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The (UK) Government's Response to the Chernobyl Accident -FOE's Memorandum to the Agricultural Committee

Author	FOE
Date
Classification	2.34.8.30/29 (CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT - CONSEQUENCES EUROPE - GENERAL)
Front

1. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The Government had five clear days warning before the Chernobyl fallout cloud
reached the UK. Their response demonstrates that although the UK has had nuclear 
energy for over thirty years, adequate and rehearsed emergency plans did not exist 
for an accident of this magnitude. The possibility that such an accident could occur 
was not taken seriously by the Government, its advisors, or the nuclear industry.
(2) Since the accident, the Government has admitted that whilst mistakes were made,
the lessons have been learned and appropriate changes have been made in emergency 
plans and monitoring arrangements. This is far from the case. Twenty-one months on, 
the handling of lamb bans by the Government still shows signs of bad management 
and poor decision making. This In turn continues to lead to confusion, and hardship 
on the part of farmers still awaiting compensation, with no Government scientist or 
politician apparently in a position to predict how long the situation will last.
(3) The UK response was marked by a lack of coordination and poor decision making
by the different departments responsible for monitoring the environment and advising 
the Government. At first, Government statements were designed to play down the 
seriousness of the situation, claiming that the UK would not be affected and the 
accident could not occur in the West because of superior technology. When the fallout 
cloud did reach the UK, on May 2nd, it took MAFF a further two days to establish an 
emergency operations room to provide information and advice for members of the 
pubic and farmers, and to make the necessary arrangements to ensure that food 
monitoring results would be available within 24 hours. This was too late. These 
arrangements should have been part of existing emergency plans so that the response 
in the UK was automatic. The delay meant that when heavy rail fell In the North of 
the UK leading to contamination of large areas, no advice was issued by the 
Government. This caused particular hardship for farmers who were forced to turn 
to organisations like local authorities and FoE for simple advice and information
(4) Four days after the cloud had reached the UK, the Government stated that the
situation had been assessed and found not to pose a risk to heath. Milk and other food 
products were declared sate. This reassurance was misleading as insufficient samples 
had been tested by MAFF. Those samples that had been tested showed a wide range 
in contamination levels. This should have alerted MAFF to increase the coverage in 
the worst affected areas. Instead, many samples came from the areas that had not 
experienced the highest rainfall levels demonstrating the poor communication that 
existed between MAFF, its regional offices and the MET office.

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