Publication Laka-library:
Vol II, Part 1: Rocky Flats, Working Group Assessment (1994)
| Author | Plutonium Working Gr US DoE |
| Date | September 1994 |
| Classification | 3.01.5.30/08 (UNITED STATES - GENERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS + CLEAN UP) |
| Front | 
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From the publication:
Rocky Flats Plant Executive Summary When the Department of Energy (DOE) curtailed operations at its Rocky Flats Plant on December 22, 1989, a large inventory of plutonium was left in operational status in forms and conditions not appropriate for long-term storage. On March 15, 1994, Secretary O'Leary directed the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (EH) to conduct an environmental safety and health (ES&H) vulnerability study of the plutonium holdings at DOE facilities. Such a study was initiated April 25, 1994, and began with self-assessments at the facilities conducted by Site Assessment Teams (SATs). Several Headquarters Working Group Assessment Teams (WGATs) were established and then dispatched to those DOE sites with the most significant amounts of plutonium to review and validate the results of the Site Assessment Teams. Rocky Flats Plant holds about two-thirds of DOE's inventory of nonweapons plutonium in approximately 27,000 packages containing 12.9 metric tons of plutonium. This report presents the results of the WGAT assessment of Rocky Flats and the SAT Report on Rocky Flats. A reference to the SAT Report is included in Appendix B. A number of external stakeholder organizations are active at Rocky Flats. In accordance with the Secretary's direction, three members of stakeholder organizations were included in the Rocky Flats WGAT. The involvement of external stakeholders was considered to be a positive step forward in DOE openness to the public. This should provide the basis for future external stakeholder contribution to DOE program assessments. The WGAT reviewed and validated the findings of the SAT (Section 2.0). The SAT Report disclosed 54 vulnerabilities in all seven of the principal facilities reviewed. These were loosely connected to 11 general potential "events" for each facility. Including an earthquake, fire, criticality, and aircraft crash. In cases where the WGAT and the SAT differed on identified vulnerabilities, it was because they each used different methodologies to analyze the same event scenario. The WGAT used a methodology common to all DOE sites. The WGAT identified 29 additional vulnerabilities (Section 3.0 and Appendix A). Most of the WGA T vulnerabilities addressed more specific problems under the umbrella of the SAT general vulnerabilities. However, some WGAT issues were not covered by the SAT event-driven generic events. The 83 vulnerabilities identified by the SAT and by the WGAT are ranked in Tables ES-1, ES-2, and ES-3 for impacts to worker safety, public safety, and the environment, respectively. It is noted that 81 vulnerabilities could affect the worker, 27 the public, and 36 the environment. Ten high likelihood/high consequence vulnerabilities were identified. Most of the vulnerabilities tend to cluster on the low likelihood, low consequence sides of the chart, as might be expected as a result of the good practices at Rocky Flats to reduce risk.
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