-proliferation policy. (1) HEU is made from natural uranium by artificially increasing the proportion of one of its more unstable isotopes. Natural uranium is the most abundant radioactive element in the earth's crust. It is a mixture of three isotopes: U-238, accounting for 99%, U-235 about 0.71% and U-234 the remainder. Each of these is radioactive and their decay process gives rise to all naturally occurring radioactive elements. Depending on the use it is put to, uranium requires different proportions of the U-235 isotope. For weapons it is preferable that the enrichment is over 90 per cent. For research reactors and reactors used to power ships anything from 10-90 per cent may be required. For civilian electricity-producing plants the proportion is usually from 3-5 per cent, although natural uranium can be used if heavy water is the moderator.
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