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Publicatie Laka-bibliotheek:
Fissile material in South Asia and implications of US-India nuclear deal (2006)

Auteur	Mian, Zayyar, Rajaraman, Ramana
	-
Datum	juli 2006
Classificatie	4.03.0.00/15 (INDIA - ALGEMEEN)
Voorkant

IPFM Review Draft

Summary

The July 2005 US-India joint statement represents a fundamental transformation 
of U.S.-India relations and at the same time a challenge to the disarmament and 
non-proliferation regimes. There is concern that the March 2006 separation plan 
proposed by India for demarcating its military and civilian nuclear facilities may 
allow a potentially rapid expansion of its capacity for fissile material production 
for weapons.

In this analysis, we have assessed fissile material production capabilities in India 
and how they might change as a result of the U.S.-India deal.

India may already have a stockpile of about 500 kg of weapons grade plutonium 
from CIRUS and Dhruva reactors, sufficient for roughly a hundred nuclear warheads. 
Under the deal, India will be able to produce another 45 kg of weapons grade 
plutonium from the CIRUS reactor before it is shut down in 2010. The Dhruva reactor 
will continue to operate and add about 20-25kg/year. A second Dhruva-sized reactor 
that is being considered would add a similar amount each year.

However, the most important potential increase in India's weapons grade plutonium 
production will come from the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR), to be 
completed in 2010, that the deal proposes to place inside the military fence. We have 
estimated that this reactor can produce on the order of 130-140 kg of weapons grade 
plutonium each year, a four-fold increase in India's current production capability.

The deal also enables India to run some of the unsafeguarded power reactors to 
produce weapons grade plutonium. The extent to which this can be done is limited 
by the availability of domestic uranium. We find that an additional 60-100 kg of 
weapons grade plutonium can be produced this way each year.

In all, therefore, the deal will enable India, should it choose to do so, to grow its 
stocks of weapons grade plutonium from the present rate of about 7 weapons worth 
a year to about 40-50 weapons worth a year.

India's stock of 11 tons of reactor-grade plutonium is also being kept out of 
safeguards. This stock is currently increasing at the rate of about two tons/year. 
The reactor grade plutonium may be primarily used to fuel the PFBR and future 
breeder reactors, but is also potentially weapons-useable.

Under the terms of the deal, India's 16 indigenous power reactors, including five 
that are expected to begin operation in 2007-2008, will be divided equally into 
safeguarded, civilian facilities and unsafeguarded military facilities, with a larger 
capacity in the latter: There are another six reactors that India has purchased from 
abroad which are required to be under safeguards. India will be able to import 
uranium for its safeguarded reactors and will have to fuel its military nuclear 
sector using domestic uranium.

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