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Vol II, Part 8: Argonnne - East, Working Group Assessment (1994)

Author	Plutonium Working Gr US DoE
Date	September 1994
Classification	3.01.5.30/15 (UNITED STATES - GENERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS + CLEAN UP)
Front

Argonne National Laboratory - East and New Brunswick Laboratory

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Plutonium Vulnerability Working Group Assessment Team No. 1 (WGAT-1) 
visited Argonne National Laboratory-East (ANL-E) and New Brunswick Laboratory 
(NBL), located at the ANL-Illinois site, from May 23 through May 27 and June 6 
through June 1 0, 1994. The objective of the WGAT-1, the ANL-E Site Assessment 
Team (SAT), and the NBL SAT was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the 
environment, safety, and health (ES&H) vulnerabilities arising at ANL-E and NBL 
from the storage and handling of the Department's current plutonium holdings.

During the first visit to the site (May 23-27), WGAT-1 toured various site facilities 
and, after each tour, met with SAT members to conduct "table-top" discussions. In 
addition, various briefings were given to ANL-E management, NBL management, 
and DOE management. During the second visit (June 6-10), WGAT-1 completed 
their assessment report, and met with various site technical representatives.

Based on the site visits and walkdowns, the WGAT -1 considered the SAT reports 
and question set responses to be factual assessments of the facilities. WGAT-1 
observed many good practices at ANL-E and NBL during their visit to these sites.

The WGAT-1 and ANL-E SAT identified one ANL-E vulnerability and three issues. 
The vulnerability applied to several of the facilities at ANL-E and involved Pu storage 
in containers with uncharacterized internal conditions. The uncharacterized packaging 
conditions might lead to container degradation with potential worker exposure or 
contamination. The widely accepted practice of using plastic materials and other 
hydrogenous materials for packaging presents the potential for radiolytic effects 
that could lead to material release. The three issues identified are not explicit ES&H 
vulnerabilities but are considered concerns and thus are documented in the body of 
the report.

The WGAT -1 and NBL SAT identified four NBL vulnerabilities and two issues. 
The first vulnerability involved the potential for reduced safety system reliability. 
The lack of a prioritized preventive maintenance program for aging equipment may 
contribute to a time-dependent degradation of the equipment. The lack of a 
preventive maintenance program has been identified as the cause of recent safety 
equipment degradation. The second vulnerability involves the physical condition 
of staged low level liquid radioactive waste (LLRW) materials. The material is 
predominately stored in conditions intended only for short-term storage. Specific 
areas of concern involve plutonium LLRW contained in plastic bottles in sealed 
plastic bags stored in steel drums. The third vulnerability involved inadequacies 
with the existing safety analysis reports (SAR) concerning non-conservative fire 
scenario assumptions. As a result of a recent site-wide Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA), 
a review of the NBL SAR revealed that fire scenarios with a greater potential for 
facility damage may not have been fully considered. The fourth vulnerability 
involved the lack of a clear line of authority and responsibility for resolution of 
fire protection deficiencies that were identified in the previous vulnerability. The 
two issues identified are not explicit ES&H vulnerabilities but are considered 
concerns and thus are documented in the body of the report.

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