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ROSATOM in the war years of 2023 and 2024 (2025)

Auteur	A.Nikitin, D.Gorchakov, Bellona
	2-34-6-50-14.pdf
Datum	februari 2025
Classificatie	2.34.6.50/14 (RUSLAND - EXPORT / ROSATOM)
Voorkant

ROSATOM in the war years of 2023 and 2024
Main events, projects, decisions, facts and problems
2025, Bellona
Authors: Alexander Nikitin, Dmitry Gorchakov

Forward
If Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom, is to be believed, 2024 was 
a banner year. It is expanding its footprint in new markets in Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East, as well as in Central Asian post-Soviet states. It’s running a 
wide-reaching development program along the Northern Sea Route, the 6,000-kilometer
Arctic shipping corridor uniting Europe and Asia, and is responsible for everything
from nuclear icebreaker construction to port infrastructure along its reach. It’s
powering the mining of rare earth minerals essential for renewable energy and 
electronics in operations from the Kola Peninsula to Siberia. It’s acquiring 
domestic energy firms and making forays into transport, housing and utilities. And,
of course, it’s building nuclear power plants in foreign markets—including in some 
NATO countries—at a pace unmatched by any other country or corporation.
But the slick commercial rhetoric belies the fact that Rosatom is a company that is
literally at war.
As one of the Kremlin’s prize state industries, Rosatom, has since 2022 reoriented 
its practices to align with Moscow’s war economy as the invasion of Ukraine drags 
on. For this, it receives lavish state support and is overseen by members of 
President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. Yet, unlike other energy producers in 
Russia’s oil and gas sectors, Rosatom has more or less managed to sidestep any 
serious sanctions from the West, testifying to the dependence it has fostered on 
the international nuclear market.
Recently, Western markets have begun to challenge Rosatom’s dominance as they 
attempt to shift their dependence away from Russian produced nuclear fuels and 
other technologies. But our new report suggests that Rosatom is preparing for such
shortfalls by shifting who it sells to and expanding its operations into industries 
beyond the nuclear—moves that includes further enmeshing itself in Moscow’s war as 
an active military participant. These are the corporate achievements that are less 
likely to appear in the company’s glossy PR.