Publication Laka-library:
Vol II, Part 6: Lawrence Livermore Working Gr. Assessment (1994)
| Author | Plutonium Working Gr US DoE |
| Date | September 1994 |
| Classification | 3.01.5.30/13 (UNITED STATES - GENERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS + CLEAN UP) |
| Front | 
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From the publication:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Executive Summary The Secretary of Energy requested a plutonium vulnerability assessment on the hazards to the environment, public and workers of plutonium stored and processed at facilities of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). A Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) was formed to examine the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The team members learned of the facilities and holdings of plutonium at the LLNL, and verified vulnerabilities that the site assessment team (SAT) identified in the LLNL Draft Plutonium ES&H Vulnerability Self Assessment Report. The team also performed a walk down of the facilities used for plutonium processing and storage to identify any additional vulnerabilities. The team examined areas of operations and maintenance, health physics, plutonium processing, nuclear criticality safety, safety during seismic events, and safeguard practices with respect to safety. Areas examined by the team include radiological protection practices and procedures, the air filter and other barriers for plutonium, worker training and radiological detection instruments. The team also examined LLNL's safety analysis. The team identified as vulnerabilities condition that may lead to unnecessary or increased radiation exposure, or release of radioactive materials to the environment. The team identified as concerns conditions that degrade a barrier containing plutonium, or jeopardize a layer of the safety envelope. Unlike a vulnerability, a concern, by itself, could not provide a path for the release of plutonium. The team verified the results of the SAT concerning the tow yet unnecessary dose to workers created by excess plutonium stored at LLNL. The team examined uncertainties in plutonium materials and the non-standard packaging that LLNL identified as a vulnerability by the SAT. Manifesting this vulnerability, plutonium oxide and ash materials of uncertain composition bulged eight storage containers recently at LLNL. Because similar conditions may exist in a total of 108 cans, the team rated the likelihood of this vulnerability to be high. The team confirmed the seismic inadequacy of non-structural walls in the Plutonium Facility (B332) and added other walls not listed in the SAT report. The team identified two additional vulnerabilities within the Plutonium Facility (Building 332). The vulnerabilities are caused or are aggravated by earthquake. One vulnerability is the inadequate seismic design of the fire suppression system. This vulnerability Is of low likelihood and may result in low exposure to the environment or public. The vulnerability may lead to a criticality and, therefore, has the potential to be of high consequence to the worker. The other vulnerability in Building 332 stems from unsecured cans of plutonium in the vault cabinets that may be disrupted during an earthquake. This vulnerability has low likelihood and low possible consequence to the worker.
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