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Securing the European Supply of 19.75% Enriched Uranium Fuel. Proposed Options (2022)

Auteur	Euratom Supply Agency ESA
	6-01-2-25-17.pdf
Datum	mei 2022
Classificatie	6.01.2.25/17 (URANIUM - VERRIJKING)
Voorkant

Euratom Supply Agency ESA
Securing the European Supply of 19.75% Enriched Uranium Fuel 
PROPOSED OPTIONS
May 2022

REPORT OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON EUROPEAN PRODUCTION OF 19.75% LEU
3RD MANDATE - May 2022

1. Introduction
Research reactors are vital to a number of scientific
disciplines, basic research, materials research, nuclear
physics and life sciences. In addition, they are essential
for nuclear safety in the European Union by testing
existing and future materials under irradiation, for
example for the production of homogenously doped
silicon and urgently needed radioisotopes for industry
and medicine. Thus, neutrons produced in research
reactors not only enable scientific progress, but are
also crucial to the development of technology applications,
production and qualification of materials and
nuclear medicine. Today, the European Union with its
high-performance research reactors (EU-HPRR) and
diversity in nuclear technologies is leading in science
with neutrons and medical radioisotope production.
Traditionally, fuels for the European Union research
reactors and radioisotope production targets have
been manufactured using highly enriched uranium
(HEU), supplied mainly from the USA and Russia.
Over time the supply and use of HEU have become
subject to additional political and administrative constraints,
making the future supplies of HEU uncertain.
For example, a ban on the export of HEU for the exclusive
purpose of production of medical radioisotopes is
in force in the USA since the end of 2021. In addition,
due to the current geopolitical developments, HEU
supplies from Russia become increasingly uncertain.
In order to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation,
EU Member States are strongly committed to the
principle of HEU minimization with the objective of
converting research reactors and radioisotope production
targets to high-assay low-enriched (19.75%)
uranium (HALEU). In line with this political commitment,
existing European Union research reactors
are actively working to achieve this conversion as
soon as technically and economically feasible. Several
European Union research reactors and radioisotope
production facilities have already made
the transition to HALEU successfully, while others
have active conversion projects. HALEU is currently
exclusively supplied from the USA and Russia.
Next to its use in research reactors and for the production
of radioisotopes, HALEU is also gaining attention
for the development of fuel systems for
advanced reactors, such as SMRs and GenIV-type
reactor systems or nuclear-powered space exploration.
With higher enrichment, longer fuel cycles
become possible and fast reactor systems
are more readily deployable. This report however
will not take this potential demand into account.
HALEU supplied from the USA is made by the
down-blending of existing HEU stockpiles, and the
United States (US) Administration anticipates its availability
for research reactors until around 2035-2040.
This dependency on USA and Russia creates a critical
risk to the security of HALEU supply for the needs of the
European Union. In order to ensure the future operation
of research reactors and radioisotope production,
the long-term availability and accessibility of metallic
HALEU is a key issue. No commercial facilities for
HALEU are currently in operation in the EU, or in the US1 .
Maintaining sovereign know-how and rebuilding some
strategic capabilities in the production of HALEU metal
is essential for the European Union for the decades to
come, given the scale of the associated challenges in
the geostrategic, climatic and resource management
fields. In particular, at a time when the European Union
is seeking to guarantee its strategic autonomy in critical
sectors, these capabilities will contribute to European
Union secured supply chains for medical radioisotopes.
Therefore, the European Union must examine alternatives
to ensure the future availability of
such HALEU for its needs. Without any new initiative,
there is a risk for the security of supply
of this critically important material after 2035.