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Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
Browns Ferry; The regulatory failure? (1976)

Auteur	Ford, Kendall, Tye
Datum	juni 1976
Classificatie	3.01.8.21/01 (VS - LOCATIES - BROWNS FERRY)
Voorkant

PREFACE

This is the report of an independent investigation of the accidental fire and 
subsequent safely system malfunctions that occurred at the Tennessee Valley 
Authority's Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant on March 22, 1975. The accident, 
regarded as "probably the most serious commercial nuclear power incident to date" 
(Nucleonics Week, March 27, 1975) revealed a surprising and ominous frailty in 
one of the world's largest nuclear plants: elaborate safety systems installed to control 
major accidents can be rendered inoperative by the very accident they are intended 
to control. The failure of Browns Ferry's critical safety equipment was all the more 
remarkable in light of prior Federal safety reviews and approvals of the plant and of 
its emergency equipment. The question naturally arises as to how a major safety 
problem developed in such a heavily regulated facility. Our investigation uncovered 
government internal files documenting a far-reaching regulatory breakdown 
preceding the Browns Ferry accident. Government records reveal extensive official 
foreknowledge of safety deficiencies in Browns Ferry and show that the plant was 
allowed to operate by Federal safety authorities who had identified but left 
uncorrected the very combination of problems that caused the accident and allowed 
it to develop to major proportions.
Our investigation, carried out over the last 14 months, reviewed the nature and 
sequence of events during the accident; the circumstances, both technical and 
administrative, that gave rise to the accident and precipitated across-the-board 
safety system failures at the plant; and the implications of the accident for the 
U S. nuclear power program.
Basic data about the events at Browns Ferry during the accident have been compiled 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Inspection and Enforcement 
and published on July 25, 1975. This NRC compendium contains detailed 
descriptions of activities at the plant on March 22, 1975 and includes time sequences 
and safety system status reports available from plant records and from the sworn 
statements of persons on the site during that day. It also provides some analysis of 
events and operator actions. Further NRC commentary on the accident is contained 
in testimony presented by several NRC officials before the Congressional Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy in a September 16, 1975 hearing on the fire and in 
the report of a special NRC study group released in February 1976 (the "Hanauer 
Report").

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