Publication Laka-library:
Vol II, Appendix B, Part 5: Argonne -West Site Assessment (1994)
| Author | Plutonium Working Gr US DoE |
| Date | September 1994 |
| Classification | 3.01.5.30/26 (UNITED STATES - GENERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS + CLEAN UP) |
| Front | 
|
From the publication:
Executive Summary In accordance with the directive of Secretary of Energy O'Leary ["Department of Energy Plutonium ES&H Vulnerability Assessment: Project Plan," April25, 1994.], Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANLW) has conducted an assessment of the AN L-W site's plutonium environment, safety, and health (ES&H) vulnerabilities. Addressed in this assessment were all the ANL-W holdings of unirradiated plutonium (including the fuel for the ZPPR reactor) and the facilities in which those materials are handled and/or stored. Special attention was given to the containment and packaging of plutonium-bearing materials. The facilities addressed in this study include the Analytical Laboratory (AL), the Experimental Fuels Laboratory (EFL), the Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF), the Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) Laboratory, the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility, and the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) Vault and Workroom. The Site Assessment Team found no ES&H vulnerabilities in the AL, EFL, NDA Laboratory, or TREAT. For those facilities, any potentially adverse conditions or potentially hazardous events were found to be of little or no consequence due to compensatory and mitigative measures existing in the facilities or within the AN L-W operations. Also addressed in the Site Assessment were sealed radiation sources that contain plutonium. Because AN L-W has an accurate accounting of those sources and because the integrity of those sources is checked semi-annually, the Site Assessment Team found no vulnerabilities associated with sealed sources. The ANL-W site has within its plutonium holdings nearly 2600 plutonium-bearing containers, of which 190 are packaged in a suspect configuration. Each of these suspect packages has a food pack can as its innermost container. These inner food pack cans are sealed in plastic bags and are contained within outer food pack cans. These packages contain plutonium in various forms- primarily as a U-Pu-Zr alloy, but also as metallic plutonium, mixed oxide or mixed carbide. Of these 190 packages, 17 4 are stored in the vault in the FMF, and 16 are stored in the vault in the ZPPR mound. The Site Assessment Team found these packages to be vulnerabilities. Of the 177 packages in the FMF vault, 15 have been found to be accumulating mass; i.e. the cans are each at least 3 grams heavier than the original gross weight measured at the time of their closure. That these cans have been gaining mass indicates that the material in the innermost can is reacting with the container atmosphere, and that air is being drawn into the outer can adding to the measured mass of the package. This phenomenon can occur with the plastic bag either intact or breached. Nine other packages that were found to be gaining mass have already been addressed by either repackaging or using the material.
This publication is only available at Laka on paper, not as pdf.
You can borrow the publication or request a copy. When we're available, this is possible for a small fee.