Publication Laka-library:
Vol II, Part 9: Oak Ridge, Working Group Assessment (1994)
| Author | Plutonium Working Gr US DoE |
| Date | September 1994 |
| Classification | 3.01.5.30/16 (UNITED STATES - GENERAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS PLANTS + CLEAN UP) |
| Front | 
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From the publication:
Oak Ridge EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This is the report of a visit to the Oak Ridge (OR) site [Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)] by the Working Group Assessment Team (WGAT) to assess plutonium vulnerabilities. Purposes of the visit were: to review results of the site's self-assessment of current practices for handling and storing plutonium; to conduct an independent assessment of these practices; to reconcile differences and assemble a final list of vulnerabilities; to calculate consequence and probability for selected vulnerabilities; and to issue a report to the Working Group. This report, representing completion of the OR visit, will be compiled along with those from all other sites with plutonium inventories as part of a final report to the Secretary of Energy. Another objective of the visit by the WGAT was to inform the public and local stakeholders of the project's mission, its modus operandi, and the specific results of the OR assessment. To this end, an "In-Briefing" was held at the outset of the WGAT visit to explain purposes and actions to be taken, and an "Exit-Briefing" was held at the conclusion of the visit to reveal results. Both meetings were announced publicly and accessible to the public. Questions from the public as well as from OR personnel were addressed at each of the briefings. This report contains an accounting of these meetings. The Site Assessment Team (SAT) had conducted its self-assessment and drafted a report of its findings prior to the visit by the WGAT. In a review of this work, the WGAT found the SAT report adequate except for a few of the facilities where question sets were incomplete. The WGA T team explored the deficiencies and identified needed corrections for SAT implementation. The WGAT identified 19 facilities which contained in-scope material and walkdowns were conducted for each of these facilities. Team members interviewed a number of workers and managers, and discussed impressions with cognizant members of the SAT. The SAT had identified 14 potential "vulnerabilities" during their assessment. The WGAT, however, found that five of these were inappropriate for this assessment: four were for facilities containing material declared waste (and, thus, are outside the scope of this assessment), and five more vulnerabilities were for facilities or areas of facilities that contain no plutonium. The three remaining SAT vulnerabilities were combined with nine more identified by the WGAT for a total of twelve. One of the vulnerabilities identified at OR is generic to the other sites within the Department of Energy (DOE) weapons complex. It relates to the loss of institutional memory for the processes and configurations associated with the buildings, equipment, and material packaging. The loss of institutional memory is exacerbated by the continued reduction in the operating budgets.
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