Publication Laka-library:
Vol II, Part 3: Los Alamos, Working Group Assessment (1994)
| Author | Plutonium Working Gr US DoE |
| Date | September 1994 |
| Classification | 3.01.5.30/10 (UNITED STATES - GENERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS + CLEAN UP) |
| Front | 
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From the publication:
Los Alamos National Laboratory EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Department of Energy (DOE) Defense Programs (DP) has been required to respond to a reversal in mission. Long committed to expanding the nation's inventory of nuclear weapons, DP is now reducing that inventory to the level needed only to preserve a credible nuclear deterrent. In response to the new mandate, production activities at many DP sites have been curtailed and efforts have focused on environmental restoration under the auspices of Environmental Management (EM). In DP's current thrust to support stockpile stewardship, non-proliferation activities, and the disposition of plutonium wastes, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) remains a canter of excellence as a major broad-based national resource for technical creativity. On January 25, 1994, Secretary O'Leary directed the Office of Environment, Safety and Health (ES&H) to conduct a vulnerability study of the plutonium operations and holdings at DOE facilities. Assistant Secretary O'Toole initiated such a study on March 25, 1994. This effort began with self-assessments and, as a major facility dealing with plutonium, Los Alamos National Laboratory was designated to perform one of them. Subsequently, Working Group Assessment Teams (WGATs) were established and dispatched to the DOE sites to validate the reported results of the Site Assessment Teams (SATs). This document presents the results of the ES&H vulnerabilities observed by the WGA T (Appendix D) and the WGA T assessment of the report submitted by the Site Assessment Team at LANL (Appendix 8). In keeping with Secretary O'Leary's initiative for openness, the WGA T that reviewed the LANL SAT report participated in a public inbriefing on July 6, 1994, to inform the public of its pending validation activity and in a public out-brief on July 19, 1994, to inform the public of the team's findings. A confidential telephone mailbox was set up to solicit anonymous input and comment from workers and the public as a result of a request at the public in-briefing. To accommodate a request by the Pueblo Indian Nations who are neighbors of the LANL site, a special progress briefing on the Working Group Assessment was provided to the Indian Governors on July 13, 1994. In response to their desire for involvement, WGAT invited a "Q" cleared representative from the Pueblo Nations to join the WGAT during the preparation of this report (Appendix C). The Site Assessment Team report disclosed 49 vulnerabilities associated with the 24 plutonium-containing facilities assessed at LANL. The WGAT found the SAT identification and assessment of LANL vulnerabilities to be thorough and conservative. Most of the vulnerabilities identified would have some consequences to workers and no consequences to the public or to the environment.
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