Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
THORP: The case for contract renegotations (1999)
| Auteur | M.Sadnicki, Barker, MacKerron |
| Datum | juni 1999 |
| Classificatie | 2.05.8.35/11 (GROOT-BRITTANNIË - SELLAFIELD - THORP) |
| Voorkant |
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Uit de publicatie:
THORP: THE CASE FOR CONTRACT RENEGOTIATION Mike Sadnicki, Fred Barker and Cordon MacKerron EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A The reprocessing of spent fuel will play a diminishing role in the future of nuclear power. At issue is the pace at which a transition to an alternative spent fuel management strategy - based on interim storage and eventual direct disposal - can be completed. Although this alternative strategy is already the norm for the majority of the world's spent fuel, reprocessing continues in the UK and France, largely because of contractual commitments entered into decades ago. It is the future of the contracts between the British reprocessor, BNFL, and its main overseas customers that is examined in this Report. B In essence, the Report asks whether these contractual commitments are, on economic or sustainability grounds, still worth fulfilling. Its specific point of departure in Section 2 is to examine why the UK Government is resisting the trend away from reprocessing. This is likely to be because the Government - taking its lead from BNFL - holds five convictions about THORP, the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield: • that continued reprocessing will make more money for BNFL than any alternative strategy; • that it will provide more employment; • that it will contribute to sustainability through 'recycling' of plutonium and uranium; • that it will bring waste management advantages; and • that the maintenance of good trading relationships with Japan depends on the fulfillment of all existing reprocessing contracts with Japanese utilities. C On the first conviction, THORP' s future cash earning potential, BNFL secured highly favourable 'baseload' contract terms. These were a result of the pressing political needs of its main customer countries and its own substantial market power. These terms included large prepayments towards construction costs- up to £1.9 billion [DM 5.6 billion] - and further payments on delivery of fuel to Sellafield. However, when considering future cash flows, this sunk income should be ignored along with the more obvious category of sunk costs. So, although THORP may have had positive net cash flows to date, what is relevant today is whether future cash flows show net costs to BNFL and, if so, whether alternative strategies can reverse this position.
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